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only in relation to other bodies that anybody is somebody.” In the same vein, this dissertation is 
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“making history.” Margot, Jackie, Marc and Colin Diver took the time to read the thesis and 
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 Although I have spent much of my life in academia, I have learned just as much or more 
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like to thank Bob Stacey, Mary Kyle McCurdy, Richard Murphy, Conan Smith, Melanie Piana, 
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 I would not have completed this dissertation without the unflagging encouragement and 
support of Joe Grengs, who has served as my advisor, in both formal and informal capacities, 
since I first entered the University of Michigan’s master of urban planning program ten years 
ago.  His research and teaching on transportation planning and social justice, and his care for his 
students, have been an inspiration and a model. It has also been a great privilege to have Scott 
Campbell, June Manning Thomas, and Matt Lassiter on my committee. There are few scholars 
with more knowledge of regional planning, inequality, and Detroit, and this dissertation is 
particularly indebted to Joe and June’s prior writings on the Motor City. The entire committee 
took time to offer comments and suggestions that have significantly improved the project, while 
showing more than a little patience with my pacing; any errors are, of course, my own. I have 
also learned a great deal from other faculty members in the urban planning program and beyond, 
including Harley Etienne, Robert Fishman, Jonathan Levine, Kim Kinder, Greta Krippner, 
Martin Murray, and Richard Norton. Peggy McCracken and the Humanities Institute at the 
University of Michigan provided a stimulating environment to work and exchange ideas during 
the 2019-2020 academic year.  I also received summer fellowships from the Program for Public 
Scholarship at the University, and my time preparing a small exhibit on the events of July 1967 
was particularly influential. 
 Many thanks are due to the archivists who made this project possible, including the staff 
of the Walter Reuther Library; the Bentley Historical Library; and the Detroit Public Library’s 
Burton Historical Collection. I am enormously grateful to the people who took time to sit with 
me for oral history interviews. It should go without saying that they may not endorse the 
conclusions I draw, but I have tried to present a fair-minded, if necessarily incomplete, account 
of the work to which several of them devoted the greater part of their lives. 
I am indebted to everyone who helped make hundreds of hours and thousands of miles of 
travel between Detroit and Ann Arbor less painful, and often genuinely pleasurable, though 
shared travel and conversation. On the carpool front, that roster includes (among others) Bithia 
Ratnasamy, Eric Dueweke, Irene Brisson, Erika Linenfelser, Ujijji Davis, Anna Skinner, James 
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a half years, two union contract campaigns, and one eight-day strike. I was fortunate to enter the 
program with two cohort-mates, Xiang (Jacob) Yan and Matan Singer, who shared my interest in 
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planet. I am grateful for their friendship, and for that of David Weinreich, Carla Kayanan, 
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Ravitz concluded by thanking his wife Eleanore, who, he wrote, “shared for the usual number of 
years the doctoral degree tensions and difficulties, and gave constant encouragement to offset 
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 My wife, the Reverend Julie Brock, has done the same, over a number of years that 
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we might to understand this universe, and even hope of changing it, such grand aspirations must 
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Scholars of planning and policy have long argued that metropolitan or regional 
institutions for planning and governance are needed to address such problems as urban sprawl, 
central city decline, and inter-jurisdictional segregation and inequality. Yet some form of 
regional planning and governance is already practiced in every major U.S. metro area under the 
auspices of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), which the federal government has 
mandated for roughly half a century. Why have these institutions proved inadequate to remedy 
America’s “metropolitan dilemma” of sprawling, inequitable (sub)urbanization? Are they simply 
too weak?  Have they lacked the political will to challenge this pattern? Or both?  
I examine the question through a historical case study, based in archival research, of the 
Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG), the MPO for the seven-county area 
that includes metropolitan Detroit. I argue that SEMCOG should be understood in the context of 
the political history of twentieth-century Detroit and the trajectory of twentieth-century 
American liberalism. The development of SEMCOG in the wake of the New Deal and World 
War Two reflected broader liberal efforts to harmonize private choice and public planning, and 
municipal autonomy with metropolitan interdependence, in an era of federally sponsored, 
whites-only suburbanization. SEMCOG’s arrested development from the 1970s onward mirrored 
the broader unraveling of postwar American liberalism as the inherent tensions in the project 
became increasingly evident. 
In the twenty years after World War Two, Detroit pioneered the development of regional 
institutions for planning and governance: a Regional Planning Commission (RPC) and a 
Supervisors Inter-County Committee (SICC). These institutions were initially intended not to 
challenge but to facilitate the prevailing patterns of outward development and the proliferation of 
independent suburban communities, both of which placed escalating burdens on the central city 
of Detroit and black Detroiters in particular. 
The RPC and SICC were merged to form SEMCOG just as the political transformations 
wrought by suburbanization, segregation and the African American freedom movement shook 
the foundations of the liberal political order in which regional planning and governance had 
xii 
 
evolved. As metropolitan politics grew increasingly racialized along city-suburb lines, and the 
federal government retreated from regional initiatives, SEMCOG survived the 1970s only by 
vowing to defend local control and eschewing a role in resolving issues of racial segregation and 
inequality, while accommodating the prevailing pattern of sprawl and disinvestment. When 
SEMCOG staff questioned this course, they were forced to back down in the face of opposition 
from the now-dominant suburban growth regime. 
 For advocates of regional planning and governance, there are sobering lessons to be 
drawn from the history of SEMCOG. In Detroit, institutions for regional planning and 
governance have failed to resolve the problems of sprawl and inequality, and in some respects 
exacerbated them, since these institutions are embedded within a larger political system that has 
been dominated by suburban development interests and defenders of racial and economic 
segregation. Although MPOs can help to bring important metropolitan issues before 
policymakers, and structural reform of MPOs could increase their capacity and willingness to do 
so, solving the metropolitan dilemma will ultimately require the development of a new multi-








Walk a few blocks from my home on the near west side of Detroit, to the corner of Wildemere 
and Gladstone, and on a winter’s day, when the snow muffles the movement of sound, you can 
almost imagine you’ve left the city entirely, or perhaps traveled back in time a hundred years and 
more, to an era before the city arrived. Streets and sidewalks where generations of children 
played are silent, and entire blocks where dozens of homes once stood are empty. Listen closely, 
however, and you can hear the faint rush of traffic on nearby expressways; look up, and you may 
see jets passing overhead. The quiet of the surroundings belies the fact that you stand not in a 
nineteenth-century farmer’s field, or at the outer limits of the present-day city, but in the heart of 
a twenty-first century metropolis of over four million people—a hollowed-out heart, where much 
that was solid appears to have melted into air.
1
   
Now get in a car—this is the Motor City, after all—and drive a half-mile to the 
westbound on-ramp of the Jeffries Freeway, officially designated the Rosa Parks Memorial 
Highway and more commonly known as U.S. Interstate 96. Continue for fifty miles: beyond the 
stacked bridges that mark the city limit at Telegraph Road, north across Eight Mile Road into 
Oakland County, past the acres of asphalt that make up the Novi shopping district, and finally 
through an area of lakes and low hills, relics of ancient glaciers, into Livingston County. Exit off 
the freeway halfway between Brighton and Howell at the Latson Road interchange, a $32 million 
construction project completed in 2013.
2
 Head north, past the new cluster of competing retail 
“supercenters,” and on either side of the road, for a mile and more, you can observe the inverse 
of the process unfolding at Wildemere and Gladstone. Home construction here has never  
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 See Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York: Verso, 1983 
[1982]). 
2
 Maria Stuart, “Latson Road Interchange: Crossing Fingers for Kinder, Gentler Development,” The Livingston Post, 
December 1, 2013, https://thelivingstonpost.com/latson-road-interchange-crossing-fingers-for-kinder-gentler-




Figure I.1. Large areas of Detroit have become meadows, like this block in the Dexter-
Linwood area. The shell of an apartment building constructed during the boom years of 
the 1920s stands as a reminder that this was once one of the city’s most densely populated 
neighborhoods. Photo by author, 2020. 
 
 
Figure I.2.“The Meadows,” a new subdivision at the metropolitan fringe near Howell, fifty 
miles to the northwest, nears completion in 2017. Jennifer Timar, “Builders: Livingston 
growing, but is it enough?”Livingston Daily,  June 12, 2017,  accessed October 5, 2020. 
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regained the heights it reached before 2008, but there are still new subdivisions taking shape:  
cul-de-sac after curling cul-de-sac, surrounded by gabled conglomerations of plywood and 
drywall, where two decades ago there was nothing but fields and forests.
3
  
 The disassembly of Detroit and the development of the far metropolitan fringe are two 
sides of the same process. Over the past seventy years, the metropolitan Detroit region has 
become arguably the world’s most dramatic example of the pattern of (de)urbanization that the 
planning scholar Rolf Pendall has termed “sprawl without growth.”
4
 Some analysts refer to 
Detroit and its Rust Belt counterparts as “shrinking cities.” That is true enough with respect to 
population loss in the central city: from 1950 to the present, the population of the Motor City fell 
by nearly two-thirds. Applied to the metropolitan area as a whole, however, the term is 
misleading. The population of the metropolitan area as a whole has not declined: from 1950 to 
1970, it increased by roughly one million, and from 1970 to the present, it has remained 
effectively the same. What has changed is the distribution of population: out of the central city of 
Detroit, and increasingly out of the inner ring of suburbs, into a contiguous swath of suburban 
and exurban growth stretching as much as fifty miles from downtown Detroit, and even beyond 
the tri-county core comprised by Wayne, Oakland and Macomb County. Viewed geographically, 
then, Detroit is less a shrinking city than a spreading city, a great American metropolis that has 
gradually cannibalized itself. 
Detroit is by most measures an extreme case. Yet it is not exceptional among U.S. cities, 
particularly those of the North and Midwest, most of which have lost population since 1950 even 
as their suburbs have proliferated.
5
 “The most significant political, economic, and spatial 
transformation in the postwar United States,” the historian Robert Self has written, “was the  
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 Jennifer Timar, “Builders: Livingston growing, but is it enough?” Livingston Daily, June 12, 2017, 
https://www.livingstondaily.com/story/news/local/community/livingston-county/2017/06/12/builders-livingston-
growing-but-enough/365805001/, accessed October 5, 2020. 
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 Rolf Pendall, “Sprawl Without Growth: The Upstate Paradox,” Brookings Institution Center on Urban and 
Metropolitan Policy, October 2003, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200310_Pendall.pdf, 
accessed October 7, 2020. 
5
 Of the 20 largest U.S. cities in 1950, 14 are less populous today. Six of those 14—Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland, 
Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Buffalo—have experienced population declines of over 50%. The six cities that have 
gained population since 1950 are New York City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Seattle, and Kansas City. 
Notably, Kansas City—the only (arguably) Midwestern city among those six—experienced its peak population in 
1970, likely due to annexation over the prior two decades, and then lost population over the 1970s and 1980s, 




Figure I.3. Population of the seven-county SEMCOG region by county, 1900-2010. (Detroit is 
located in Wayne County.) The focus of this study is the 50-year period between 1945 and 
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Figure I.4. The seven-county Southeast Michigan Council of Governments region, showing 
urbanized areas, 2000. SEMCOG, April 2009, via Daniel Little, “Measuring recession’s 
impact: Michigan,” Understanding Society, December 10, 2009. 
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overdevelopment of suburbs and the underdevelopment of cities.”
6
 This phenomenon has not 
always been viewed as a problem.
7
 For over half a century, however, a variety of observers have 
warned that the twin processes of outward growth and political fragmentation risked 
exacerbating problems of inefficient governance, environmental degradation, and structural 
inequity.
8
 Over the course of the 1990s, sprawl was increasingly cited by environmentalists as 
among the nation’s top environmental problems, and more recently, referencing Gunnar 
Myrdal’s landmark 1944 study of American racism, Matthew Lassiter described “the suburban 





The Metropolitan Dilemma and Metropolitan Planning 
 
The “metropolitan dilemma” that Detroit exemplifies—sprawling, inequitable 
suburbanization  that has continued even in the absence of growth—has deep roots in American 
culture, politics, and economic life. It can be understood as a consequence of the triumph of the 
suburban “bourgeois utopia” as an aesthetic ideal; as a manifestation of discriminatory public 
policy; and as an example of the “creative destruction” wrought by modern capitalism.
 10
 What is 
rarely noted, except in specialized literature on transportation planning, is that in the three 
decades after World War Two, the federal government began to fund and, eventually, to mandate 
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 Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 1. 
7
 Apologists for sprawl and metropolitan fragmentation most often equate these phenomena with the workings of the 
“free market”—a dubious proposition, as this dissertation suggests. See Charles Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64.5 (1956), 416-424, and Robert Bruegmann, Sprawl: A Compact 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
8
 Early writings on these subjects included William H. Whyte, Jr., “Urban Sprawl,” in The Exploding Metropolis 
(Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Company, 1958), 133-156; Charles Abrams, “Housing and the Suburban Milieu,” 
in Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing (New York: Harper, 1955), 137-149; and Robert Wood, 
1400 Governments: The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1961). 
9
Ann Brown et al., Sprawl: The Dark Side of the American Dream (Oakland, CA: Sierra Club, 1998), 
https://vault.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report98/, accessed January 21, 2021. Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: 
Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 323. 
10
 See, among others, Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 
1987); Joe T. Darden, Richard Child Hill, June Thomas and Richard Thomas, Detroit:Race and Uneven 
Development (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1987); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: 
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), and June Manning 
Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer City in Postwar Detroit (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University 
Press, 2013 [1997. For a useful review essay on the Detroit literature, see Kevin Boyle, “The Ruins of Detroit: 
Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City,” Michigan Historical Review 27.1 (2001), 109-127. 
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new structures of regional planning and governance that bridged the city-suburb divide.
11
 From 
the advent of the New Deal, Washington had reshaped urban America in unprecedented ways, as 
federal dollars bankrolled highway development, funded “urban renewal,” and underwrote 
millions of new suburban homes. A small group of critics began to warn that these policies could 
have unforeseen and potentially disastrous consequences in the absence of more careful 
planning, and in a 1961 message to Congress, President Kennedy described the need for “an 
effective and comprehensive planning process in each metropolitan area,” a process that 
recognized “[t]he city and its suburbs [as] interdependent parts of a single community.”
12
 A 
dozen years later, after the passage of a series of laws that culminated with the passage of the 
Federal Highway Act of 1973, the federal government finally began to mandate the existence of 




Why have these metropolitan planning organizations so rarely shaken the American 
pattern of suburban sprawl and deprivation at the urban core, in spite of profound social, 
ecological and economic costs that have been recognized for more than half a century?
14
 Why, 
indeed, have they apparently served to further that pattern, or at least been an accomplice to its 
continuation? And what can be done, in an era when widening inequality and ecological crisis 
cloud the future of all U.S. metropolitan areas, and perhaps the future of human society itself?
15
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 “Regional planning” (and “regional governance”) can sometimes refer to “regions” much larger than individual 
metropolitan areas, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority’s seven-state service area. In this dissertation, I use the 
terms “regional” and “metropolitan” interchangeably. It should be noted that according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 
the seven-county region served by the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG) actually includes 
portions of three separate Census-designated metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs): the Detroit-Warren-Dearborn 
MSA, the Ann Arbor MSA, and the Monroe MSA. Further complicating matters, the Census Bureau also includes 
Lapeer County, which is not part of the SEMCOG region, as part of the Detroit-Warren-Dearborn MSA, rather than 
grouping it with Genessee County.) However, the three “separate” MSAs are relatively integrated as an economic 
and social unit. 
12
 Robert Fishman, “The Death and Life of American Regional Planning,” in Bruce Katz, ed., Reflections on 
Regionalism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 107. 
13
 Mark Solof, “History of Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” New Jersey Transportation Planning Authority, 
Inc., January 1998, 21. 
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 Apologists for sprawl and metropolitan fragmentation do exist, generally equating these phenomena with the 
workings of the “free market”—a dubious proposition, as this dissertation suggests. See Charles Tiebout, “A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64.5 (1956), 416-424, and Robert Bruegmann, 
Sprawl: A Compact History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
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 See, for example, Elise Gould, “Decades of rising economic inequality in the U.S.,” Economic Policy Institute, 
March 27, 2019, https://www.epi.org/publication/decades-of-rising-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s-testimony-
before-the-u-s-house-of-representatives-ways-and-means-committee/, accessed December 28, 2020; Jonathan Watts, 
“We have 12 years to limit climate change catastrophe, warns UN,” The Guardian, October 8, 2018, 
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It is likely that of the nearly five million people who live in the seven-county region 
encompassed by the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG), only a small 
fraction are aware that the agency exists. The same is probably true of most of the nation’s over 
400 MPOs, which typically have a limited public profile. To some extent, this reflects the fact 
that while federal law mandates the existence of MPOs for urbanized areas of more than 50,000 
residents, MPOs are not actually “MPOwered” (as it were) with broad authority to produce 
binding regional plans. In fact, few MPOs have any jurisdiction over land use planning per se, 
which remains the prerogative of local governments.
16
 
MPOs exert the strongest formal authority in the process of transportation planning. In 
order for a metropolitan area to receive the federal funds that are essential for constructing and 
maintaining roads, highways, public transit systems, and other transportation infrastructure, its 
MPO must prepare long-term and short-term transportation plans that list the specific 
transportation projects to be funded. In theory, if an MPO’s governing board were to reject a 
specific transportation project proposed within its jurisdiction—for example, the widening of an 
interstate highway by a state Department of Transportation—that project could not proceed, at 
least not with the federal funding which is vitally necessary for most major transportation 
projects.
17
 Since transportation infrastructures (along with other public infrastructure, 
particularly water and sewer systems) powerfully influence the process of land development, 
MPO planning authority in the transportation arena is a potentially influential mechanism for 
shaping the overall process of regional urbanization. 
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Given that most U.S. metropolitan areas have continued to experience varying degrees of 
outward sprawl and central city disinvestment since the formation of metropolitan planning 
organizations in the 1960s, most MPOs would seem to have been either incapable or unwilling to 
change this pattern of development, or perhaps both. Determining the precise nature of the 
problem—are MPOs too structurally weak, lacking political will, or both?
18
—is a crucial step 
towards formulating solutions. If the problem is “A,” that MPOs lack the authority to shape 
metropolitan growth, planners and policymakers should seek ways to increase their powers. On 
the other hand, if the problem is “B,” that MPOs do wield authority, but have chosen for sprawl 
and metropolitan cannibalization instead, the focus should be primarily on shifting their planning 
agenda. 
 
The Trouble with MPOs: Structural Weakness, or Political Will? 
 
It is possible to interpret A and B as mutually exclusive: if MPOs are in fact furthering 
sprawl (B), it follows that they do influence metropolitan development (A). However, neither 
diagnosis is necessarily an all-or-nothing proposition, and if A and B both hold true to a degree, 
a two-pronged approach is necessary. In that scenario, shifting the substantive agenda of MPOs 
without expanding their ability to actually influence metropolitan development would have little 
effect, and strengthening MPOs without shifting their substantive agenda could stand to 
exacerbate sprawl and disinvestment. Instead, both strategies must be pursued. 
Scholarship on MPOs remains somewhat limited, probably due to their overall obscurity. 
However, researchers have amassed evidence for both type A and type B diagnoses of the 
problem. A useful review of the literature by Gian-Claudia Sciara identifies six specific 
structural shortcomings that together constitute “The Trouble with Contemporary [U.S.] 
Metropolitan Planning.”
19
 Four of these fall under the broad rubric of MPO weakness, or 
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1985), xxi. Theologians and philosophers over the past two millennia have offered a variety of possible rejoinders 
(theodicies) in response to this logic. 
19
 Gian-Claudia Sciara, “Metropolitan Transportation Planning: Lessons From the Past, Institutions for the Future,” 
Journal of the American Planning Association 83.3 (2017), 262-276. 
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diagnosis A:  MPOs’ aforementioned lack of authority over land use; their lack of taxing powers; 
their often weak “organizational capacity,” defined in terms of technical expertise; and, finally, 
the fact that their supposed authority in transportation planning is considerably weaker than it 
can appear on paper, as Kate Lowe has illustrated in case studies of the role of MPOs in transit 
planning in Boston and Miami.
20
 
Sciara also highlights two type “B” issues that, she implies, may bias MPO governing 
boards in favor of highway investment and sprawl: the limited representation those boards 
provide for transit agencies (compared with state highway agencies, for example), and especially 
the over-representation of less populous suburban and exurban areas under the “one government, 
one vote” system (or variations on it) practiced by many MPOs.
21
 A number of scholars have 
cited the inequity of this arrangement as a primary cause, perhaps the primary cause, of MPO 
policies favoring sprawl at the expense of central cities. In the case of SEMCOG, which was 
sued by a coalition of activists in the early 2000s over its system of governance, Joe Grengs 
noted that Livingston County residents enjoyed nearly ten times the representation of Detroit, 
accounting for population, on SEMCOG’s governing board—a level of bias that rivals even that 
of the United States Senate.
22
 Predictably, under-representation of central cities on MPO boards 
is accompanied by under-representation of nonwhite residents of MPO regions.
23
 It makes 
logical sense that such under-representation would generate inequitable policy outcomes and 
further the process of sprawl. That said, fixing the representation problem would not necessarily 
alter planning outcomes. 
 Sciara’s literature review concludes with a call for planners and policymakers to take a 
more optimistic attitude towards MPOs’ latent potential, in spite of their various limitations. 
                                                     
20
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“Seen historically,” she argues, “metropolitan planning has matured significantly,” representing 
“a glass more half full than half empty,” and MPOs can take steps to grow stronger, more 
equitable, and more “relevant” even in the absence of federal legislation to expand their 
authority.  From the vantage point of a city that has half emptied since modern metropolitan 
planning was instituted, this argument may not be altogether reassuring. As noted, if the problem 
is that MPOs are pursuing policies that exacerbate sprawl and central city disinvestment, we 
might not wish to strengthen them at all. Before we can formulate an effective solution to the 
problem of metropolitan planning, we need a better understanding of whether the trouble with 
metropolitan planning organizations is one of institutional weakness, associated with their 
limited federal mandate; misplaced institutional priorities, perhaps associated with inequitable 
systems of representation; or somehow both. 
 
Table 1. What is the trouble with MPOs? 
 
A. “Structural weakness” theory: 
 
MPOs have generally failed to alter 
prevailing patterns of sprawl and 
inequity because they are weak 




Lowe (2014): “[E]xisting government 
arenas [i.e. not MPOs but other, mostly 
–though not necessarily—“non-
regional” actors such as state DOTs, 
counties, and transit agencies] largely 
determine the outputs from MPO 
planning processes,” on account of the 
fact that MPOs have no authority over 





 The federal government 
should grant MPOs more power 
to allocate federal transportation 
funds (Katz, Puentes and 
 
B. “Political will” theory: 
 
MPOs have generally “failed” to 
alter prevailing patterns of sprawl 
and inequity because they have 




Basmajian (2013): “Regional planning 
has been an important factor in 
metropolitan change in the United States 
during the twentieth century but has been 
conspicuously overlooked when 
researchers seek explanations for how 
and why urban change happens.” 
 
Over the thirty-year period from 1970 to 
2000, the Atlanta Regional Commission 
“helped establish a basic set of 
parameters and paths that structured 
future development,” despite the fact that 
it did not wield “despotic power.” Its 
efforts “could be deemed a success by the 
state,” despite the fact that “protecting the 





 State governments could 
enable MPOs with taxing 
authority so that they can 
generate their own revenue. 
[Note: A number of MPO host 
organizations (generally non-
COG structures, such as states, 
cities or county governments) 
already wield this power.] 
 
 
mention, as Bullard et al have 
documented, promoting regional equity, 
though this is not Basmajian’s focus] 
were largely ignored,” as the region and 
state’s political leadership embraced a 





Not discussed extensively, but Basmajian 
writes favorably of the ISTEA reforms of 
the early 1990s and other federal actions 
to emphasize the connection between 
transportation systems, land use, 
sustainability and social equity. He also 
supports the efforts of ARC and Atlanta 
legislators to provide multi-county areas 
with authority to levy regional taxes for 
infrastructure. 
 
It might be asked, however, whether 
these taxes would necessarily advance 
sustainability and equity goals, given the 
history Basmajian describes. Indeed, as 
Basmajian notes, a referendum on such a  
T-SPLOST (Transportation Special-
Purpose Local-Option Sales Tax) was 
resoundingly defeated across the ARC 
region in 2012, in part because it was 
opposed by a range of groups across the 
region and political spectrum, from anti-






B-1. An extension of the “Political Will” 
theory: the “White/Suburban Bias” 
theory. 
 
MPOs have generally “failed” to alter 
prevailing patterns of sprawl and 
inequity because they have 
successfully planned for sprawl and 
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inequity, due to inequitable 
governance structures that under-
represent central cities and people of 
color. 
 
Grengs (2005): “The problem with 
MPOs is that most of them are biased 
against central cities in their voting 
structure.” 
 
Sanchez (2006): “Suburban 
communities [i.e. not central cities] and 
white residents are over-represented in 
current MPO decision-making.” That 
said, proportional representation is not 
necessarily “commensurate with equal 





 The federal government 
should consider decertifying 
MPOs if they do not adopt 
proportionate structures of 
representation. 
 
 State governments should 
require proportionate 
representation on MPO boards. 
 
 Citizens and grassroots 
organizations may consider 
challenges to MPO structure 
under civil rights law, although 
the burden of proof is high. 
 
 
Sciara meta-review of the literature (2017): The “weak MPO theory” and “wayward MPO 
theory” each have validity. MPO deficiencies are rooted in the structural weaknesses of MPOs, 
which are in turn rooted in their history.  MPO structures were grafted onto pre-existing 
structures of transportation planning and funding that had evolved over the prior half-century and 
which continue to retain substantial power. 
 
Structural weaknesses that limit MPOs 




 Limited transportation 
planning authority 
 Lack of authority over land 
use 
 Lack of taxing power 
 Lack of “organizational 
[technical] capacity” 
 
Structural biases that may lead MPOs to favor 
sprawling, inequitable planning include the 
following: 
 
 Lack of proportional representation for local 
governments on MPO boards, favoring suburbs and 
exurbs 
 Lack of representation for transit agencies on many 





 The federal government and state governments should consider granting 
MPOs more discretionary authority in transportation funding and requiring them 
to adopt revised governance structures for greater equity among local 
governments and greater equity among providers of different transportation 
modes. 
 
Question: If MPOs had more discretionary authority in transportation funding, 
would they necessarily deploy it more equitably and sustainably than other actors 
do currently? Do MPOs wield the (admittedly) limited discretionary authority 




 The federal government and state governments should consider recasting 
representation on MPO governing boards, to both (1) ensure greater equity among 
representation of local governments and population and (2) greater equity among 
providers of different transportation modes (e.g. transit agencies as well as 
highway agencies/DOTs). 
 
Question: If formal governance of MPOs was restructured, would this necessarily 
shift MPOs’ substantive policy priorities? Some MPOs already have proportional 
representation; are their plans more equitable and sustainable? Since the early 
2000s, SEMCOG adopted a “dual voting system” that employes both “one-
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government, one-vote,” and a population-weighted vote; has this produced any 




What role have MPOs played in shaping American metropolitan development? 
 
More specifically, given that most U.S. regions have continued to be defined by sprawling, 
inequitable growth over the past fifty years, why has the existence of MPOs not led to 
different outcomes, given the longstanding belief of many planners that metropolitan 
planning is essential to achieving such outcomes? 
 
In considering this question, it is important to note that sprawling growth and inequitable growth 
do not necessarily go hand in hand, although they are generally assumed to accompany one 
another in U.S. regions. 
 
Indeed, it is difficult to identify any U.S. metropolitan region that has not sprawled (defined as 
experiencing disproportionate suburban growth, relative to growth of the central city) over the 
past 50 years. To take one example, the population of suburban Washington County, just west of 
Portland, Oregon, has tripled over the 40 years since Portland’s urban growth boundary was 
adopted. 
 
Nor is it possible to identify any U.S. metro that has truly grown more equitable, although some 
have grown more equitably than others. 
 
In Just Growth, Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor discuss Kansas City, Nashville, Jacksonville, 
and Columbus as metros that “performed relatively well on both growth and equity in the 1980s 
and 1990s.” It is interesting to note that over the same period, growth in all four metros (two of 
which happen to be consolidated city-counties, and two of which are relatively rare instances of 
extensive postwar central city annexation in the Midwest) can also be described as fairly 
sprawling.
26
 By the same token, some of the metro areas most often thought to be less sprawling, 
such as Portland, Oregon, are not necessarily the most equitable. 
 
To conclude: is the “failure” (?) of MPOs to plan more equitable and sustainable 
metropolitan areas a consequence of their structural weakness (“weak MPOs”), misguided 
substantive policy agendas (“wayward MPOs”), and/or, as a variation on the latter, 
inequitable governance structures (“white/suburban bias”), and possibly pro-highway/anti-
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The Case for a Historical-Institutionalist Case Study 
 
Given the diversity of MPO institutional forms and U.S. metropolitan regions, and the 
opacity of the regional planning process, detailed case studies offer the best opportunity for a 
deeper understanding of the role that MPOs actually play in shaping metropolitan development. 
As Lowe emphasizes, that role must be understood in reference to the broader institutional 
context in which MPOs operate.
27
 Furthermore, as Sciara suggests, we must also understand how 
the role of MPOs, in that context, has developed over time, particularly with regard to the “pre-
history” of metropolitan planning: the development of city and state planning mechanisms 
(mostly for transportation planning) in the fifty years before the passage of the 1962 Federal 
Highway Act, which “planted the seeds” for MPOs by mandating a (theoretically) “continual, 
cooperative, and comprehensive” (3C) process of regional transportation planning.
28
    
Over the past several decades, the revival of a “historical institutionalist” school of social 
research has provided useful models for this type of inquiry. Broadly speaking, historical 
institutionalists focus on the development of organizations over time, generally in the context of 
a broad analysis of political economy. While historical institutionalists recognize the power of 
economic interest in the shaping of political institutions, they stress that government institutions 
are not merely mechanisms for class domination, but agents unto themselves: they can act 
autonomously and even structure the forms that politics takes.
29
 In a metropolitan setting, this 
approach suggests that though the city—or region—may indeed tend to function as a “growth 
machine” for a capitalist elite, that machine is not necessarily a well-oiled, smoothly operating 
vehicle reflecting the unified vision of a single team of engineers. Like some of the battered cars 
one sees plying the streets of Detroit neighborhoods, the political structures of the metropolis 
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form an assemblage that has been continuously—sometimes haphazardly—subtracted from and 
added to in the wake of various collisions.
30
 
Given the quantitative orientation of most transportation research, there are relatively few 
case studies of metropolitan planning organizations, and even fewer that examine MPOs over a 
multi-decade time horizon.  Indeed, there is only one book-length study that examines a 
metropolitan planning organization over the course of its lifetime: Carlton Wade Basmajian’s 
study of the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), the metropolitan planning organization for 
that sprawling “New South” metropolis. Basmajian argues that ARC has exerted considerable 
influence over its 50-year history, despite its limited formal authority and relatively low public 
profile. Furthermore, ARC has facilitated the Atlanta region’s spectacular sprawl, offering “a 
sharp contrast to the notion that regional planning necessarily leads to one set of ends [compact 
development, etc.].”
31
 Returning to our previous schematic, then, we can say that on the question 
of what the trouble with MPOs really is, Basmajian tends towards diagnosis B. 
Basmajian’s study is a persuasive challenge to the “received wisdom” regarding the 
virtues of regional planning institutions.
32
 That said, although it may appear at first glance to be a 
history of ARC, this is not the case, as Basmajian explains in his introduction.  The first chapter 
outlines the historical evolution of regional planning in Atlanta, from a 1937 report by University 
of Michigan political scientist and municipal governance consultant Thomas Reed to the 
eventual birth of ARC in 1971.
33
 The rest of the work, however, zeroes in on several specific 
regional planning issues over narrower time horizons that range from one year (planning for the 
Chattahoochee River watershed) to four years (the struggle over the Northern Arc expressway), 
rather than seeking to provide a comprehensive narrative regarding the structure, activities and 
orientation of ARC over time.
34
 Furthermore, although Basmajian draws important connections 
between ARC’s activities and broader political shifts in the metropolitan political landscape—
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such as the rise of black political power in Atlanta and the ascendancy of a new white political 
regime based in the city’s wealthy northern suburbs—he does not attempt a systematic 
assessment of metropolitan political development, and some of the most important actors in 
metropolitan politics are absent from the narrative.
35
 The next logical step in elucidating the 
workings of metropolitan planning organizations, then, is a broader historical study, one that may 
provide less information on the specific planning processes and products that Basmajian details, 
but that offers a more comprehensive sketch of MPO development over time, and places that in 
the context of other transformations in metropolitan politics and governance. 
 
Excavating the Metropolitan Dilemma in Detroit 
 
Although this study addresses a problem in urban and regional planning, it draws heavily 
on prior scholarship in urban and metropolitan history. The “new metropolitan history” has not 
only shed light on the past (and present) of U.S. cities and suburbs; in doing so, it has also 
reshaped the broader historical understanding of American politics in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Among the foundational works in this field (published nearly twenty-five 
years before this writing) was Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit. In meticulous and disturbing fashion, Origins charted the 
deindustrialization of Detroit in the decade after World War Two and the rise of massive white 
resistance to neighborhood racial desegregration in the city, exposing the economic precarity, 
racial inequity and reactionary political ferment in the postwar Motor City and belying its 
popular image as a beacon of working-class affluence and left-liberal strength.
36
 
Sugrue noted that while Detroit was in some respects an extreme case, similar arguments 
could be made about many other U.S. cities. Since then, scores of scholars have taken up that 
challenge. Although suburban development remained largely outside the scope of Sugrue’s 
study, others have labored to extend his analysis to metropolitan regions as a whole, showing 
how urban and suburban politics co-evolved in the separate and unequal landscapes of the 
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postwar years, and ultimately helped give rise to a new bipartisan, ostensibly color-blind politics 
rooted in the maintenance of state-sanctioned suburban separatism.
37
 
The following study of metropolitan planning, governance and power in Detroit, focused 
on the development of SEMCOG and its predecessor institutions, attempts to bring the broader 
insights of metropolitan historians to bear on this specific institutional history. Detroit is a useful 
vantage point into MPO development because for several reasons, all traceable to the Motor 
City’s defining industry, it found itself on the cutting edge of the “metropolitan dilemma.” First, 
the region was a pioneer in pre-World War Two suburban super-highway construction. Second, 
it experienced rapid decentralization of its manufacturing base during the war and the decade that 
followed. Finally, it was a primary destination of the Great Migration of African Americans from 
the South. There is little question that Detroit is an extreme case. Yet on the whole, it is probably 
more typical of most American metropolitan areas, and certainly the older metros of the 
Northeast and Midwest, than the pair most often examined by students of regional planning and 
governance: Portland, Oregon and Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota. Certainly, in the postwar 
period, Detroit’s leaders considered their region a model of the modern multi-jurisdictional 
metropolis, as did the Ford Foundation when it funded the metropolitan planning and governance 
re-organization effort that ultimately produced SEMCOG. 
This history, in tracing the development of regional planning and governance in Detroit 
over five decades, sketches the development of the political infrastructure that has shaped and 
sustained the modern metropolitan dilemma of racial and economic segregation; disinvestment in 
central cities and older suburbs; and sprawl. It is by no means a full accounting of that story, or a 
comprehensive history of SEMCOG. Indeed, one of the reasons that the political economy of 
metropolitan development is so little understood is that so many different units of government 
are involved—ranging from cities and townships to counties and school districts. In particular, in 
focusing on the officially designated institutions for comprehensive, general-purpose regional 
planning and governance, my narrative may tend to under-emphasize the power of the older and 
more influential infrastructural empires—particularly the Detroit Water and Sewer Department, 
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the County Road Commissions, and the State Highway Department—that actually laid the 
groundwork for metropolitan development.
38
 
However, a focus on the formal institutions for regional planning and governance offers 
unique insights into the political economy of metropolitan development in the postwar era, as 
various iterations of the “metropolitan dilemma” came to the fore. In Detroit, such institutions 
originally formed the vanguard of elite efforts to retool the metropolitan political system, after 
growing frustrations with one aspect of what they termed their “metropolitan problem”—the 
difficulty of efficient decision-making in a politically fragmented region. It so happened that 
those efforts bore fruit—the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG)—in 1967-
8, precisely as another problem came to the fore: the metropolitan iteration of the “American 
dilemma” of racial segregation and inequality. As the movements for civil rights and black 
power forced a public reckoning with that problem, which was popularly known as the “urban 
crisis” but might just as easily be described as a suburban or metropolitan one, SEMCOG 
became embroiled in questions of regional redistribution which many of its framers had not 
conceived of addressing. 
SEMCOG managed to survive the political firestorms of the ensuing decade, which saw 
black central city politicians and white suburban leaders rally around their own banners of local 
control. It did so, however, only by relinquishing any notion that it might become a stronger 
metropolitan government, and rejecting the efforts of corporate leaders who sought to centralize 
metropolitan administration in much the same way that municipal governance in Detroit had 
been refashioned fifty years earlier. Two further interpretations of the “metropolitan dilemma” 
came to the fore as suburbanization continued: an ecological interpretation, as environmental 
activists attempted to protect undeveloped land, particularly in Oakland County; and an 
economic-inequality interpretation, as the leaders of older, still largely white suburbs saw their 
communities increasingly cannibalized by growth at the fringe. However, the region’s racial 
divide remained the most salient political division, and as the region’s corporate leadership 
increasingly distanced itself from the central city, SEMCOG’s attempt to lead a regional 
reckoning on the costs of sprawl and inequality was quickly quashed. 
                                                     
38
 For detailed studies of some of these institutions, see Philip J. D’Anieri, “Regional Reform in Historic 
Perspective” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2007) and Dana Kornberg, “The Structural Origins of Territorial 
Stigma,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 40.2 (2016), 1-21. 
21 
 
 My argument proceeds in four chronological chapters. Chapter 1 describes the 
development of SEMCOG’s predecessor organizations, the Regional Planning Commission 
(RPC) and the Supervisors Inter-County Committee (SICC). The chapter begins with an 
overview of how Detroit’s corporate leaders took the wheel of city government in the 1920s and 
laid out a blueprint for a decentralized metropolis geared to the capacities of the automobile, a 
blueprint furthered by federal aid during the New Deal and Second World War. The formal 
authority wielded by the RPC and SICC was limited, as demonstrated by their marginal role in 
several debates over regional infrastructure in the 1950s, but their influence was felt nonetheless: 
they helped to facilitate suburbanization and provided a framework for the suburbs’ budding 
political power in a metropolitan political landscape previously dominated by the city of Detroit. 
Given the exclusive character of suburban development, regional planning for suburbanization 
speeded the exodus of white homeowners from the city and hastened the process of racial and 
economic transition within the city of Detroit. It was an outcome that regional planners ignored; 
focused chiefly on physical planning and suburban development, they treated the condition of the 
central city largely as an afterthought. 
 Chapter 2 describes how the RPC and SICC became SEMCOG. In the early 1960s, 
amidst a national re-examination of the costs of metropolitan growth, the Ford Foundation 
sponsored an effort to strengthen and streamline metropolitan institutions in Detroit, recruiting a 
city manager named Kent Mathewson, who had helped found one of the nation’s first “councils 
of government” in Salem, Oregon, to oversee the effort under the auspices of the Metropolitan 
Fund, a nonprofit organization that Edward Connor had founded. By the early 1960s, the growth 
of suburbia and the incipient decline of central cities had prompted a nationwide reexamination 
of metropolitan governance reform. The ascendance of the Great Society political coalition in 
Washington gave reformers a chance to put theory into practice, and Detroit struck some as an 
ideal candidate for reconstructing metropolitan governance, especially after its increasingly 
powerful black electorate—empowered by white flight to the suburbs—secured the election of 
liberal mayor Jerome Cavanagh. Reflecting the pluralist ideology of the era, the Metropolitan 
Fund had considerable confidence in the model of voluntary regional cooperation that a Council 
of Governments embodied. Although the anticipated policy agenda of the new COG remained 
indeterminate, its backers hoped that by merging regional planning and regional governance in a 
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single institution, and providing direct representation for the city of Detroit, it would facilitate a 
more efficient metropolitan pluralism. 
 Chapter 3 relates how the Detroit rebellion of 1967 and the political upheavals that 
followed brought the region’s longstanding conflicts of race and class to a head and helped 
transform the politics of regional planning and governance. On the one hand, SEMCOG’s 
director initially pledged the organization to helping resolve the region’s racial dilemma. On the 
other, the growing racial polarization between city and suburbs put SEMCOG’s survival in 
question. Many white suburban leaders feared SEMCOG as a tool of the regional redistribution 
and desegregation that liberals had come to advocate, following the precepts of the Kerner 
Report. Detroit’s rising class of black political leaders, meanwhile, was also wary of regional 
governance schemes as threats to their authority, particularly after Coleman Young won election 
as Detroit Mayor in 1973. SEMCOG managed to survive, but given its weak institutional basis, it 
could do so only by avoiding controversy. Frustrated by SEMCOG’s lack of action, and perhaps 
unmindful of the degree to which the political landscape had been transformed over the previous 
ten years, the Metropolitan Fund attempted to bypass its own creation by advocating a stronger 
regional government, a proposal that failed spectacularly after managing to unite SEMCOG’s 
members in mutual defense of local control. 
 Chapter 4 explains the implications of SEMCOG’s weak institutional structure over its 
first quarter-century, despite the limited authority granted to SEMCOG and other metropolitan 
planning organizations by federal policy. It also suggests the profound influence of metropolitan 
racial segregation on what Margaret Weir has called the “calculus of coalitions” for preventing 
suburban sprawl and urban disinvestment. Although local campaigns for land preservation in 
Oakland County won several victories in the 1970s, these campaigns did not focus on SEMCOG, 
which tended to ratify decisions made by more powerful bodies such as the counties and the 
state. In the late 1980s, however, inspired by opposition to a proposed mega-mall in the outer 
suburbs, longtime SEMCOG director John Amberger and his staff embarked on a project they 
called the Regional Development Initiative, producing a report that linked sprawl to racial 
segregation and inequality and provided recommendations for countering both. The effort ran 
headlong into the Oakland County suburban growth machine that decades of regional planning 
had helped to foster, and that was now—along with race and class segregation—the region’s 
most powerful political force. The Oakland County Board of Commissioners condemned the 
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report, threatening to pull out of SEMCOG and nearly costing Amberger his job. The Regional 
Development Initiative’s recommendations helped raise awareness regarding inter-jurisdictional 
inequalities, and may have contributed to ensuing reforms of Michigan’s school funding system, 
but a more fundamental resolution of the “metropolitan dilemma” proved elusive. Two years 
later, the outspoken anti-busing leader, “law and order” prosecutor and self-described “sprawler” 
L. Brooks Patterson won election as Oakland County Executive. His 26-year reign as the 
region’s most influential elected official marked the triumph of the politics of segregation and 
fringe development at the expense of older communities, most of all Patterson’s native Detroit, 
but increasingly including inner-ring suburbs and satellite cities like Pontiac. 
 Looking backward from the perspective of 2021, the trajectory of metropolitan planning 
and governance in greater Detroit can seem vastly over-determined. In telling this story, 
however, I have tried to avoid what E.P. Thompson called “the enormous condescension of 
posterity.”
39
 The individuals who people this story believed that alternate futures were possible 
through their actions—regardless of whether we, today, are confident that such alternatives 
would necessarily have been better than our present.
40
 History may be most valuable when it 
sheds light on the possibility of paths not taken, even if it is also more tragic.
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Figure I.5. Regional planning and governance in metropolitan Detroit, 1945-1995. 
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Chapter 1: Politics and Planning in the Exploding Metropolis 
 
In 1958, the urbanist William H. Whyte and the editors of Fortune magazine published a volume 
of articles on American cities titled The Exploding Metropolis. In the “centrifugal movement” to 
the suburbs, a phenomenon Whyte termed “urban sprawl,” the authors observed that “the city has 
been losing some of its traditional strength as a unifying element of the region.”
1
 Few places 
exemplified this phenomenon better than Detroit, whose automotive industry had helped make 
mass suburbanization possible. 
Detroit’s last annexations of land had occurred in 1926, but in 1940 the city still 
accounted for nearly three-fourths of the population of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb County. In 
the two decades that followed, the city-suburb balance shifted dramatically. By 1960, more than 
half of the region’s approximately 4 million people lived outside the central city, and the Motor 
City’s population registered a slight decline from its 1950 peak. The economic life of the region 
was suburbanizing too. Detroit’s automakers abandoned central city factories for modern plants 
in the suburbs, and downtown Detroit’s central business district ebbed as new shopping malls—
enticing shoppers with abundant parking—took shape just beyond the city limits. 
Detroit’s postwar suburbanization had been enabled by the automobile, but it had been 
driven by public policy dating back decades to the close of World War One, when the Motor 
City’s automobile executives took control of city government and laid out a vision for a 
centrifugal city: a low-density metropolis built around a network of modern super-highways. In 
the wake of the New Deal and World War Two, this centrifugal city became an increasingly 
segregated one, as government policy and violent neighborhood resistance confined Detroit’s 
growing black population to the older sections of the central city. 
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Figure 1.1. Detroit and suburban Detroit population, 1900-1960. Population growth in the 
suburbs began to outpace the city in the Thirties. By 1960, a majority of the region’s people 
lived outside Detroit. U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
As independent suburbs burgeoned in the postwar era, Detroit’s political and corporate 
leaders pioneered the development of general-purpose institutions, encompassing city and 
suburbs, for regional planning and governance. In 1947, they created the Detroit Metropolitan 
Area Regional Planning Commission (RPC), the first public regional planning agency in a major 
American metropolitan area. In 1954, county leaders founded the Supervisors Inter-County 
Committee, the first permanent metropolitan inter-governmental council in the United States. 
In the age of the exploding metropolis, Detroit could claim to be at the forefront of 
national efforts to adapt metropolitan systems for planning and governance, establishing new 
regional institutions to fulfill roles that had historically been the province of the central city 
alone. To be sure, these institutions were weak and limited in scope, and they were not intended 
to redress the growing imbalance between city and suburbs. Indeed, they largely served to 
facilitate suburbanization: the suburbanization of Detroit’s white population and economic life. 
The long-term costs of the metropolitan explosion they left for future generations to gauge.  
 
Blueprint for a Centrifugal City 
 
Detroit’s transformation into a decentralized, automobile-oriented metropolis began in 
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Detroit’s city government and re-engineered it as a vehicle for their interests. In 1918, the Detroit 
Citizens League—an elite group founded by Cadillac president Henry Leland—convinced voters 
to approve a sweeping overhaul of city government. The new city charter centralized municipal 
government, putting all city departments under direct control of the mayor, and substituted a 
nine-member “Common Council,” elected “at large” from across the city, for the thirty-six 
member, ward-based city council that had preceded it.
2
 The first elections conducted under the 
new charter, in November 1918, also transformed who was in charge of Detroit’s municipal 
machinery. The Citizens League’s candidates for the new Common Council swept to victory 
over a labor slate backed by the Detroit Federation of Labor. The majoritarian orientation of at-
large elections had a particularly dramatic effect. The new system effectively wiped out 
representation for Detroit’s immigrant communities in city government. At a time when one in 
three Detroiters was a first-generation immigrant to the United States, the new Council was 
entirely native-born, and eight of the nine were businessmen.
3
 
The League’s candidate failed to win the race for Mayor. But the victor, James Couzens, 
was no stranger to Detroit’s automotive elite. Couzens had served as general manager for Ford 
Motor Company, where he helped Henry Ford hatch the Five-Dollar-Day, before resigning in 
exasperation with his boss’s egotism.
4
 As a candidate for Mayor, Couzens planted himself in the 
populist tradition of the late Mayor Hazen Pingree by calling for public ownership of the Detroit 
United Railway, Detroit’s privately owned streetcar monopoly. Like Pingree, Couzens staged an 
act of civil disobedience by boarding a streetcar and refusing to pay fare, which the DUR had 
just raised to six cents.
5
 The stunt spurred hundreds of copycat actions and helped give Couzens 
a landslide victory on Election Day.
6
 Despite Couzens’ willingness to antagonize his fellow 
businessmen on occasion, as Mayor he took steps to involve them in directing Detroit’s growth. 
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Soon after taking office, Couzens summoned 250 local executives and public officials to a 




From 1910 to 1920, the city’s population had doubled to almost one million, and a series 
of annexations had nearly doubled its physical extent. Until 1915, the city’s northernmost 
neighborhood had been the Boston-Edison district, where Couzens and other executives built 
their mansions four miles from downtown Detroit. After the annexations, Detroit surrounded the 
independent factory towns of Highland Park and Hamtramck, home to the Ford and Dodge 
assembly lines. It stretched beyond the industrial belt of the Detroit Terminal Railroad, and north 
along Woodward Avenue, where the Wayne County Road Commission had laid the world’s first 
mile of concrete highway in 1909, all the way to the County’s boundary at Eight Mile Road. The 
city government now faced the challenge of providing for the development of this area.
8
 
With voter approval, the City issued $37 million in bonds—nearly half a billion in 2019 
dollars—for the public utilities that would help developers to transform fields and orchards into 
factories and homes. Over Mayor Couzens’ four-year term, he oversaw the construction of 100 
miles of sewer mains, 200 miles of lateral sewers, and 170 miles of roads.
9
 Yet this was just the 
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Figure 1.2a and 1.2b.  Architects of Detroit’s 1920s expansion: former Ford executive and 
Detroit Mayor James Couzens, “A Big Business Man for a Big Business Job,”  and 
former Packard executive Colonel Sidney Waldon, chair of the Rapid Transit Commission. 




beginning. Before leaving office, Couzens appointed a Rapid Transit Commission chaired by 
former Packard executive Colonel Sidney Waldon. It was the Rapid Transit Commission’s 1925 
plan which set forth a radical vision for a decentralized city built around the car. 
Waldon understood that the automobile was already revolutionizing the process of urban 
growth. “The automobile has become the pioneer in the development of otherwise inaccessible 
places,” he stated. “It is the greatest distributor of land values that the world has ever seen.”
10
 
The Rapid Transit Commission’s plan projected that Detroit’s outward sprawl would continue 
for generations to come. “In 1950 the city will probably extend out 11 miles from the present 
center,” it predicted. By the year 2000, it would extend 15 miles out, for a total area of more than 
400 square miles: nearly four times the city’s extent in 1924.
11
 
By 1925, the outer portions of Detroit’s major radial roads—Woodward, Gratiot, Grand River, 
and Michigan Avenues—were already being expanded to 204 feet in width. Grand River, 
Woodward and Gratiot spanned the Eight Mile Road boundary between Wayne County and 
Oakland and Macomb County to the north; with that in mind, a 1925 act of the Michigan 
Legislature had enabled adjacent counties to form joint Super-Highway Commissions for the 
purpose of acquiring right-of-way.
12
 The Rapid Transit Commission’s master plan proposed to 
extend these 204-foot super-highways and 120-foot “major thoroughfares” into the heart of the 
city. “Population follows transportation,” the plan noted. “Conversely, transportation must be 
supplied to induce population.” The plan, proclaimed the Commission, without modesty but not 
without reason, “will become the real basis of the City Plan for Greater Detroit.”
13
 
The Master Plan had not assumed that the automobile would serve the transportation 
needs of all Detroiters.  Although automobile registrations in Detroit had skyrocketed, most of 
Detroit’s factory workers could not yet afford to purchase the vehicles they built. As of 1929, 
only one in three Ford workers owned their own cars. The rest, if they did not live within 
walking distance of their factories, relied on the streetcar system that Mayor Couzens had finally 
brought into public ownership as the Detroit Department of Street Railways.
 14
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Figure 1.3. The Rapid Transit Commission’s blueprint for a centrifugal city. In “Rapid 
Transit System for the City of Detroit,” City of Detroit Rapid Transit Commission, August 




Yet as the city grew, the slow-moving streetcars of the DSR strained at the task of 
transporting Detroit’s working class. A five-mile radius, the Rapid Transit Commission stated, 
was “the limit of satisfactory street car service.” As Detroit’s automakers relocated to huge new 
plants at the edge of town, like Ford’s River Rouge facility, their employees spent as much as an 




The RTC urged construction of a modern rapid transit system, consisting of subways and 
surface rail lines, separated from street traffic, which would speed workers to outlying factories. 
Yet the RTC and the Citizens League failed to convince a majority of Detroit voters to approve 
their subway proposals. The last major ballot effort for a subway, in 1929, met a resounding 
defeat at the hands of a coalition of outlying homeowners’ organizations, whose middle-class 
members had no desire to pay higher taxes for a subway they viewed as a public subsidy for elite 
business interests.
16
 “If downtown merchants and outside-the-city-limits manufacturers desire 
special transit advantages,” wrote one resident in a letter to the Detroit News, “it is high time for 
them to club together, become philanthropic, and make a present to the city of a model unit of a 
rapid transit system.”
17
 Rapid transit in Detroit would move forward on rubber, not rails, and as 
the Roaring Twenties drew to a close, Colonel Waldon vacated his Boston-Edison home for a 




The Great Depression brought the Motor City to a near standstill. By August of 1930, 
Detroit’s factories had cut their workforce in half, giving the city the nation’s highest rate of 
unemployment. Several automakers loaned their buildings to the City for use as temporary 
shelters for the homeless.
 19
 Housing development ground to a halt, as did new public works.
20
 
The City of Detroit, barely able to make payroll, experimented with turning off half the 
                                                     
15
 Davis, Donald F., “The City Remodeled: The Limits of Automotive Industry Leadership in Detroit, 1910-1929,” 
in Histoire Sociale - Social History XIII (26), 473. 
16
 Jones, Howard P., “Barber Shop Opinion and Rapid Transit in Detroit,” National Municipal Review 18 (June 
1929). 
17
 “Transit Ideas Fill Letter Box,” Detroit News, March 31, 1929, 2. 
18
 “Automobile Pioneers of the Historic Boston-Edison District,” Boston-Edison Historic District Association, 
https://www.historicbostonedison.org/Significant-Residents-of-BE#auto, accessed April 20, 2020. 
19
 Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 201, 273. 
Streetcar ridership also fell by half between 1929 and 1933, suggesting the close link between factory employment 
and streetcar ridership. Fine, 247. 
20
 Fine, Frank Murphy: The Detroit Years, 247. 
32 
 




 Detroit Mayor Frank Murphy, a populist swept into office by working-class voters in 
1930, convened fellow big-city mayors for a conference in Detroit to plead for federal aid. Even 
President Hoover acceded to some of their demands, signing off on an “Emergency Relief and 
Construction Act” that included substantial funding for public works.
22
 Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal would bring more. By the close of the Thirties, the city had put the funds to work and 
accomplished the formidable task of widening its radial avenues to ease traffic congestion, a 
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Figure 1.4.  Widening of Woodward Avenue, 1936, looking south towards downtown 
Detroit. St. John’s Episcopal Church (foreground) has been shifted sixty feet to the left to 




process that began with the demolition of all the structures on one side of each thoroughfare. 
Woodward Avenue was a special challenge: north of the downtown area, a series of gracious 
houses of worship fronted Detroit’s main street. City planner Walter Blucher solved the church 
problem by, in his own words, “cutting chunks off the front” of each sanctuary. For this, he 
recalled decades later, “I was consigned to hell at least once a week,” but in Detroit, even the 




The Home Front 
 
 By the close of the Thirties, Detroit was humming again, and the fledgling United Auto 
Workers was delivering on its pledge to “make Detroit a union town” by organizing workers for 
shop-floor solidarity. At the same time that federal policy helped to unite workers in the 
factories, however, it reinforced divisions at the neighborhood level. In 1939, as the drumbeat of 
war accelerated in Europe, the appraisal department of Franklin Roosevelt’s Home Owners Loan  
Corporation completed an exhaustive neighborhood-by-neighborhood assessment of housing in 
Detroit. Created in Roosevelt’s First Hundred Days to save homeowners from foreclosure, the 
HOLC provided refinancing assistance for one in ten of the nation’s homeowners in its first two 
years of operation. To determine who would be eligible for a loan, the HOLC prepared 
“Residential Security Maps” for every major city in the nation.
24
 
The street map the HOLC used as the base map for their assessment, prepared by Hearne 
Brothers of Detroit, showed that in spite of the lost years of the Depression, the urbanized area of 
the region was already approaching the limits of the 10-mile circle the Rapid Transit 
Commission had plotted for 1950. Some of the outlying neighborhoods within the city limit had 
not yet been built up, but the great majority had. In Oakland County, a huge area along 
Woodward Avenue stretching north to Fifteen Mile Road had already been laid out with streets, 
although owing to the Depression, much of this expanse was still “very sparsely settled.” 
As defined by the nation’s realtors, “residential security” had as much or more to do with the 
kind of people in a neighborhood as the condition of the neighborhood’s physical structures. The 
HOLC systematized their practices nationwide. On the standardized form they completed 
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Figure 1.5. Home Owners Loan Corporation residential security map of greater Detroit, 1939.  
Robert K. Nelson et al., “Mapping Inequality,” American Panorama, ed. Robert K. Nelson and 





for each neighborhood, assessors began by noting the characteristics of its people, including their 
“class and occupation;” the percentage of “foreign families;” the presence or absence of “Negro” 
settlement; and any “shifting or infiltration.” They then proceeded to assess the condition and 
market value of the neighborhood’s housing stock, and concluded by assigning it one of four 
grades, from A to D, marked on the map in bright colors: green, blue, yellow, and red. 
The HOLC map for Detroit offered a vivid portrayal of the centrifugal city’s rapidly 
changing pattern of settlement. Nearly every neighborhood within the three-mile circle of Grand 
Boulevard was colored red, or “Hazardous.” The assessors’ descriptions cited vacancy, 
vandalism, and the presence of industry, but most of all the “grade of residents.” East of 
Woodward Avenue, a “slum area” stretching north to the Boulevard was inhabited almost 
entirely by “Negroes.”
25
 To the west of downtown, the assessors noted the Corktown area near 




Beyond the Boulevard, most neighborhoods were colored yellow: Grade C, for 
“Definitely Declining.” This description encompassed most of the area that had been built up in 
the boom years of the 1910s and 1920s, a section that included single-family homes of all sizes, 
two-family and four-family flats, and handsome apartment buildings on the larger thoroughfares. 
Even the Boston-Edison district, where Couzens, Waldon and other automobile barons had built 
their mansions a quarter-century earlier, received a grade of C. “Better element moving out,” the 




The “better element” of Detroit now made their homes in a band of exclusive 
neighborhoods towards the outer limits of the central city. The names of these neighborhoods—
Palmer Woods, Sherwood Forest, Rosedale Park—advertised their remove from the clamor of 
Detroit’s industry. Their curving tree-lined streets suggested a quiet country setting, even as the 
great radial highways nearby provided convenient access to downtown offices and distant 
factories. The HOLC assessors favorably cited the “highly restricted,” “homogeneous” character 
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of these neighborhoods, whose residents consisted of as much as 98% native-born Americans, if 
the assessments are to be believed.
28
 
The HOLC map also charted a growing constellation of suburban development radiating 
beyond the Detroit city limits, largely along the super-highways that the Inter-County Highway 
Commissions had laid out over a decade earlier. These suburban neighborhoods, many platted 
but only partially built up, spanned all four categories of the HOLC code. The community of 
Inkster along Michigan Avenue, populated mostly by workers at the Ford Rouge plant who were 
barred from living in all-white Dearborn, was “occupied almost entirely by Negroes” and 
characterized by “garage type houses,” mostly without the benefit of sewer service. “There is 
little future for an area as poorly built as this one,” the assessors concluded, rating the area fourth 
grade.
29
 The all-white (increasingly Polish) community of Hazel Park in Oakland County, with 
unpaved streets and “scattered poor houses,” was “convenient to the Chevrolet plant for 
employment” but suffered from infrequent (every half hour) bus service on its main thoroughfare 
of John R Street.
30
 Other suburban communities were among the most exclusive in the 
metropolitan area, few more so than the Grosse Pointe towns along Lake St. Clair to the city’s 
east. Grosse Pointe Shores, zoned entirely residential, and consisting entirely of native-born 
Americans, was considered “the most exclusive in the entire Detroit area.”
31
 Several new 
communities in Oakland County also showed promise, like a new residential section of the 
village of Birmingham. Though nine miles north of the Detroit city limit, it was located along the 
Woodward Avenue superhighway, and the assessors noted that its residents could reach 
downtown Detroit in 40 minutes on the Grand Trunk Railroad’s commuter trains.
32
 
By opening the path to homeownership for millions of middle-class and working-class 
Americans, while conditioning mortgage lending on neighborhood segregation, the federal 
government underwrote the expansion of all-white suburbs and set the stage for the 
transformation of Detroit politics in the 1940s. Local politics in the nation’s most prominent 
bastion of industrial unionism would increasingly revolve not around the vision of working-class 
solidarity but the defense of neighborhood racial segregation. Edward Connor, a former New 
Deal official and housing advocate who would become Detroit’s most prominent advocate of 
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metropolitan planning, bore firsthand witness to the rise of the politics of the racialized “home 
front.”  
 
The U.S. mobilization for World War Two brought the Motor City roaring back to life. It 
also helped redraw the map of the metropolitan region. Well before Pearl Harbor, bulldozers 
were clearing the way for a series of suburban military plants that would begin to redraw 
Detroit’s industrial geography. By January 1941, the steel skeleton of the U.S. Army Tank 
Arsenal had taken shape in a snowy field in Warren Township, north of the Detroit city limit 
along the Grand Trunk Railroad in southern Macomb County.
33
 That month, the Navy awarded a 
contract to Hudson Motor Car Company to build a gun component factory in nearby Center 
Line.
34
 In April, workers broke ground for the Ford Motor Company’s B-24 bomber plant near 




 As migrants streamed into Detroit seeking work, the city suffered an extreme shortage of 
housing. No one was more affected than Detroit’s fast-growing black community, which made 
up nearly ten percent of Detroit’s population by 1940 but remained largely confined to the city’s 
inner east side ghetto.
36
 In 1941, the federal government proposed a two-hundred-unit housing 
complex for black occupancy, the Sojourner Truth Homes, in the Seven Mile-Fenelon 
neighborhood on Detroit’s northeast side. While the site was adjacent to the middle-class black 
enclave of Conant Gardens, much of the surrounding area was white—predominantly Polish. 
The proposal sparked vociferous opposition, especially in light of the Federal Housing 
Administration’s decision to cease issuing mortgage loans to homeowners in the area in the 
aftermath of the decision to build public housing there.
37
   
 The Sojourner Truth proposal inaugurated a protracted battle over segregation and public 
housing in Detroit that would outlast U.S. involvement in World War Two. Leading the charge 
for black occupancy at Sojourner Truth was a coalition of white liberals and leftists, including  
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Housing Commission director and then Councilman George Edwards, and Detroit’s black 
political leadership, a coalition staffed by a young labor activist named Coleman Alexander 
Young.
38
 On the other side were white Detroit homeowners. It was not an equal contest. As 
Edwards wrote: 
The Negroes have all logic, decency, civilization and ethics on their side. The 
whites have a simple argument “We don’t want Niggers living near us” and 
probably a majority of Detroit citizens on theirs.
39
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Figure 1.6.  Black tenants of the Sojourner Truth Homes, flanked by Detroit police, flee a 






Move-in day—February 28, 1942—turned into a melee as white mobs attacked the black tenants. 
Detroit’s Mayor Jeffries was a liberal who had supported black occupancy for Sojourner Truth, 
but in the aftermath of the riots, he and Housing Commission Director Josephine Gomon put 
forward a policy that in future, no public housing project would change “the racial pattern of a 




 Edward Connor, who in the two decades that followed would do more than any other 
politician to chart a course for metropolitan governance in Detroit, arrived in the Motor City in 
1943, at a time when racial tension in the city had reached fever pitch. The Sojourner Truth 
housing battle paled in comparison to the terrible riots of 1943, which left thirty-four people 
dead. 17 of the victims—all black—had been shot dead by Detroit police.
41
 Born in Chicago and 
educated at Notre Dame, Connor had spent nearly a decade as a New Deal official, serving the 
Works Progress Administration and the Federal Works Agency.
42
 He came to Detroit to accept 
the directorship of the Citizens Housing & Planning Council, a local reform group focused on 
“slum clearance” and public housing. Founded in 1937 and composed primarily of professionals 
in related fields, the CHPC billed itself as the “VOICE OF THE INARTICULATE,” an advocate 
for the thousands of Detroiters living in substandard housing.
43
 Its members viewed the problem 
as essentially one of improper planning, although the CHPC singled out Detroit’s black “slum” 
areas for special attention.
44
 However, Connor soon found that Detroit’s housing problem could 
not be easily disentangled from the politics of racial segregation. 
“A serious housing crisis exists in the Metropolitan Detroit area,” Connor told the Detroit 
Free Press in January 1945. “The shortage is particularly acute for Negroes.” This posed both a 
“health menace” and “an increasing handicap to vital war production.” To address the crisis, the 
CHPC urged the development of additional “Negro housing,” arguing that there were 16 
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potential sites “which meet local policy in regard to not disturbing the racial compositions of 
neighborhoods.”
45
 Like other liberals, given the depth of white resistance to neighborhood 
desegregation, Connor was willing to accept segregated housing for blacks over no housing at 
all.
46
 As with the Sojourner Truth Homes, however, white neighborhood groups opposed new 
housing projects for black Detroiters even when they were located adjacent to existing areas of 
black settlement. 
Of the 16 sites identified by the CHPC, the Detroit Housing Commission came to focus 
its efforts for a new black housing project on a location near Oakwood Avenue on Detroit’s far 
southwest side, where the Federal Housing Administration had already approved a small black 
subdivision in 1944. Yet this proposal met massive resistance from the adjacent neighborhood, 
composed mostly of first and second-generation immigrants who loudly asserted their “white” 
identity and their “right” to an all-white neighborhood in hundreds of letters to the Detroit 
Common Council. The Council held its first hearing on the proposal on March 9, 1945. The 
Detroit Police directed most supporters of the proposal to stay home “in order to prevent possible 
racial disturbances,” but Connor and a small group of liberals, including clergy and a 




They were outnumbered. A crowd of thousands had descended on Detroit’s City Hall. 
Louis J. Borolo, a local olive oil distributor and president of the Oakwood Blue Jackets, told 
Council members that they owed it to the men fighting overseas to preserve segregation at home. 
“There are 1,500 blue stars in the windows of homes of that neighborhood,” he said. “Those stars 
represent soldiers waiting to come back to the same neighborhood they left.” Borolo assured 
Council that he was not arguing against black Detroiters’ right to decent housing, only that the 
residents’ right to an all-white neighborhood came first. “There are a great body of respectable 
hard-working Negroes,” he said. “We respect their rights,” Borolo claimed—but, he added, “we 
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 In the years that followed, Connor witnessed the transformation of Detroit politics as the 
“defense” of all-white neighborhoods eclipsed other issues in local government. Mayor Jeffries, 
who had previously run as “Mayor of all the people,” won re-election against a left-wing 
challenger in the fall of 1945 on a platform opposing “mixed housing.” Journalist Henry Lee 
Moon, writing in the NAACP magazine Crisis, charged that Jeffries had taken up the cause of 
“our more refined fascists, the big money interests, and the precarious middle class whose sole 
inalienable possession is a white skin.”
 49
 
In 1948, when a seat opened on Common Council, Connor decided to enter the fray of 
Detroit politics himself. Connor’s work with the CHPC had positioned him well for the 
campaign. The organization’s board of directors included a who’s who of Detroit’s leading 
liberals, including Victor Reuther of the United Auto Workers; George Schermer, director of the 
Mayor’s Inter-Racial Committee; “labor priest” Father Raymond Clancy; retired rabbi Leo 
Franklin; and Louis Martin, publisher of the Michigan Chronicle, Detroit’s largest black 
newspaper.
50
 Connor’s bid for Council received support from the fledgling Detroit chapter of 
Americans for Democratic Action and an inter-racial Committee of 101 Women,
51
 and he won 
with the most votes of any council candidate in Detroit history.
52
 Yet the following year’s 
election extinguished any hopes Connor might have had of reversing Detroit’s lurch to the right. 
The 1949 mayoral contest pitted former Burroughs Corporation executive and longtime 
City Treasurer Albert Cobo against Connor’s leading liberal colleague on Council, George 
Edwards, who had worked to ensure black occupancy of the Sojourner Truth Homes as Detroit 
Housing Commissioner eight years earlier. Despite an unprecedented campaign push for 
Edwards by the UAW and the Democratic Party, Cobo swept to victory, winning 45% of the 
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vote in a four-way primary contest and 60% in the general election.
53
As one organizer explained 
in a postmortem meeting, “George was beaten by the housing program.” Doubling down on 
Jeffries’ race-baiting strategy, Cobo had pledged to oppose “Negro invasion” of all-white 
neighborhoods.
54
 He won every white precinct in the city.
55
 Racial segregation, not class 
solidarity, had become the axis around which Detroit politics revolved. 
 As Mayor, Cobo enthusiastically carried out the program of “slum clearance” that the 
CHPC had urged under Connor—while largely rejecting the other component of the CHPC’s 
program, the construction of new public housing. Among Cobo’s first actions as mayor was to 
veto eight of twelve proposed public housing sites, most of them at the city’s outer edge.
56
 
Meanwhile, armed with federal “urban renewal” funds, the city forged ahead with the “Detroit 
Plan,” a proposal for the clearance and redevelopment of the Black Bottom area—one hundred 
acres of the city’s most densely populated area—first developed under Mayor Jeffries. Evictions 
began in 1950, even as housing advocates protested that without more public housing 
construction, the “slum clearance” they had advocated would only exacerbate the housing crisis 
for black Detroiters. “With no decent place to move,” one predicted, “9,000 people are going to 
have to crowd into already overpopulated old houses and shacks.”
57
 
    
Figure 1.7a and 1.7b. Adversaries in City Hall: Edward Connor (left, 1951), and Mayor 
Albert Cobo (right, 1956), pictured at Detroit’s first expressway interchange. Detroit Free 
Press and Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University. 
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 With the support of Democratic Governor G. Mennen Williams, Cobo also prevailed on 
the Michigan Legislature to permit the city, county and state to issue thirty-year revenue bonds, 
based on anticipated gas tax collections, in order to finance expressway construction. The war 
effort had given rise to Detroit’s first limited-access expressways: the Davison Expressway, an 
east-west trench dug through Highland Park, and the Willow Run Expressway, a suburban 
umbilical cord linking the Willow Run bomber plant to Ford’s River Rouge complex in 
Dearborn. The new revenue bonds enabled Cobo to accelerate the city’s extension of the 
expressway network, bringing the Willow Run expressway (later the Edsel Ford) east across the 
city of Detroit and building a new expressway, named for former Mayor John C. Lodge, that 
speeded travel between the downtown business district and the wealthy residential areas of 
northwest Detroit. The expressways, too—dubbed “Cobo’s canyons”—disproportionately 
displaced black Detroiters. Although the Lodge mostly traversed white areas of the city, the Ford 
slashed across the black West Side enclave near Grand River and Warren Avenue, a haven of 
middle-class prosperity.
58
 Worse was yet to come: the proposed Hastings-Oakland Expressway, 
still in the planning stages in 1950, was slated to eliminate the Hastings Street commercial 
district, heart of the Paradise Valley area.
59
 
 The effects of “urban renewal” on Detroit’s black community were profound. Coleman 
Young, who had been raised in Black Bottom and helped lead the fight for black occupancy at 
the Sojourner Truth Homes, reflected on the destruction many decades later: 
My father’s tailor shop was plowed under in 1950. Maben’s barbershop bit the 
dust a little while later. Ours was the first neighborhood to be eliminated, with 
long stretches of stores and houses being demolished seemingly at random. The 
swath of destruction was broad and frightfully unpredictable. It took every nearby 
structure that meant anything to me, with the exception of St. Joseph’s Church on 
my grandmother’s street. 
 
Edward Connor criticized the Cobo administration’s “rosy picture” of the city’s efforts to 
assist Black Bottom residents in relocating.
60
 Indeed, some residents did not even know  
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Figure 1.8 Gratiot urban renewal area, formerly Black Bottom, after clearance, 1950s, looking 
northwest towards Eastern Market and Brewster-Douglass housing projects (upper right). St. 
Joseph’s Church is visible at the edge of the cleared on Antietam Street at upper right, where 
future Detroit Mayor Coleman Young lived when his family arrived in Detroit. Reuther Library of 
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University. 
 
 
they were eligible for relocation assistance. Some who did receive assistance were placed in 
deteriorating apartments with crumbling ceilings and disconnected plumbing.
61
 
Many of the refugees from urban renewal joined the growing exodus of black Detroiters 
out of the East Side ghetto to the Twelfth Street area, an area of Detroit’s Near West Side that 
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was in the process of being vacated by its predominantly Jewish residents. In Coleman Young’s 
estimation, the Twelfth Street area “trebled the problems of Black Bottom while inheriting little 
of its charisma.” Young was one of the luckier newcomers: he “integrated” a previously all-
white block of Collingwood Street on the north end of the Twelfth Street area, near the mansions 
of the Boston-Edison district. For his one-bedroom apartment there, he was charged twice the 
rent that the previous tenants had paid.
62
 
 The Gratiot “renewal area” lay fallow for years, a bad joke on the outcome of Connor’s 
efforts on the “home front.” As a member of Detroit Common Council, his housing agenda 
stymied by Mayor Cobo, Connor increasingly directed his attention outward, away from the 
segregationist stalemate of city politics towards the new frontiers of metropolitan growth. Half a 
mile to the east of the ruins of Black Bottom, on the tenth floor of a downtown skyscraper, a 
small group of planners were sketching the beginnings of a regional plan for metropolitan 
Detroit. 
 
A Plan for the Postwar Metropolis 
 
 
“Detroit was established more than two hundred years ago,” the spring 1947 edition of 
the Citizens Housing and Planning Council’s Housing and Planning News stated with some 
consternation. “Isn’t it about time we grew up to acknowledgement of the fact that city and 
region are interdependent, and that planning and development for one, must include planning and 
development for both?” The cause for the Council’s impatience was the delay in the creation of a 
Regional Planning Commission for metropolitan Detroit. The Michigan Legislature had passed a 
law authorizing such commissions in 1945, with backing from the Greater Detroit Board of 
Commerce. Yet Mayor Jeffries had held up the proposal “on a question of mechanics: how the 
commission is to be set up.” The CHPC hoped for timely action. A Regional Planning 
Commission, it argued, was needed to “(1) study the region’s assets and liabilities; (2) do 
something about the latter; and (3) coordinate the planning of Detroit with that of surrounding 
towns, villages and townships.”
63
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 As the war had drawn to a close, and Americans anticipated a new era of postwar 
suburbanization, metropolitan planning had become a subject of discussion in Detroit and around 
the nation.
64
 Already, in January 1942, Mayor Jeffries had convened a Regional Defense 
Planning Committee for the Metropolitan Area, with representatives from localities across the 
region.
65
 In 1943, the American Society of Planning Officials sponsored a national competition 
seeking the best proposal for a “regional council” for metropolitan planning.
66
 The experience of 
the New Deal and World War Two, moreover, convinced many corporate leaders that public 
structures for planning could not only coexist with but facilitate the private quest for profit. 
Indeed, the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce had been the key actor in the passage of 
Michigan’s Regional Planning Commission Act, most likely with the urging of the Citizens 
Housing and Planning Council.
67
 
 The Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission (RPC) finally came into 
being in June of 1947, and opened its office in downtown Detroit’s Cadillac Square Building the 
following May.
68
 Initial funding for the RPC had come from the private sector as well as the 
State of Michigan,
69
 and the RPC’s composition suggested its orientation towards the needs of 
business as well as the broader public. Half its forty-six members consisted of public officials, 
including such key infrastructure providers as Wayne County Road Commission chief engineer 
Leroy Smith; Detroit water department manager Laurence Lenhardt; and the ubiquitous Edward 
Connor, who held a seat on the Executive Committee. The other half consisted of various civic 
leaders, primarily businessmen, among them Foster Winter, treasurer of the Hudson department 




The RPC’s jurisdiction indicated how the wartime investment in suburban industry had 
expanded the boundaries of the “region”: in addition to Wayne, Oakland and Macomb County, 
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the RPC included the four easternmost townships of Washtenaw County and the city of 
Ypsilanti, so as to encompass the area of Willow Run.
71
 Over this sprawling region, containing 
hundreds of separate cities and townships, the RPC exercised no formal political authority. Per 
their enabling legislation, regional planning commissions did not supplant local governments in 
any way, nor did they govern planning by county or state bodies like the County Road 
Commission or the State Highway Department. Instead, they functioned simply as 
clearinghouses for research and discussion among their members—who were also responsible 
for funding them. As Edward Connor, then serving as RPC Chairman, noted in 1952: “the 
Regional Planning Commission is not an operating agency. It has no power to impose. The only 
power [the RPC] has might be called the power of the dictatorship of a good idea.”
72
 
As a result, the RPC moved with caution with respect to the local governments and 
businesses who were, after all, its sponsors. In the words of its staff: 
From the beginning, it was our intention to sacrifice speed wherever necessary for 
integration of operation with local government and private development. We took 
our time getting the feel of the job, added staff slowly, depended almost entirely 
upon committees for physical information and specialized knowledge, and 




As RPC director T. Ledyard Blakeman stated, “we knew that we had to keep in touch with the 
local governments of the region if we were to stay alive, if our planning was to be realistic and if 
the plan was to be used.”
 74
 The “dictatorship of a good idea” was not much of a dictatorship at 
all. 
Blakeman, a graduate of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who had previously 
worked for state planning boards in Virginia and New Jersey,
75
 attempted to approach the 
problem of regional planning on a piece-by-piece basis. The Regional Planning Commission 
divided the region into 19 smaller subunits, or “development areas.” In each of these, the RPC 
attempted to organize a “development area council” consisting of delegates from each local 
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 Blakeman confessed this was a “rather arbitrary solution,” but hoped it might help 
to begin the process of building a regional consciousness among the public. “[I]t is too much to 
ask a citizen of a one-square-mile town to recognize his dependence on a two-thousand-square-
mile metropolitan area,” he stated. “If, however, you can get him to look at his neighbors in a 






Figure 1.9. Regional Planning Commission Director T. Ledyard Blakeman (in bow tie, 
pointing at a map of the region) with officials of suburban Oak Park and Royal Oak. 
Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, “1949 Annual Report,” p. 6. 
 
At the RPC’s May 1952 conference on local planning and zoning, held at the new 
Veterans Memorial Building in downtown Detroit, Blakeman announced that the next twelve to 
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eighteen months would be “the crucial year” for the organization, as it worked to feed the work 
of its committees into its first Regional Land Use Plan: a plan that would be both “technically 
sound” and “acceptable to the people of the Region.” Fittingly for Detroit, the first stage would 
be charting the possibilities for new industrial development in relation to water, sewage and 
transportation infrastructure. The threat of nuclear attack, Blakeman noted, gave further impetus 
to the industrial decentralization already underway: “The Federal Government insists that as a 
defense measure all new plants producing critical materials be kept at least 10 miles from present 
concentrations of industry or major concentrations of population.” The identification of sites for 
residential areas would follow industrial planning, recapitulating the basic sequence of Detroit’s 
development: people following factories.
78
 
The following year, the fifth annual report of the RPC overflowed with enthusiasm as it 
announced the conclusion of the regional planning process. 
There is unmistakable evidence that a turning point has been reached in helter-
skelter, runaway physical development. This has exacted an enormous penalty 
from the people of this surging and dynamic Region for nearly a century. Within 
the next year the Commission expects to see materialize a definite pattern of 
enlightened social and economic growth. Such development would make possible 
a more pleasant and profitable way of life both for this generation and for those to 
come. 
 
The inside cover of the report described “The Problem”: “riotous, undirected growth,” the “sum 
of a multitude of decisions” by manufacturers, individual families, and other private actors. “The 
vast majority of these decisions have been individual and unrelated,” the report asserted; “few 
have been public or collective decisions.”
79
 
“None of us is opposed to growth and development,” the authors hastened to add, “to 
expansion of the economic base and increase of the value-producing activities in the peripheral 
parts of the metropolitan area.” Indeed, outward growth was both inevitable and desirable, since 
it promoted “discontinuance of high population concentrations and resulting congestion.” Yet 
unplanned suburban growth could generate further traffic tie-ups, wasteful spending on 
infrastructure, even the specter of “rural slums and blighted industrial areas…no more to be 
desired in the periphery than in the center of a metropolitan area.” Readers turned the page of the 
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report to reveal a fold-out, full-color depiction of “The Solution:” the regional land use plan for 
greater Detroit. 
The plan sketched a new stage in Detroit’s suburbanization. The great industrial corridors 
followed the railroad lines far into suburban Wayne and Macomb County. In between, wide 
swathes of residential development spilled a dozen miles beyond the limits of Detroit as far as 
Flat Rock at the southern boundary of Wayne County; Ypsilanti in Washtenaw County; and 
Macomb County’s Selfridge Air Force Base on Lake St. Clair. The southeastern corner of 
Oakland County was entirely urbanized. Beyond it, a lower-density expanse of “rural non-farm 
residential” stretched through the county’s lake country and encompassed Detroit’s industrial 
satellite of Pontiac. An extensive highway system threaded its way throughout the entire 
metropolitan area, snaking out of Detroit’s downtown core and encircling the central city in a 
series of beltways. At the periphery of the region, green recreational corridors curled through the 
remaining farmland. 
The Regional Planning Commission, however, had no authority to ensure this plan for 
regional development actually unfolded. “If, after working with us to develop this plan, the 
people of a particular community don’t like it, they don’t have to do anything about it,” 
Blakeman had assured local officials. The RPC would simply use it as a basis for planning with 
regard to other public infrastructure, including water and sewer systems, parks, and 
transportation. It also hoped that private industry and business would make use of the plan. 
Detroit Edison, for example, the region’s primary electric utility, had donated $15,000 towards 
the preparation of the regional plan, seeing it as an aid to its own planning efforts. Finally, 
Blakeman hoped that local communities, “in the few cases where it is necessary,” would modify 
their local zoning ordinances to conform to the Regional Plan.
80
 
 The most substantive accomplishment of the Regional Planning Commission, indeed, 
may have been the assistance it provided suburban communities in developing their local 
capacity for planning and zoning. Before World War Two, scarcely a dozen Detroit suburbs had 
incorporated as cities. Setting aside the enclaves of Highland Park and Hamtramck inside 
Detroit, and the General Motors satellite city of Pontiac in central Oakland County, Dearborn 
was the only suburb with more than 50,000 residents. Between 1940 and 1965, however, thirty- 
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Figure 1.10. Regional Planning Commission plan for greater Detroit, 1953. Detroit Metropolitan 
Area Regional Planning Commission, “Annual Report,” 1953, in ECP, Box 20, “Reports.” 
 
one new suburban governments came into being, including both villages and cities, and ten 
villages re-incorporated as cities. From 1950 to 1965, the incorporations absorbed over 215 
52 
 
square miles, roughly doubling the amount of metropolitan land within city or village limits. By 
comparison, it had taken the city of Detroit over a century to reach its 139-square-mile extent.
81
 
Incorporation gave the new communities planning and zoning powers, powers they used 
aggressively to control development and expand their tax base. The Regional Planning 
Commission vigorously promoted local planning and zoning, noting it gave local governments 
the means to “protect what you have and promote what you want.”
82
 Beginning in 1950, the 
Commission hosted annual metropolitan conferences on local planning and zoning. Focused on 
showing suburbs the ropes of the process, they covered such topics as  “Making a Master Plan 
and Keeping it Up to Date,” “State Laws Regarding Local Planning,” and “How and When to 
Use Consultants.”
 83
 At the 1958 annual conference, Paul M. Reid, who had succeeded Blakeman 
as director the previous year, described the proliferation of local planning capacity as one of the 
Regional Planning Commission’s proudest accomplishments. 
Ten years ago this May, when the staff and office of the Regional Planning 
Commission were set up, there were just 27 local planning commissions in 
operation in the region. Today, we have 74! Ten years ago, Washtenaw had the 
only County Planning Commission in southeastern Michigan. Today such 
planning agencies have been established in Oakland, St. Clair, Livingston and 
Macomb Counties. Obviously, we cannot claim credit for all this upsurge of local 
and county planning commissions. But along with the tenor of the times, I think 
we can say honestly that we have made a real contribution to the understanding 




Despite its metropolitan scope, and its paeans to inter-governmental cooperation, the Regional 
Planning Commission ultimately served to facilitate local government control over land use, as 





 There was one area of planning where the principle of “local control” counted for 
relatively little: highway planning. The Regional Planning Commission may have been justly 
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proud of its 1953 regional plan, but a pioneering regional study completed two years later was 
probably far more influential in shaping the actual growth of the region. This was the Detroit 
Metropolitan Area Traffic Study, prepared by actors who had considerably more power than the 
“dictatorship of a good idea,” and few hesitations about its exercise: the region’s highway 
engineers planning the routes of the new expressway system. The Rapid Transit Commission’s 
guiding principle of 1925—“population follows transportation”—remained equally true three 
decades later. As the Rapid Transit Commission had suggested, it might be said that highway 
planning was the real basis of regional planning in metropolitan Detroit, even that the super-
highways planned in the 1920s had more or less created the region as it existed in 1950. The 
original logo of the Regional Planning Commission, in fact, mapped out both  its constituent 




 The Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study (DMATS) was financed by the region’s 
three primary road-building agencies: the City of Detroit, the Wayne County Road Commission, 
and Michigan State Highway Department, in cooperation with the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads. 
Its purpose was to provide for the movement of people and vehicles throughout the metropolitan 
area “by thoroughly understanding the nature of the movement and then by devising the most 
effective highway plan to serve it,” including both current and future travel demand. To chart the 
flow of traffic in the region required an extraordinary effort, including household surveys, 
interviews with truck drivers and taxi drivers, and roadside interviews of drivers. More than 200 




The results of the study painted a striking portrait of traffic flow in the “exploding 
metropolis.”  Lines of movement surged outward from the center of the city, following the path 
of the radial super-highways. Furthermore, the study predicted that by 1980, the total vehicle 
miles travelled in the region would increase by 76 percent.
88
 To serve this movement and avert 
gridlock, the study recommended a 200-mile network of expressways superimposed over the old  
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Figure 1.11. A lurid portrait of the exploding metropolis: 1980 “pattern of travel desire” 
forecasted by the 1956 Detroit Metropolitan Area Transportation Study, a pioneering 
effort in its field. “Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study: Part 2: Future Traffic and A 
Long Range Expressway Plan,” Michigan State Highway Department, March 1956. 
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radial super-highways, as well as expanded arterial surface streets.  The total cost of the new 
expressways was estimated at $1.5 billion.
89
 
 On June 29, 1956, President Eisenhower signed the Interstate Highway Act into law, 
providing a new means of financing the expressway system.
90
 By that time, the Lodge and Ford 
Expressways were well on their way across the city. The sprawling 14-bridge interchange 
between the two expressways, located near General Motors headquarters in the New Center area, 
had opened to the public in the fall of 1955.
91
 With the federal government now picking up 90 
percent of the Interstate tab, the stage was set for accelerated highway construction in the years 
to come. 
 Speaking of the RPC’s 1953 Regional Land Use Plan, T. Ledyard Blakeman had said that 
“if the people of a particular community don’t like it, they don’t have to do anything about it.” A 
different principle operated with regard to expressways. Much of the public, of course, 
welcomed the expressways, the latest step towards retooling Detroit around the automobile. Even 
in the Motor City, however, particular alignments drew opposition. The first sections of the Ford 
and Lodge Expressway had traversed older, predominantly working-class areas of the inner city; 
as expressway planning continued, however, wealthier neighborhoods found themselves in the 
planners’ path. Yet even those communities found the highway juggernaut a nearly irresistible 
force.   
In 1953, the City Council of the newly incorporated suburb of Harper Woods, a three-
square-mile patch of modest homes at Detroit’s northeast corner, passed a resolution declaring its 
opposition to the extension of the Ford Expressway through the city, as the State Highway 
Department’s preferred route of Harper Avenue would eliminate the city’s namesake commercial 
strip.
92
 State Highway Commissioner Charles Ziegler, asked whether he could build without the 
city’s consent, politely replied that “we would much rather sit down and work it out with the city 
officials.”
93
 There was little question who had the upper hand, as the City of Detroit was 
committed to the Harper Avenue route and the road itself was already under the jurisdiction of 
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the Wayne County Road Commission, a close ally of the State Highway Commission.
94
 The 
Joseph Hudson Company, Detroit’s flagship department store chain, also made it known that its 
plans for a giant shopping center in Harper Woods—following up on the success of its Northland 
Center in Southfield—depended on a speedy resolution of the expressway alignment.
95
 After the 




 In 1958, on Detroit’s wealthy northwest side, the extension of the Lodge Expressway 
drew resistance from residents and business owners who feared it would damage property values 
along James Couzens Highway, a tree-lined boulevard that formed the area’s main commercial 
thoroughfare and provided a “prestige address for business firms.”
97
 Irving Rubin, the State 
Highway Department representative assigned the task of selling the proposal, went to 
considerable lengths to placate residents. The state even hired the famed Detroit architect Minoru 
Yamasaki to beautify its proposal for a double-decked expressway that would avoid demolitions 
along Couzens and preserve surface streets for local access on either side of the new 
thoroughfare.
98
 At the end of the day, however, Rubin made little effort to hide the state’s 
overriding interest in getting the expressway built. “May I congratulate you on the campaign you 
have mounted against us,” he told opponents at a public hearing in Detroit’s new City-County 
Building. “I wish you ill luck, but I do congratulate you.”
99
 The double-deck proposal was 
ultimately abandoned in favor of a below-grade design, but the expressway moved forward with 
majority support from Detroit Common Council.
100
 
 As the super-highways constructed in the Twenties and Thirties had structured the 
urbanization of metropolitan Detroit in the decades that followed, so would the postwar 
expressway building boom guide the region’s growth through the latter half of the century. The 
Regional Planning Commission could only set forth a vision for regional development. The 
highway planners could get it built, constructing the circulatory system of the metropolitan area 
around the singular value of the motoring public’s need for speed. 
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 Next to the highway planners, the most powerful actors in the development of Detroit in 
the Fifties were probably Detroit’s automakers themselves. Before the Depression, the first 
generation of automobile executives had laid the blueprint for a centrifugal city and carved out 
the original industrial suburbs of Dearborn, Highland Park and Hamtramck in its midst. In the 
boom years after 1945, the Big Three continued to drive the suburbanization of the region as 
they relocated their assembly lines beyond the boundaries of Detroit. Automobile production 
increasingly shifted out of Michigan entirely in the years after World War Two, in part as a 
response to federal industrial decentralization policy and union militancy in Detroit,
101
 yet auto 
plants remained a mainstay of the region’s economy. 
However, in the postwar years, more and more of these plants relocated to the suburbs. 
From 1947 to 1958 alone, the Big Three constructed twenty-five new suburban Detroit plants.
102
 
During the Korean War buildup, 92.5% of federal aid for equipment and new plant construction 
in metropolitan Detroit went to suburban sites.
103
 In a Regional Planning Commission survey, 
manufacturers cited the lower tax rates and abundant land in suburban areas as their top reasons 
for relocating.
104
 Some of the new plants were located in the inner suburbs: sites along the rail 
corridors that traversed the new cities of Warren and Livonia, for example, were particularly 
favored locations not far from the central city.
105
 Others were far more distant, like the Ford plant 
in rural Wixom in central Oakland County, fifteen miles beyond the Detroit city limits on the 
Grand River super-highway. 
 The smaller, less capitalized automakers tended to remain in Detroit, being less able to 
afford new suburban facilities. By 1960, as General Motors and Ford jobs suburbanized, 
Chrysler had become the city of Detroit’s largest employer, but it continued to shed jobs as it 
struggled to compete with its larger rivals. The city’s remaining independent automakers rapidly 
disappeared. Following its merger with Studebaker, Packard shut down its 50-year-old, forty- 
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Figure 1.12. Suburbanization of Detroit industry accelerated in the 1950s, particularly 
along the Van Dyke corridor in Macomb County and the Schoolcraft-Plymouth corridor in 
western Wayne County. This Regional Planning Commission map shows new suburban 
manufacturing plants with more than 500 employees that opened between 1950 and 1957. 
Plants outlined in white relocated from Detroit. Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional 




acre facility on Detroit’s East Side in 1956. Hudson’s two Detroit plants closed after it was 
absorbed into George Romney’s American Motors between 1954 and 1957.
106
 Building permits 
issued for factories and shops in Detroit declined almost every year over the Fifties.
107
 Between 
1953 and 1960, Detroit’s East Side alone lost over 70,000 manufacturing jobs,
108
 about the same 




Detroit might still be synonymous with American industry, but the balance of industrial 
employment in the region was shifting to the suburbs. The Regional Planning Commission’s data 
revealed the extraordinary pace of the migration. In 1950, Detroit, Hamtramck and Highland 
Park still contained more than twice as many manufacturing jobs as the suburbs. Six years later, 
the suburbs had gained nearly 100,000 jobs and the city had lost nearly 100,000, suggesting the 
advent of a suburban majority in manufacturing by the end of the decade.
110
 Macomb County 
more than doubled its total industrial employment over the same six-year period.
111
 By 1956, 
more than 40,000 people worked manufacturing jobs in the city of Warren alone, which had 




 The Regional Planning Commission’s 1953 plan might not have carried formal authority. 
Yet there could be little doubt that the vision for a decentralized region was coming to fruition, 
thanks in large part to the region’s highway builders and the automakers whose plant decisions 
drove so much of the region’s economic life. The broad elite consensus behind the desirability of 
suburbanization, however—the “dictatorship of a good idea” that made Blakeman’s regional 
plan something more than an exercise in wishful thinking—did not necessarily extend to every 
detail of postwar metropolitan development. This was particularly true where the management of 
regional assets was up for grabs. In the midst of two such struggles in the 1950s—battles 
between Detroit and Wayne County over airports and water infrastructure—Edward Connor saw 
an opportunity to build a new metropolitan political structure that complemented the Regional 
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Planning Commission’s planning efforts, a project that also promised to help the ambitious 
councilman leverage the suburbs’ growing political might and, perhaps, get out of Mayor Cobo’s 
shadow. 
 
Connor’s Inter-Governmental Gambit 
  
When the Regional Planning Commission released its 1953 regional plan, Edward 
Connor’s term as Chairman was over, but Connor still served on the organization’s Executive 
Committee. He had served on that body continuously since the RPC’s creation, one of only four 
members to do so. The other three men were the leading directors of regional infrastructure: 
Detroit City Engineer George R. Thompson, Detroit Board of Water Commissioners 
Superintendent Laurence G. Lenhardt, and Wayne County Highway Engineer Leroy C. Smith. 
Connor was the only elected official of the four, and in fact, he seems to have been the only 
elected official among the RPC’s 46 members. Indeed, he served not as one of the RPC’s 23 
public officials, but as one of the 23 “representatives of civic, economic, and social fields,” as 




 By 1954, any hopes Connor entertained of breaking Cobo’s hold on city government had 
been extinguished. In 1953, Cobo was reelected Mayor for a third time with sixty percent of the 
vote, the same total he had received in 1949 and 1951, defeating Democrat James Lincoln.
114
 
Connor continued to do battle with Cobo over a range of issues in city government, including 
downtown parking garage construction,
115
 but he saw more opportunities to build his political 
influence beyond the city limits by making common cause against Cobo in concert with 
suburban officials. 
 The struggle over a new metropolitan airport presented one such opportunity. By the time 
the Regional Planning Commission released its plan, a debate over the location of a new 
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airport—or airports—in the region had been underway for nearly a decade. Detroit’s old City 
Airport, a small pre-war field on the east side of the city, could only accommodate two-engine 
aircraft, and the adjacent neighborhoods made expansion unlikely.
116
 City Airport did not even 
show up on the RPC’s map, which suggested the area would be given over to industrial 
development. The RPC did identify three other, already existing airports: Selfridge Air Force 
Base on Lake St. Clair in Macomb County; Willow Run, which had temporarily become the 
region’s major commercial air facility after the war;
117
 and Wayne County Airport, twelve miles 
towards Detroit along the Willow Run Expressway. 
Conspicuously absent in the RPC plan was a fourth major airport, somewhere in Oakland 
or Macomb County. This airport did not exist in 1953, but it had been the subject of extensive 
public discussion. Members of the Detroit Board of Commerce believed the Willow Run and 
Wayne County sites were too distant from the city center, and that the region’s major airport 
should be located more in line with the anticipated growth of the region towards the north and 
northwest. The Board of Commerce even went so far as to offer to purchase 704 acres in 
Oakland County, just north of the Eight Mile Road boundary, and donate it to the city as a 
portion of the new airport.
118
 
That site failed to win support, however. By 1952 the Board of Commerce and Mayor 
Cobo were advocating a site in northeastern Warren Township which could complement one of 
the two existing western airports. Warren Township was developing rapidly, however—with 
more than 40,000 residents in 1950, it was the largest township in Michigan—and the proposal 
spurred immediate protests from local residents and their elected officials, who cited the effects 
of noise, declining property values, and the loss of taxable land.
119
 
 The people of Warren Township found a formidable ally in Wayne County Highway 
Engineer Leroy Smith. Like Robert Moses of New York, Smith held no elected position, but 
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since taking office in 1918, he had turned his mastery of public road dollars into almost 
unrivaled political power. Unlike Moses, Smith did not seek the political spotlight, but by the 
1950s he controlled a semi-autonomous public works empire with an annual budget of $65 
million, or nearly $600 million in 2020 dollars. His influence extended far beyond Wayne 
County through his relationships with other county road commissions across the state.  “[S]tate 
capital veterans,” the Detroit Times reported, “declare [Smith] can get more out of the legislature 




 Since 1944, Smith had been set on making his own County Airport the region’s primary 
air facility.
121
 Although the airport was located twenty miles distant from downtown Detroit in 
southwest Wayne County’s Romulus Township, this ultimately worked in its favor: unlike the 
Oakland and Macomb County sites under consideration, the area around the County field was 
largely unpopulated, ensuring that there would be little local opposition to its expansion. As the 
Board of Commerce, city and suburbs debated the merits of other sites, Smith used millions of 
dollars in state, local and federal funds to build a new airport adjacent to the old one.
122
 He also 
used his clout in Lansing to help the Macomb County leaders pass legislation to block the City 
from pursuing the Warren Township site by requiring approval from the County Board of 
Supervisors. The Board of Commerce attempted to mediate by calling a meeting between the 
County Road Commission and the City’s Aviation Commission. This was a failure; “its tenor,” 




For Connor, the airport battle presented an opportunity to take on the Mayor in concert 
with allies in the suburbs and County government. He urged his colleagues on Council to join 
him in supporting the Legislature’s proposal “as a matter of good relations and common sense 
with other units of government.”
124
 In 1954, Connor established a new base of operations—
outside the straitjacket of City government—by securing the position of chairman of the Wayne 
County Board of Supervisors. 
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As a power position, the chairmanship was not equal to the mayor’s seat. The Board of 
Supervisors was an unwieldy 111-member body composed of representatives from every 
township and city in the County, partially weighted by population. By tradition, the chairmanship 
rotated between a member of Detroit Common Council and an “out-county” official from the 
County’s suburbs or rural townships.
125
 The Board’s authority was limited by the convoluted 
structure of county government established by Michigan law. Containing dozens of other 
independently elected officials, and powerful semi-autonomous agencies like the Road 
Commission, it formed “a nightmare to one with a passion for clear-cut lines of authority and 
responsibility.”
126
 Nonetheless, seeking to make political capital of the region’s suburbanization, 
Connor set about turning his position as Chairman into the center of a multi-county sphere of 
influence. 
Soon after assuming his new role, Connor extended a lunch invitation to the chair of the 
Oakland County Board of Supervisors, Floyd Andrews. Andrews was a 19-year veteran of that 
position, which he held by virtue of his post as supervisor of rural Independence Township and 
postmaster for the village of Clarkston.
127
 He had never before met with any Wayne County 
official, and he doubted Connor’s motives enough that he brought along his attorney to the 
meeting. After some discussion, Connor recounted, “they decided that I wasn’t up to anything 
much and they decided to go along with it and said let’s have lunch again.”
128
 Connor and 
Andrews went on to invite the Macomb County chairman to lunch, and eventually the chairs of 
neighboring Washtenaw and Monroe County. On June 25, 1954, the group adopted a resolution 
of intent to hold “joint meetings to discuss problems of mutual interest and concern.” In August, 
they met for the first time as the Supervisors Inter-County Committee or SICC. If Connor’s 
account can be believed, he initially declined the nomination to chair the group, but relented at 




Having previously chaired the Regional Planning Commission—and lobbied for its 
creation—Connor seems to have concluded that the region needed a different sort of 
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metropolitan organization, more attuned to politics than planning. By the close of 1953, in fact, 
the year the RPC plan had hailed as a "milestone of unprecedented significance,” the RPC’s 
Development Area Councils were “either moribund or floundering badly,” according to one 
assessment. The RPC had enjoyed some success in stimulating the formation of suburban 
municipal planning commissions, but director Blakeman’s pessimism on the prospects for 
regional thinking had been amply borne out.
130
A 1956 SICC publicity brochure suggests 
Connor’s thinking on the two agencies’ respective roles. Breezily asserting that the RPC and 
SICC “are not at all in conflict, nor do they duplicate each other’s efforts,” it explained that the 




Connor also had his own political career in mind. The SICC’s county-based structure 
conveniently excluded Mayor Cobo and his lieutenants in Detroit city government, who were 
heavily represented on the board of the Regional Planning Commission.
132
 By contrast, Connor 
was in a position to dominate the SICC. SICC’s founding documents stressed that the 
organization was formed for the purpose of “representing the six counties equally,” but Wayne 
County had more than twice the population of the other five put together, allowing Connor to 
play the leading role.
133
 Connor was mulling his own bid for Mayor in the 1957 election, and the 
SICC was the kind of project that would help to build his public profile.
134
  
Soon after the formation of the SICC, Connor attempted to play the role of regional 
statesman in another rancorous city-county fight, this one over water. The postwar tide of 
development placed new strains on Detroit’s water system, to the point that the Water 
Department began to restrict the watering of lawns.
135
 The City had supplied water to suburban 
areas for decades, and in 1951 it broke ground on a new northeastern pumping station on Eight 
Mile Road, intended to serve the burgeoning suburbs beyond.
136
 However, in a 1954 letter to the 
Common Council, Water Department Manager Lawrence Lenhardt stated that after the 
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completion of the northeastern station and another northwest facility, the city should cease its 
expansion program. Wayne County, he wrote, ought to be responsible for supplying suburban 
areas west and south of Dearborn.
137
 
The Wayne County Road Commission stood ready to step into the breach. The 
enterprising Leroy Smith had added suburban water lines to his infrastructure portfolio during 
the war. As of yet, however, these were merely an extension of the Detroit system, requiring 
Smith to do battle with Lenhardt to seek more water for the Wayne County suburbs.
138
 In 1955, 
the crisis reached a point where a moratorium on new housing construction was issued in several 
suburban Wayne County townships.
139
 Smith was more than happy to take Lenhardt’s advice and 
prepare a proposal for a Wayne County intake and filtration plant, to be located in the Downriver 
suburb of Allen Park.
140
 Yet when Lenhardt retired, Mayor Cobo appointed a successor, Gerald 
Remus, who opposed the development of a County system and argued the Detroit Water 
Department should continue to manage the expansion of a single metropolitan water system.
141
 
In 1956, the SICC waded into the suburban water issue by commissioning a study on the 
question. The report ultimately sided with the City of Detroit in recommending a single 
metropolitan system under City control.
142
 Nonetheless, Connor and several other Common 
Council members continued to vote in favor of allowing the County to proceed with its Allen 
Park plant, prompting charges that they were carrying water for Leroy Smith.
143
 The city-county 
water war dragged on until 1959, when the SICC helped persuade Detroit Common Council to 
accept Wayne County representation on the Detroit Board of Water Commissioners in exchange 
for the City’s takeover of the County system.
144
 By that time, Cobo was dead and Smith had 
retired after nearly four decades at the helm of the County Road Commission.
145
 The City may 
have prevailed in the water fight, but Smith had won the airport battle. Although discussion of a 
second, northern airport continued for years afterwards, in 1958 the Detroit Aviation 
Commission belatedly recognized the county site, whose first modern terminal opened that year, 
as the city’s major commercial airport. 
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Figure 1.13a and 1.13b. Airports and water infrastructure were major fronts of City-
County contention in the 1950s. Left: Wayne County Highway Engineer Leroy Smith in 
1958, standing victorious in front of the new terminal of the Detroit Metropolitan Wayne 
County Airport. Right: Interior of the completed Allen Park pumping station, focal point in 
the Detroit-Wayne   County water war of 1955-59. The man in foreground may be City 
Water Department director Gerald Remus. Detroit-Wayne County Metropolitan Airport, 
“The History of Detroit Metro Airport,” and Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and 
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University 
 
In his dual role as Detroit councilman and progenitor of the SICC, Connor had helped set an 
important precedent in regional governance: institutionalizing suburban participation in 
managing metropolitan infrastructure. The political dividends, however, were less than he might 
have anticipated. Connor ultimately decided not to run for Mayor. His efforts to pass county 
home rule legislation—which would have allowed him to seek the new position of Wayne 
County Executive—met opposition from Mayor Louis Miriani, who succeeded Cobo after he 
died in office in 1957.
146




Connor’s metropolitan organization-building did pay off in other respects. By the mid-
1950s, discussion of “metropolitan area problems” was a popular pastime for public officials, 
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academicians and philanthropists. Michigan State University hosted a national conference on the 
subject in 1956.
148
 The following year, Connor pitched a proposal to the Ford Foundation for a 
five-year, five-million-dollar grant to establish a non-profit Southeastern Michigan Metropolitan 
Community Research Corporation that would complement the activities of the SICC and the 
Regional Planning Commission.
149
 The foundation approved a scaled-down grant of $900,000 
over four years,
150
 and Connor added a new title to his already extensive list of roles. Yielding 
the chairmanship of SICC to his Oakland County counterpart, Connor continued to serve on the 
Detroit Common Council, and accepted the position of Secretary of the new organization, for 




 By the close of the Fifties, there could be little doubt that the future landscape of 
metropolitan Detroit would look very different than the prewar city. As the centrifugal growth of 
the region continued, more of it would be metropolitan, and less of it would be Detroit. The 
formation of metropolitan institutions acknowledged the shift towards the suburbs, and the fact 
that the central city was no longer the region’s only major political actor. For the most part, these 
metropolitan institutions, like the Regional Planning Commission, saw their role as helping to 
facilitate that shift. Fortune editor William H. Whyte might describe “urban sprawl” as the result 
of too little planning, the lack of a “pattern of growth,”
152
 but the fact was that sprawl was 
planned, and had been for decades. It had been planned for by Mayor Couzens and Sidney 
Waldon’s Rapid Transit Commission, by the Inter-County Superhighway Commissions, and 
eventually by the Regional Planning Commission itself. 
 Pioneering though they were, however, Detroit’s new metropolitan institutions were 
fragile things. The Regional Planning Commission’s “dictatorship of a good idea” only ruled so 
long as everyone agreed. While the region’s leading citizens accepted the desirability and 
inevitability of suburbanization, the Commission had no authority to resolve disputes over the 
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specific terms of that process. When conflicts emerged, as they did over airports and water, they 
were settled in the political arena, not by the Regional Planning Commission or its draftsmen. 
 Edward Connor recognized that reality. The Supervisors Inter-County Committee was 
both a vehicle for his own political aspirations and a step towards greater political influence for 
the growing suburbs, particularly those of Oakland and Macomb County, which had neither a 
single large city government like Detroit’s or a powerful county bureaucracy like Leroy Smith’s 
Wayne County empire. Nonetheless, the SICC too was a voluntary body, without any ability to 
compel action from its members, not a regional government unto itself. In the fight over water, it 
could only attempt to intervene from the sidelines as the two heavies, the City and the County, 
fought their way to a draw. The SICC was also exceptionally dependent on the person of Connor 
himself. An observer noted that Connor “constantly refers to SICC as ‘his’ organization,” and 
Connor installed his confidante Gerard Coleman, a former merchandising representative, as the 
group’s Executive Director. As one business leader commented in a revealing analogy, SICC’s 
success relied heavily—perhaps almost totally—on  Connor and Coleman’s mastery of behind-
the-scenes politics. 
The political environment surrounding SICC reminds me of an Ohio State 
football game. Ohio usually starts at one end of the field and eventually scores by 
using straight ahead and slight slant plunges which yield only five or so yards at a 
time. Many fans roar approval while others sit back in awe at the overt display of 
raw power. What is not overtly evident is the marvelous cross-blocking and trap 
play executions on the part of the Ohio line. This analogy holds true for SICC. 
Overtly, the political leaders appear to move into substantive program areas with 
great ease. However, SICC has been extremely successful in gaining public and 
private support for these programs in advance. This success can be traced directly 
to Coleman’s fine execution of personal persuasion and political salesmanship 
techniques. He, with Ed. Connor’s assistance, has developed a well cultivated 
ability to deal with community leaders, and to translate programs into visible 
political realities capable of generating positive spill-over effects significant to 
local politics and position…SICC’s style is a tribute to Connor’s political ability 




The SICC was ultimately perhaps less a genuine governance body than a “soft-sell 
merchandising organ capable of uniting the Region’s public and private power structures.”
154
 Yet 
as with the Regional Planning Commission, a “soft sell” approach would not suffice when the 
region’s leaders found themselves on opposing teams. 
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 The limitations of metropolitan planning and governance in Detroit did not prevent 
Connor from taking some pride in the metropolitan institutions he had helped to build in the age 
of the exploding metropolis. “Working together in the past 10 or 15 years,” he announced in a 
1961 speech to the SICC, “we have created in this area a situation that is unique in the country, 
and I think unique in the world. We have attempted to develop instruments and tools that we can 
use to influence the future. There are three such tools,” he explained—the Regional Planning 
Commission; the Supervisors Inter-County Committee, and the Southeast Michigan Metropolitan 
Community Research Corporation—“and, to my knowledge, no area in the country has all three 
of them.” Together, they made the region a “three-car family,” and in the coming decade, as the 
region’s urbanized area expanded by another 300 square miles, they would ensure the region 
avoided the land use errors of the past. “With these three cars,” Connor concluded, “our family 
can look with confidence to the road that all of us will have to travel in the next ten years,” even 
“serve as an example to the entire country.”
155
  
 Over the next several years, however, the road ahead took turns that Connor may not 
have anticipated, due in part to aspects of metropolitan growth that Connor did not mention: the 
fact that suburbanization of population was disproportionately a movement of the middle and 
upper classes, and almost exclusively a whites-only phenomenon. As the costs of 
suburbanization to the city of Detroit became more apparent, and white flight helped open a path 
to regime change in City Hall, the torch of metropolitan reform passed to a new set of actors. 
With the encouragement of the federal government, and the generous assistance of the Ford 
Foundation, they would begin to retool the “three cars” for the age of President Kennedy’s New 
Frontier and Johnson’s Great Society, an age whose most optimistic anthems came straight out 
of Motown.
                                                     
155





Chapter 2: Brave New COG 
 
In 1963, an Oregon city manager named Kent Mathewson traveled to Detroit for a 
luncheon interview with the five most powerful men in Michigan. The meeting took place over 
lunch in the Detroit Club, an exclusive institution whose red-brick, Gilded Age–era building 
hunched in the shadows of downtown Detroit’s skyscrapers. The welcoming committee for 
Mathewson included Henry Ford II, chairman of Ford Motor Company; Chrysler chairman Lynn 
Townsend; General Motors president Jack Gordon; Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh; and 
Michigan Governor George Romney, former president of the American Motors Corporation. 
They wanted to recruit Mathewson to chair an organization called the Metropolitan Fund, 
intended to modernize regional governance in greater Detroit. 
Mathewson was then the city manager of Salem, Oregon, population 50,000. He was 
accustomed to meeting with various dignitaries, but later confessed to feeling “slightly 
intimidated.” Finally, he turned to General Motors president Gordon and asked, in the Southern 
accent he had retained from his adolescent years in North Carolina, “what it was I would be 
expected to do if I took the job.” 
“Why,” Gordon said, “we simply want you to solve our metropolitan problem.” 





The Metropolitan Frontier 
 
The men who summoned Mathewson to Detroit were in many respects the inheritors of 
Edward Connor’s handiwork over the previous two decades. The Metropolitan Fund was in fact 
the reincarnation of the Southeast Michigan Metropolitan Community Research Corporation, the 
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third of the “three cars” that Connor, in various capacities, had helped to create. It was also the 
beneficiary of growing nationwide interest in the problems of the “exploding metropolis,” and 
the possibility of new metropolitan institutions that could address them. 
In 1957, the American Academy of Political and Social Science published a special issue 
of its Annals titled “Metropolis in Ferment,” culminating in a remarkable essay by one of the 
volume’s editors, Paul N. Ylvisaker. Several articles in the issue took a dim view of the 
metropolitan fermentation. Sociologist David Riesman, describing “The Suburban Dislocation,” 
lamented the march of highways—which, he wrote, “takes on the lunatic quality of an arms 
race”—and what he termed the “aimless quality of suburban life…a pervasive low-keyed 
unpleasure.”
2
 Frank Zeidler, the Socialist mayor of Milwaukee, predicted a bleak future for the 
cities. Even if they survived the looming threat of nuclear war, they might still be doomed by 
hostile state legislatures and white racism towards incoming black migrants. The concentration 
of these newcomers in central cities, he warned, might well generate “a segregated caste 
system…as the northern whites seek to withdraw from contact with the Negro community,” and 
bring “a greater tendency in the North to follow the pattern of the southern states.”
3
 
By contrast, Ylvisaker’s essay—“Innovation and Evolution: Bridge to the Future 
Metropolis”—expressed confidence that American ingenuity would develop workable solutions 
to metropolitan problems. Written from the perspective of a historian in the year 1980, his essay 
described how enterprising reformers of the 1960s and beyond had steered a middle course 
between “blind action” and laissez-faire “urban conservatism,” thanks to “the same unlikely 
coalition of pragmatist and idealist, politician and intellectual with which history generally allies 
itself during critical periods.” Ylvisaker conceded that the metropolis had real problems, but they 
could be overcome: 
Crisis—the usual device by which history introduces a new era—was one factor 
in producing the coalition, but it was not the dramatic sort which alarmists of the 
1950’s had predicted. There were no massive transportation failures, no 
uncontrollable waves of race or juvenile violence, no total bankruptcies of central 
city—technically and politically, Americans were too resourceful to let such 
obvious problems become that bad.
4
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The key to Ylvisaker’s reform scheme was the creation of new metropolitan governments—
complete with “metromayors”—which would preserve a degree of local control while re-
incorporating central cities and suburbs into meaningful wholes.
5
 The traditional argument for 
metropolitan government on the basis of efficiency lacked “political sex appeal,” he wrote, and 
proved inconsistent in practice. Instead, the metropolitan coalition could succeed only by 
appealing to the historical precedent of the U.S. Constitution’s framework for a “more perfect 




Ylvisaker’s ideas were not unique. In the same volume, Luther Gulick of the Institute of 
Public Administration in New York City described such a “metropolitan council” as the optimal 
solution to the emerging metropolitan community. What did distinguish Ylvisaker was his 
unique ability to compel such a vision into being, using the resources of the world’s largest 
foundation. The son of the president of a Lutheran college in rural Minnesota, Ylvisaker had 
received a doctorate in political science from Harvard with a dissertation examining the political 
consensus-building that had modernized county government in his home state during the New 
Deal era.
7
 After a stint as a professor at Swarthmore College, outside Philadelphia, Ylvisaker 
sought practical experience in government as an aide to the city’s reform mayor (later Senator) 
Joseph Clark. In 1955, he joined the staff of the Ford Foundation in New York as director of its 




It was to Ylvisaker that Edward Connor, in 1957, pitched his proposal for the 
Southeastern Michigan Metropolitan Community Research Corporation.
9
 A collaboration 
between members of the SICC and representatives of the area’s major universities, the 
Corporation would be a vehicle for “research, planning and intelligent community action,” 
ensuring a “more effective approach to the meeting of those problems being produced by the 
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inevitable expansion and complexity of the New Metropolitan Community—a living social 
organism which is no longer a thing of the future—it is here today and will be the future.” The 
Detroit area, the proposal noted, “is known world-wide as typical of America—industrially and 
socially…Thus it will have acceptance as a representative or demonstration center for research, 
planning and guiding of community growth.”
10
 
As described in the proposal, the “problems” produced by the region’s “inevitable” 
expansion were essentially technical ones. 
For example, a township in serving a new development puts in a six inch water 
line—the development expands and the water supply is not adequate—another 
small line is installed—and before long the two lines are inadequate. 
 
“The desire to cooperate exists today in each governmental unit,” the proposal asserted, “and this 
attitude is growing as the existence of the Metropolitan Community becomes clear to each public 
official and to each citizen.” What was needed were “facts, figures and trends which will enable 
existing governmental units to function more effectively,” and “on which basic ‘grass-roots’ 
understanding can be reached between the citizens and their governmental units.”
11
 
Connor well knew that metropolitan planning also posed political questions whose scope 
extended well beyond the appropriate diameter of suburban water lines. However, under 
executive director Walter Blucher, a former Detroit city planner who had served 19 years as head 
of the American Society of Planning Officials, the Corporation oriented itself primarily towards 
research, to the frustration of some regional leaders. “It was a big overstuffed think organization 
that never did anything,” remarked one.
12
 In the words of a later report to the Ford Foundation: 
Consensus could not be reached as to the proposed program of research. The 
hoped for cooperation between the university committee and governmental 
officials did not materialize. Public involvement in the program was far less than 
anticipated. Leadership elements of the community did not participate to the 
extent expected… 
 …[M]ost significant of all, it also became apparent that the products of the 
Corporation’s research were not being given careful consideration and its 
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Under pressure from the board, Blucher resigned in 1962, at the end of the 5-year grant period.
14
 
By 1963, however, some of the Corporation’s trustees had decided to revive the organization as 
the Metropolitan Fund. 
It seemed apparent that the region’s experiments in metropolitan planning and 
governance had a promising future under the new liberal administration s in the White House 
and Detroit’s City Hall. The political mood of the nation had changed under President Kennedy’s 
New Frontier, and the federal government was taking new steps to mandate regional planning 
and governance. Kennedy had described the future of American cities as “the great unspoken, 
overlooked, underplayed problem of our time,” and in a 1961 message to Congress, he argued 
for “an effective and comprehensive planning process in each metropolitan area,” a process that 
recognized “[t]he city and its suburbs [as] interdependent parts of a single community.”
15
 
Although the federal government had provided limited funding for regional planning agencies 
for some years, the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act was the first such piece of legislation to 
require a “continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative” process of regional transportation 
planning as a condition of receiving federal transportation funds. The legislation failed to specify 
exactly what that process should entail; nonetheless, it marked a departure from the Eisenhower 
era’s laissez-faire posture towards metropolitan planning. Meanwhile, advocates like Paul 
Ylvisaker’s former boss Joseph S. Clark—elected U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania in 1956—
pressed for further aid to the cities, including funds for mass transit and the establishment of a 
federal department of urban affairs.
16
 Metropolitan issues were sufficiently in vogue in liberal 
circles that the Port Huron Statement, the 1962 manifesto of the Students for a Democratic 
Society, devoted a section to “national and regional” solutions to the crisis of the cities. Echoing 
Ylvisaker’s brief for a metropolitan federalism, author and Royal Oak native Tom Hayden called 
for countering “suburban escapism” by complementing “decentralized ‘units’ spread horizontally 
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with central, regional democratic control,” ensuring “public, democratic control over the growth 
of the civic community and the allocation of resources.”
17
 
 New faces in Detroit’s City Hall also seemed to bode well for the future of metropolitan 
institutions, and the city’s role within them. In 1961, Detroit’s black community—which now 
represented nearly thirty percent of the population—mobilized to defeat incumbent Mayor Louis 
Miriani, who they held responsible for the Detroit Police Department’s assaults on black citizens, 
and elect 33-year-old liberal Jerome Cavanagh. Whereas Cobo and Miriani had taken a largely 
hands-off attitude towards the burgeoning suburbs, Cavanagh made clear that he expected the 
suburbs to shoulder some of the responsibility for the city’s ailing finances. Among the new 
mayor’s first major battles was securing permission from the state legislature for a municipal 
income tax that would draw revenue from city residents and suburban commuters alike.
18
 The 
system of electing Common Council members at large, rather than on a district basis, still 
functioned to diminish black representation on Detroit’s city council. Bill Patrick, Jr., first 
elected to the previously all-white body in 1957, remained the Council’s sole black member.
19
 
However, with the 1961election of Mel Ravitz, Detroit’s legislative body gained a committed 
liberal and a shrewd analyst of the urban and metropolitan scene. 
A scion of Detroit’s upwardly mobile Jewish middle class, Ravitz was raised in the city’s 
Dexter-Linwood area, the son of a headgear manufacturer who owned a factory downtown. Like 
many of his peers, he obtained a bachelor’s degree from Wayne State University. Afterwards, he 
moved to New York and took a master’s degree in sociology at the New School for Social 
Research, before returning to Detroit and completing a doctorate at the University of Michigan.
20
 
Ravitz described his father as a “Roosevelt Democrat,” and for Ravitz, as for many of his peers, 
the New Deal defined not an outer limit but a point of departure for a more thoroughgoing 
reconstruction of American government and politics.
21
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 In superficial respects, at least, Ravitz epitomized the stereotypical mid-century 
academic. Known to some City Hall insiders as “The Professor,” he was rarely seen without his 
pipe, and an adversary once complained that he “took three pages to say something that normally 
could be said in two words.”
22
 Yet the Professor also proved a force to be reckoned with outside 
the classroom. He was lecturing at Wayne State while completing his dissertation when he found 
that university policy barred him from full-time employment if he had not finished his degree in 
four years, leading him to take a position as a community organizer with the Detroit City 
Planning Commission. Ravitz’s task in this role was to help stabilize a predominantly Italian-
American area of Detroit’s East Side that was quickly transitioning to black occupancy. Instead 
of “urban renewal” through wholesale demolition, the project marked an experiment in 
“neighborhood conservation,” a task Ravitz approached through the formation of thirty-eight 
block clubs and collaborative enterprises like a neighborhood newspaper, alley clean-ups, and 
“street dances,” as well as city-sponsored physical interventions like home repairs, targeted 
demolitions, pocket parks and traffic diversions.
23
 Ravitz noted that although some of the area’s 
white residents initially hoped the planners would help them to expel the black newcomers, 
neighborhood organizing began to break down inter-racial distrust: “concern with common 
problems came to the fore,” and black and white residents even began sitting together at 
meetings. In the end, however, the conservation program was a victim of its own success. After 
neighborhood residents organized to demand better services from City Hall, Mayor Miriani 
responded by transferring Ravitz and his conservation colleagues to the Detroit Housing 
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 After his election to Common Council, Ravitz continued to advocate for policies that 
would desegregate Detroit and help to stabilize racially changing neighborhoods—a particular 
concern to the city’s Jewish community, for both altruistic and pragmatic reasons, since older 
Jewish neighborhoods, like Ravitz’s native Dexter-Linwood area, continued to present the path 
of least resistance for black Detroiters who faced organized violence when seeking housing in 
other all-white areas at the fringe of the expanding ghetto.
25
 Along with Bill Patrick, he 
sponsored a Fair Neighborhood Practices Ordinance that was ultimately passed by Council in 
November 1962 after amendments that narrowed its scope to targeting racial fearmongering by 
realtors. Patrick and Ravitz warned that in its weakened form, the ordinance failed to “focus 
attention on the basic problems inherent in the segregated housing pattern of Detroit.”
26
 Detroit’s 
Commission on Community Relations only added to their concerns the following month when its 
director refused to act on complaints brought forward under the ordinance by Irving Rubin, the 
Michigan State Highway Department public relations maven, who had also spearheaded the 
formation of a non-segregationist neighborhood association in northwest Detroit’s Bagley area.
27
 
The following year, little more than a month after Ravitz and his family returned from attending 
the 1963 March on Washington, Ravitz and Patrick’s attempt to pass a stronger open occupancy 
ordinance was decisively rejected by the other seven members of Council—a group that included 
onetime housing advocate Edward Connor.
28
 The effort came at a cost to the Ravitz family, for 
whom the issue of fair housing had become anything but academic. “We had our tires slashed 




 Despite the evident resistance of many white Detroiters to desegregation measures, 
Ravitz shared the hopes of Paul Ylvisaker and most liberal commentators with regard to the 
American metropolitan future. In a 1962 lecture entitled “The Sociology of the Suburbs,” Ravitz  
Ravitz noted that while “Negroes” accounted for just 2.5% of the population of the suburbs in 
1960, “[e]ventually and perhaps soon they are going to be racially desegregated.” Furthermore, 
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they would ultimately be re-incorporated with the central city in new structures of metropolitan 
governance: 
While it is unlikely that the suburbs will consent to annexation in the near future, 
it is likely that we will begin to see more and more inter-city and inter-county 
governmental structures established to handle the myriad problems of the region. 
We are on our way towards some form of metropolitan government. This is an 
inevitable next development in the growth of the urban area. 
 
Such metropolitan government, regardless of its specific form which will 
doubtless vary from community to community, is essential if we are to continue to 
have cities of any size at all. This metropolitan government will arise in response 
to the absolute needs of both the suburbs and the central city; it will result from 
the flow into the suburbs of those who have come to appreciate the problems of 
the city and from the return to the city of those who have experienced suburban 
living. This long range educational experience of living in both places will help 
achieve the political reality of metropolitan government to administer to what has 
even now become the social and economic reality of millions of people living a 
common and highly interdependent regional life. 
 




 It was in this optimistic climate that the trustees of the Southeastern Michigan 
Metropolitan Community Research Corporation, now the Metropolitan Fund, prepared the 
organization for a fresh start. They adopted new bylaws, overhauled the membership of the 
board, and sought out a new executive director.
31
 Kent Mathewson seemed to them an excellent 
fit.  
 
Rise of a City Manager 
 
The 45-year-old city manager recruited to lead the attack on Detroit’s “metropolitan 
problem” had never lived in Michigan or managed a city of more than 50,000 people, let alone a 
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metropolitan area of several million. However, Kent Mathewson did have a family connection to 
Detroit, a promising record in the city manager business, and a generous share of ambition. 
 Mathewson’s father, Park Mathewson, had been born into Detroit’s turn-of-the-century 
upper class. He attended the private Grosse Pointe Academy outside Detroit and was active with 
the Republican Party. After the failure of a Central American venture with the Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Company, however, Mathewson left Detroit for New York.
32
 There he joined a business 
consulting firm in the relatively new discipline of statistical analysis. Among his innovations was 
the “Bourse Business Barometer Dial,” a monthly subscription service which attempted to 
summarize business conditions through a colored graphical chart.
33
 Mathewson’s work came to 
the attention of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, who in 1924 recommended 
Mathewson to a position as assistant director and statistician of the North Carolina Department 
of Conservation and Development.
34
 In 1930, when Kent was twelve years old, his father 
suffered an hemorrhage and died, at the age of 43, while attending the national convention of the 
Sons of the American Revolution.
35
 
 The younger Mathewson entered the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1935, 
intending to become a Presbyterian minister. But the professor who taught his first-year course 
on Municipal Government and Urban Affairs urged him to consider the new field of city 
management as an opportunity to serve a larger flock. After meeting with the new city managers 
of Durham, Greensboro and Charlotte, the nineteen-year-old Mathewson convinced UNC 
president Frank Porter Graham to create a new bachelor of science program in public 
administration, with a major in city management.
 36
 
 In many respects, it was not surprising that Park Mathewson’s son would take to the city 
manager profession. The city manager form of government had originated with turn-of-the-
century businessmen who believed American cities should be governed after the model of the 
modern corporation, following principles of financial prudence and economy. Instead of handing 
public funds to an unruly group of elected officials, they sought to vest authority in a single 
appointed executive—ideally a businessman, or an expert trained in business principles. In the 
                                                     
32
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame, 23, 30. 
33
 “Bourse Furnishes Monthly Business Barometer,” Office Appliances, December 1921, 82. 
34
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame, 23-24, 29. 
35
 “Park Mathewson Dies at Convention,” New York Times, June 6, 1930, 19. 
36
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame , 8-9. Graham was a prominent Southern liberal and New Deal ally. See Patricia 




words of historian James Weinstein, the new class of city managers likewise tended towards the 




After graduating from UNC, Mathewson obtained a master’s degree in public 
administration from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School, the nation’s oldest and most 
respected program in the discipline.
38
 At the age of 29, he became the first professionally trained 
city manager of Asheboro, North Carolina. He set to work implementing modern management 
practices for the city in partnership with its elected officials, who included the owners of the 
city’s major textile and furniture factories. Mathewson displayed considerable talent, both in his 
work and in the energy with which he advanced his own career. Within two years, he had been 
selected president of the North Carolina Association of City Managers, then recruited as the first 
city manager of nearby Martinsville, Virginia.
39
 
Mathewson arrived in Martinsville in 1949, when the postwar civil rights movement was 
still a glimmer on the horizon. As the Jim Crow order came under growing assault, however, 
Mathewson’s position as a racial moderate in a small Southern town grew increasingly 
precarious. The Supreme Court had handed down its Brown v. Board decision in 1954, and in 
December 1955, Rosa Parks inaugurated the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott. Mathewson 
was no radical, but he attempted to form a commission on race relations and asked the police 
chief to eliminate the Ku Klux Klan presence in the Martinsville police department.
40
 
Such actions were more than enough to earn the family a reputation. Before long, 
Mathewson’s teenage son was getting into fights with fellow students who called his father a 
“nigger-lover,” and Mariana Mathewson urged her husband to move the family out of the 
South.
41
 In 1956, he relented and accepted a new position as city manager of Salem, Oregon, 
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 Mathewson had been in Salem only five months when he proposed the first stage of the 
metropolitan reforms that would eventually bring him to Detroit. Oregon’s capital city sat on the 
banks of the Willamette River fifty miles south of Portland. One side of the river was Marion 
County; the other side was Polk County. To shape the region’s development, Mathewson 
proposed a joint planning body with representation from the City of Salem, both counties, the 
local school district and the Oregon state government.
42
 Most likely, Mathewson knew of the 
precedent set by Detroit’s Supervisors Inter-County Committee and other groups of its kind, like 
the Metropolitan Regional Council just established in New York.
43
 
 Bringing the new organization into being was not a sure bet. Marion County had a 
growing population of more than 100,000. Polk County had little more than 25,000,
44
 largely in 
farming communities, and they were wary of interference from their more urbanized neighbors. 
To win Polk’s participation, Mathewson enlisted Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield in overtures to 
the county’s elected leaders. At one meeting, held in the back room of a rural café, their 
discussions were interrupted by the birth of a litter of farm cats.
45
 
Mathewson’s legwork paid off. In 1958, he presided over the first meeting of an Inter-
governmental Cooperation Study Committee, with representatives from all five governments. 
The effort eventually encompassed 17 subcommittees with more than two hundred members, 
including elected officials and such prominent businessmen as Gerald W. Frank, owner of 
Oregon’s Meier and Frank department store chain. Mathewson described the effort as “massive 




“Massive cooperation” was a timely concept in the late 1950s, since the prevailing trend 
in postwar American local government was towards massive fragmentation. As federal 
investment in highways and housing fueled suburban development beyond the old boundaries of 
central cities, many observers wrung their hands over the administrative chaos that ensued. At 
                                                     
42
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame, 103. 
43
 Mel Scott, American City Planning Since 1890 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 519. 
44
 Forstall, Richard L., ed.,"Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990," United States Census 
Bureau, March 27, 1995.  
45
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame, 106. 
46
 Hall, Keeper of the Flame, 103. 
82 
 
the request of New York’s Regional Plan Association, MIT researcher Robert Wood was hard at 
work on a study of local governance in greater New York that was published as 1400 
Governments in 1961.
47
 In 1959, Congress created the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, tasked with research and recommendations on how state, federal 
and local governments might more effectively cooperate.
48




In this climate, Mathewson’s Salem experiment—among the first of its kind—drew 
national attention. The keynote speaker at the launch of Mathewson’s Intergovernmental 
Cooperation Study Committee was Paul Ylvisaker. In an address delivered in the hulking New 
Deal edifice of the Oregon State Capitol, he hailed Mathewson and his collaborators as “early 




 Ylvisaker probably sensed a 
kindred spirit in the Salem city manager: his own sort of pragmatic idealist. It was Ylvisaker who 
would recommend Mathewson to the most challenging assignment of his life, and subject his 




For the time being, Mathewson had more than enough to occupy him in Salem. The Mid-
Willamette Valley Intergovernmental Cooperation Study Committee became the Mid-Willamette 
Valley Intergovernmental Cooperation Council, complete with a founding document that one of 
Mathewson’s interns had cribbed from the United Nations Charter at the Salem Public Library.
51
 
As one of the first such “councils of governments” in the country, it attracted attention across the 
United States. Not all of it was positive. The far-right columnist and commentator Dan Smoot, a 
vociferous critic of any and all metropolitan government proposals, called Mathewson a covert 
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Communist in one of his radio broadcasts.
52
 Indeed, if Smoot had known the source of the 
Council’s charter, he would not have been reassured.
53
 
In reality, however, Mathewson’s council of governments approach to metropolitan 
coordination—with its reassuring reliance on “voluntary intergovernmental cooperation”—
squared well with the mood of the times. The proliferation of local governments need not imply 
a fragmentation of the public purpose, the Council implied. Nor would it necessitate the coercive 
centralized authority that struck Smoot—and many others, including President Eisenhower 
himself—as incompatible with the American tradition of local government.
54
 A congratulatory 
letter to Oregon Governor Mark Hatfield from President Eisenhower, commemorating the 
establishment of the Council, summarized the point: 
 
Your concept of ‘massive cooperation’ as an antidote to the centralizing 
tendencies of our governmental structure is completely in accord with my own 
philosophy…Your Intergovernmental Cooperation Council could well bring the 
kind of lasting results that can only come from agreement on the part of the 
people back home who must live with the situation created by our tremendous 
nationwide urban growth. I am sure we both agree that it is utterly impossible and 
it would be unwise for the Federal Government to attempt to dictate answers for 
the many complex and diverse needs of more than 190 metropolitan areas. I 
would hope that we may see the Oregon concept spread—and quickly—to the 




The voluntary cooperation model for metropolitan governance promised practical results without 
the political fallout that might result from abrogating local privileges. 
 Skeptics may well have observed that the Salem area was not entirely typical of U.S. 
metropolitan areas. For one thing, Salem was tiny. At 50,000 residents, the city had a population 
less than half that of the Detroit suburb of Dearborn. (The entire state of Oregon, with 1.7 million 
residents in 1960, was only slightly more populous than the city of Detroit.)  Salem’s major 
industry—state government—was firmly entrenched in the central city, with little prospect of a 
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suburban relocation. In fact, Salem had no major incorporated suburban municipalities that might 
look with suspicion on central-city initiatives. Finally, Salem’s demographics were particularly 
unrepresentative of the nation’s larger cities and many of its smaller ones. At a time when the 
postwar phase of the Great Migration was reshaping urban America, Salem was 99.0% white in 
1960, a legacy of Oregon’s history as an officially whites-only state. Black residents of Salem 




 Still, there was little doubt that the Intergovernmental Cooperation Council had 
distinguished Mathewson as a trailblazer, and the Ford Foundation’s Ylvisaker had not forgotten 
him. Mathewson had picked up a love of fishing in North Carolina, and made frequent trips into 
the Cascade Mountains to visit the trout streams there. One afternoon in 1963, he was standing in 
the Metolius River near the village of Camp Sherman when the owner of the nearby country 
store came running out to see him. There was a caller asking for Mathewson, he said. Standing 
outside the store in his waders, fishing rod still in hand, Mathewson picked up a telephone 




Men of the Metropolitan Fund 
 
 Before the year was out, Mathewson and his family were on the road to Detroit. 
Recuperating from a cold on the long drive, he asked his son Bill to read him a report on the 
water politics of suburban Oakland County.
58
 After considering the old-money suburbs of Grosse 
Pointe, where his father had been educated, the family settled in the newer suburb of Bloomfield 
Hills, farther from downtown Detroit but set amidst central Oakland County’s rolling hills and 
sparkling lakes.
59
 Mathewson’s house on Chablis Drive was twenty-five miles from downtown, 
but the distance could be easily travelled on the new expressways then being carved through the 
city. The Metropolitan Fund’s office in a brand-new downtown skyscraper, directly opposite the 
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new City-County Building, gave Mathewson convenient access to many of the metropolitan 
region’s leading citizens. 
Indeed, a large proportion of those individuals sat on the Metropolitan Fund’s Board of 
Trustees. By 1965, the trustees encompassed 58 men, including a roughly equal proportion from 
the region’s public officials and its private sector leadership, plus the presidents and top 
university officials of the University of Michigan, Wayne State, Michigan State, and the 
University of Detroit. They included the presidents of the Big Three automakers as well as 
executives of the region’s major utilities and banks. The six county board chairmen of the SICC 
member counties were included, as was SICC director Gerald Coleman, SICC founder Edward 
Connor, and Regional Planning Commission chairman R.J. Alexander. Unlike SICC, however, 
the Metropolitan Fund board also encompassed Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh—who sat on 
the Executive Committee—and five other mayors, representing the older urban centers of 




 Notably, the trustees also included an elder leader of Detroit’s Jewish community, 
Samuel Rubiner,
61
 as well as three prominent members of what was then known as Detroit’s 
Negro community—James McClendon, Wade McCree, Jr, and Richard Austin. Reflecting the 
degree of exclusion faced by black Detroiters from both business and politics, none of these men 
held elected office or leadership positions in major corporations, in sharp contrast to the white 
trustees. McClendon was a doctor who had been elected president of Detroit’s NAACP chapter 
in the late 1930s.
62
 McCree, who became the first black judge in Michigan when appointed to the 
Wayne County Circuit Court in 1954, had been appointed a federal judge by President 
Kennedy.
63
 Of the three, Richard Austin was probably the most influential, and the only one who 
had been raised and educated in Detroit. After graduating first in his class from Cass Technical 
High School, he had become Michigan’s first black certified public accountant. In some ways, 
however, Austin—like McCree and McClendon—represented an older generation of black 
leadership in Detroit, a group that predated the rise of the civil rights movement and the 
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emboldened activism of the 1960s. In the primary election of 1964, Austin had narrowly lost the 




 The Metropolitan Fund’s board was relatively light on the new generation of suburban 
municipal leaders, with the exception of Warren Mayor William Shaw. Some of the chairs of the 
County Board of Supervisors also represented suburban cities: Edward J. Bonior of Macomb 
County, for example, was also the mayor of the suburb of East Detroit. But the County chairs 
were just as likely to come from more rural areas, like Delos Hamlin, the Oakland County farmer 
and Board of Commissioners chair who served as Vice Chair for the Fund. The mayors of 
Monroe, Pontiac, Port Huron and Ann Arbor were “suburban” in the sense that their cities had 
increasingly been incorporated into the broader metropolitan economy. However, each of those 
cities had a long history that preceded Detroit’s suburbanization. The second-largest city in the 
six-county region—and the fourth-largest city in Michigan, after Detroit, Flint and Grand 
Rapids—was the suburb of Dearborn, home of Ford’s headquarters and famed River Rouge 
plant. But Dearborn Mayor Orville Hubbard, a nationally known segregationist who took pride 
in his efforts to keep his city all-white, did not sit on the Metropolitan Fund board.
65
 
 At the time, however, the Metropolitan Fund’s board probably seemed—to most of its 
members—a fairly representative collection of the southeast Michigan region’s most prominent 
citizens. Now it was up to Mathewson to bring them into agreement on a plan for “massive 
cooperation” in the Motor City region. 
 
Blueprint for Reform 
 
The Fund’s first milestone under Mathewson was overseeing a report on local 
government purchasing practices in the metropolitan area. Conducted by a University of Detroit 
professor, the study estimated that local governments in southeast Michigan could save $15 
million each year if they established cooperative metropolitan purchasing arrangements, like the 
one that tri-county school districts already used to supply their classrooms with typewriters. The 
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report received positive coverage in the Detroit Free Press, which described it as the fund’s 
“first major project.”
66
 It was difficult to argue with saving taxpayer dollars. 
The Free Press did not mention that the Metropolitan Fund had already taken delivery of 
another study with far more sweeping implications. In 1964, the Fund had engaged the nonprofit 
Citizens Research Council and several professors from the University of Michigan, Wayne State 
University, and Michigan State University to survey local elected officials and prepare a study of 
“Governmental Organization for Metropolitan Southeast Michigan.” The professors submitted 
their 170-page report in January of 1965. It provided a detailed analysis of existing local 
government arrangements in the six-county region, including detailed evaluations of the Detroit 
water system, the Regional Planning Commission, and the Supervisors Inter-County Committee. 
Based on that analysis, it recommended a major overhaul of regional planning and governance in 
greater Detroit—along the lines of Mathewson’s Mid-Willamette organization.
67
 
The section on the Regional Planning Commission presented an especially sharp picture 
of the agency’s weaknesses. In the 1950s battle over water between Wayne County and the City 
of Detroit, the report noted, the role of the RPC had been “peripheral at best, and even on the 
periphery, minimal—possibly ascribable to the fact that the major contestants were strongly 
represented on the Commission.” In the contest over the location of Detroit’s major airport, the 
RPC had been sidelined again. “The issue was ultimately decided, not by the science and logic of 
modern regional planning techniques, but by the superior political generalship of the Wayne 
County Road Commission and its allies.” Nor had the Regional Planning Commission ever 
settled a dispute over highway planning. In conclusion: 
 
The governments concerned with major regional problems have slugged, slogged, 
waded, swum, stumbled and staggered through to solutions (or stalemates) largely 
without reference to regional planning or the Regional Planning Commission. 
 
Regional problems devolved into disputes to be settled by the application of 
political power and maneuver—sometimes with less than salutary results, nearly 
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To an extent, this was the result of structural factors: the RPC’s dependence on its constituent 
governments’ financial support and the reluctance of those governments to cede power. Most of 
all, however, the report blamed the RPC’s narrow conception of its mission, which led it to focus 
on a “generalized land use plan” instead of taking on a larger role in planning the regional 
infrastructure facilities that actually guided metropolitan development.
69
 
 The Supervisors Inter-County Committee fared better in the report. It had been assessed 
by University of Michigan professor William R. Gable in an article entitled “The Metropolitan 
Council as a Device to Foster and Coordinate Intergovernmental Cooperation.” Gable observed 
that over the decade since SICC’s initial organization, metropolitan councils had been 
established in several other metropolitan regions, including San Francisco, Seattle and New York 
City as well as Salem. “There is presently some criticism of SICC,” Gable wrote, “that it is not 
keeping up with the changing nature of the Detroit Metropolitan Area and that voluntary councils 




 Gable offered several “alternatives” for consideration. Taken together, they amounted to 
a blueprint for transforming SICC by expanding its political base beyond the county 
governments and improving its technical capacity. First, Gable suggested, SICC should be 
reorganized “to provide equal weight for the municipalities in each county,” not just county 
government. Second, SICC should be provided with “a permanent urban study staff” that would 
allow it to conduct its own research and planning. A potential basis for that staff already existed. 
“The Regional Planning Commission,” Gable noted, “might well be placed within the operating 
framework of a combined Inter-County Municipal Metropolitan Council or Committee.” 
 The Summary Report to the Metropolitan Fund built on Gable’s recommendations to 
develop a clear plan for action. “Voluntary intergovernmental cooperation among the local 
governments of Southeast Michigan has proven to be the most feasible and desirable means to 
cope with area-wide problems,” the researchers concluded. SICC had “served effectively,” but 
its structure should be expanded to include representatives from all local governments that 
wished to pay fees to support the organization, including incorporated cities and villages, 
townships, and school districts. Since this would bring the new Council of Governments’ total 




 Ibid, 102. 
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potential number of members to a staggering 404, the organization might consider two main 
legislative bodies: a “general assembly,” including all member governments, and a smaller 
executive body, representative of the larger whole. The executive, the report stated, should 
include “representation from each type of unit in each county in the area,” and should 
specifically include direct representation for the City of Detroit. Furthermore, as Gable had 
recommended, the functions of the Regional Planning Commission should be shifted to the 
COG. This would “enable the Council to more intelligently evaluate regional problems and their 
solutions,” and, by attaching the planning staff to top elected officials, it would “increase the 
likelihood of the planning being implemented.”
71
 
 In one important respect, the new Council of Governments would not differ from its 
predecessors. It would not be a government unto itself, with the authority to compel membership, 
tax or provide public services directly. The researchers had categorically rejected the formation 
of a full-fledged metropolitan government, after the Toronto model. “In the absence of a major 
crisis in the provision of local government services in the area,” they wrote, “such a drastic move 
is believed to be politically impractical, and no such crisis exists in Southeast Michigan.” 
Furthermore, “even if such a solution were politically feasible, it would not necessarily be 
desirable.” No such multi-county metropolitan government had ever been tried in the United 
States, and such a government would be “too big to function as a truly local unit of government 
representative of the diverse interests of the citizens who reside in the metropolitan complex.”
72
 
 Unstated in the proposal was an important question: if the Council of Governments was 
not a government, what was it?  The professors argued that it would provide a device for 
“improving communication and thus cooperation…Its power will be persuasion, not coercion.”
73
 
But as the example of the SICC had indicated, communication did not ensure cooperation. Could 
persuasion suffice to bring about consensus on the range of issues facing the metropolitan 
region? Could the Council survive as a voluntary organization, vulnerable to exit by any 
disaffected member? 
 Such questions had precedents in the American political tradition, as Paul Ylvisaker had 
observed. His call for a “metropolitan federalism” cited the U.S. Constitution, with its balancing 
of power between state and nation. The Constitution, of course, had not fully settled the question 
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of state and federal prerogatives. Federal troops had ultimately helped answer it, at Gettysburg 
and elsewhere, but in 1965, it was clear that secession’s challenge to federalism had only been 
partially settled. As the Metropolitan Fund’s board members reviewed the report, events in 
Selma, Alabama provided a vivid reminder of that fact. 
By establishing a larger role for Detroit and other cities, however, the COG proposal did 
mark a significant change from the SICC. And for the time being, the political landscape of 
greater Detroit’s governments appeared considerably less polarized than the situation on Selma’s 
Edmund Pettus Bridge. Perhaps, as the professors argued, the COG proposal’s merit lay in its 
ability to redress their failure to communicate. 
 
Towards a COG Consensus 
 
Pursuant to the bylaws of the Metropolitan Fund, all members of its board of trustees 
were invited to read the policy recommendations the professors had delivered, provide 
comments, and cast ballots to support or oppose their adoption. “I am pleased to advise,” 




 Most of the comments on the report came from SICC director Gerard Coleman, whose 
organization would be most directly affected by its implementation. Coleman took issue with 
several items in the report, including the notion that SICC’s structure excluded cities and 
townships from representation. Since county boards of supervisors were themselves composed of 
local elected officials, Coleman argued, this charge was not entirely fair.
75
 Coleman also 
questioned the recommendation that school districts be represented in the new organization, 
arguing that school districts had traditionally been regarded as “separate and apart from the 
functions of other local units of government,” and lacked common interests with general-purpose 
governments, other than “competition for the local property tax dollar.” In this, he was countered 
with comments from Joseph Hudson, owner of Detroit’s Hudson’s department store chain. 
Hudson noted that the region’s school districts employed as many people as all other local 
governments combined, and increasingly collaborated with other agencies “in the wars on crime 
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 Even Coleman, however, refrained from formal dissent. He acknowledged that 
the proposed restructuring of SICC “undoubtedly has considerable merit,” while hastening to add 




  With this vote of confidence, and assent (grudging or not) from Coleman, Mathewson 
moved to put the report’s recommendations into action. He convened a committee of 100 local 
elected officials to oversee the process, including three subcommittees on finance, 
representation, and functions and organization. These were chaired, respectively, by Royal Oak 
Mayor L. Curtis Potter, East Detroit Mayor Edward Bonior, and Detroit’s Mayor Cavanagh, a 
group that represented all three of greater Detroit’s most populous counties.
78
 
 On May 4, 1967, the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments held its first official 
meeting. The event took place at the Civic Center Recreation Building in Southfield, the fast-
growing Oakland County suburb on Detroit’s northwest side. A few miles to the south sprawled 
the 161-acre Northland Center shopping mall, one of the first and largest in the country.
79
 
Perhaps the suburban location had been intended to reassure suburban elected officials that the 
COG, like SICC, would not be a Detroit-dominated organization. It may also have been chosen 
for convenience. Southfield sat very nearly at the exact geographic center of the seven-county 
region, and enjoyed easy access to many major area thoroughfares, including a recently 
completed extension of the Lodge Expressway. 
 The meeting came to order at 3 in the afternoon. Royal Oak’s Mayor Potter read a 
congratulatory telegram from Vice-President Hubert Humphrey. Detroit Common Council 
member and former city planner Mel Ravitz delivered the keynote address, which he titled “The 
Committee of 100 and its Challenge.” Ravitz described himself as “hopeful” regarding the 
Council of Governments, though he emphasized that it was no panacea. 
 
I happen to be a strong believer in the value of a Council of Governments at this 
stage of our development. But I do not want to be misunderstood or seem unduly 
optimistic. 
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Make no mistake: the Council of Governments has limitations. It may 
even fail. But do not overlook that it has immense possibilities for a large step 
forward. It will provide for greater grass roots participation – albeit of officials – 
but this is good and in tune with the trend. I believe the Council of Governments 
is a reasonable plan for our regional future. There are those, I know, who argue 
that planners make mistakes. This I do not deny; but we should also note that 
those who never plan also make mistakes – more often, costly mistakes… 
The time is long since past when we could afford the luxury of narrow, 
provincial thinking. As the region and the population have grown, so too must our 
concepts and our administrative mechanisms grow. The Council of Governments 
is the next reasonable step forward to permit us to tackle the pressing urban 
problems ahead. 
 
The membership appointed Ravitz and Potter to the Steering Committee for the new 
organization, along with Oakland County Board of Commissioners chair Delos Hamlin, Macomb 
school board member Glen Peters, and Dearborn Corporation Counsel Ralph Guy, Jr. The 
meeting adjourned at 4:45.
80
 Those who had followed the development of the region’s 
metropolitan institutions over the previous twenty years might have reflected on the absence of 
one individual in particular. Edward Connor  had succumbed to a heart attack three months 





Urban Problems: July 1967 
 
Over the four years since Kent Mathewson had first arrived for his interview at the 
Detroit Club, Detroit and other American cities had been powerfully affected by the growth of 
the black freedom movement in the North. On June 23, 1963, the 20
th
 anniversary of the 1943 
Detroit riot, more than 125,000 people had paraded down Woodward Avenue in the largest civil 
rights demonstration in U.S. history to that point. Organized by a group led by Detroit’s Rev. 
C.L. Franklin, minister of New Bethel Baptist Church, the “Walk to Freedom” ended at Cobo 
Arena with speeches by Mayor Cavanagh, the United Auto Workers’ Walter Reuther, and the 
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
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In his concluding speech, two months before the March on Washington, King made his 
first use of the refrain “I have a dream.” As he expressed, the demonstration was both a show of 
solidarity with the movement in the South and a bold assertion of the black community’s 
growing power in Detroit. In the arena named for the segregationist mayor who had still held 
power just six years earlier, King praised the “magnificent new militancy” on display and urged 
the audience to “work with determination to get rid of any segregation and discrimination in 
Detroit, realizing that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” and that “de 
facto segregation in the North is just as injurious as the actual segregation in the South.” He 
cited discrimination in housing and employment and the “de facto” racial segregation in public 
schools. “I have a dream,” King proclaimed in his peroration, “that one day right here in 
Detroit, Negroes will be able to buy a house or rent a house anywhere that their money will 
carry them and they will be able to get a job,” drawing shouts of “that’s right!”
82
 
Despite the new militancy, however, and the ascension of Cavanagh, Ravitz and other 
liberals to city government, civil rights struggles in Detroit continued to meet vociferous 
resistance from the city’s white majority. In 1964, following the defeat of Patrick and Ravitz’s 
open occupancy ordinance, white neighborhood organizations successfully placed a referendum 
on the city ballot for a Homeowners’ Rights Ordinance that would protect the “right” to 
discriminate in selling one’s home. Despite a concerted campaign by liberals to defeat the 
measure, it passed, prompting a two-year battle over its constitutionality. In the same election, 
city voters also shot down a bond proposal to fund the construction of a new high school—a 
racially loaded decision, since the Detroit electorate was still less than one-third black and the 
Detroit Public Schools were at the point of tipping towards a majority-black student body.
83
 
The most explosive issue was the one that had propelled Cavanagh into office: the 
conduct of Detroit’s nearly all-white police force towards black citizens. Cavanagh had initially 
pleased black leaders with his appointment of liberal reformer George Edwards to the position of 
Police Commissioner. However, Edwards resisted their demand for a civilian review board to 
investigate police brutality, and also faced fierce opposition from white conservatives like 
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Common Council’s William Rogell, who complained that “Edwards’ main goal in his job is to 
appease the Negro.”
84
 Edwards resigned in 1963, and Cavanagh’s reform efforts bore little 
immediate fruit in the profoundly racist Detroit Police Department.
85
 
Over the summer of 1966, on the heels of the previous year’s Watts uprising in Los 
Angeles, altercations between residents and police in Chicago and Cleveland escalated into 
larger conflagrations that left seven people dead, all of them black residents killed by police, 
National Guardsmen, white vigilantes, or “stray bullets.”
86
 Despite Detroit’s public image as a 
progressive “model city,” an image cultivated by Mayor Cavanagh and taken at face value by 
many members of the civic elite, black residents and city officials were increasingly on edge. A 
1966 altercation between Detroit police and black youths on Kercheval Street on the city’s east 
side put authorities on high alert. State Senate candidate Coleman Young, who was in the 
running to become that house’s second black legislator, happened to be in the neighborhood 
hosting a wake for his late father. On learning of the incident, he quickly mobilized a group of 
black and white leaders, including Detroit Congressman Charles Diggs, to walk Kercheval and 
keep the peace. As Young later recounted, some of the DPD rank-and-file were less interested in 
de-escalating the situation. “You goddamn niggers get your black asses off the street,” one 
officer growled at the group as a line of police cruisers drove past them. In June of 1967, a 
month after the inaugural SEMCOG meeting, urban uprisings occurred in Tampa, Cincinnati, 
Atlanta, and finally Newark, New Jersey, where 23 died. 
In Detroit, the spark came at the corner of Twelfth and Clairmount, in the heart of the 
densely populated black West Side. The neighborhood had been entirely white just two decades 
earlier, but in the wake of the war, as its mostly Jewish residents moved out, it became a 
destination for black Detroiters escaping the overcrowded East Side enclaves of Black Bottom 
and Paradise Valley. In the 1950s, as Mayor Cobo’s bulldozers flattened those neighborhoods in 
the name of “urban renewal,” the migration became a flood. “Within a few years,” recounted 
Coleman Young, who along with his wife had been one of the first black residents to “integrate” 
an all-white block off Twelfth Street (and was forced to pay twice as much in rent for his one-
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bedroom apartment as its previous white occupants had), “the entire Twelfth Street community 
was one of the most densely populated areas in the country, an impoverished, underequipped, 
irritable and desperate neighborhood that trebled the problems of Black Bottom while inheriting 
little of its charisma.”
87
 
 Tens of thousands of commuters from northwest Detroit and the Oakland County suburbs 
passed by the neighborhood every day on the Lodge Expressway, which linked the downtown to 
northwest Detroit and the Oakland County suburbs beyond. Kent Mathewson was probably one 
of them; he was usually running too late in the mornings to catch the Grand Trunk Railroad 
commuter train that still ferried businessmen downtown from suburban stations in Pontiac, 
Birmingham and Royal Oak.
88
 From the trench of the expressway, the commuters could glimpse 
some of the adjacent buildings, and sometimes even the residents of the neighborhood as they 
crossed the bridges overhead. How the people of Twelfth Street factored into the “metropolitan 
problem” was not clear. In 1964, the task of planning “operational attacks” on “pockets of 
poverty” had been added to the Metropolitan Fund’s list of objectives,
89
 but there had been little 
or no discussion of racial segregation and inequality in crafting the structure of SEMCOG. 
 In the early morning of July 23, 1967, less than three months after the first SEMCOG 
meeting in Southfield, the residents of Twelfth Street made their presence known. In the 
aftermath, as SEMCOG attempted to make the case for regional cooperation, Detroit’s 
“metropolitan problem” took on a politically incendiary new dimension.
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Chapter 3: A Region in Revolt 
 
 On June 12, 1967, residents of the exclusive riverfront suburbs just east of Detroit went 
to the polls to elect two new members of the Grosse Pointe School Board. Many years after Kent 
Mathewson’s father had attended the Grosse Pointe Academy, the people of the Pointes still took 
a strong interest in the schools that, they hoped, would maintain their municipalities’ prestige and 
prepare their children to prosper as well.“The area included within the Grosse Pointe School 
District is often described as a suburban, residential community without a major industry,” 
observed psychoanalyst and incumbent School Board President Frank H. Parcells, in his Grosse 
Pointe News campaign ad. “NOT SO! Education is our major industry. The educated, 
knowledgable [sic], inquiring young citizen is our product.”
1
 Another candidate, a Ford Motor 
Company attorney named Bert H. Wicking, reminded voters that “[c]onsistent land values are 
dependent on a stable, conservative, fiscally responsible school board.”
2
 In the 1967 election, 
however, a new issue came to the fore: the fledgling Southeast Michigan Council of 
Governments, which two insurgent candidates claimed might mean the end of the Grosse Pointe 
school district and its privileges. 
 How Arnold P. Fuchs and Calvin J. Sandberg first decided to challenge the Council of 
Governments is not clear. Fuchs was Missile Division Program Manager for one of the Big 
Three automakers; Sandberg an Air Force veteran and engineer now working as a “professional 
writer and research analyst.” While other candidates for school board stressed their own personal 
and professional qualifications, Fuchs and Sandberg campaigned with a manifesto to ensure local 
control of the Grosse Pointe Schools by keeping the district out of SEMCOG. “AT LEAST YOU 
KNOW WHERE WE STAND,” their ads proclaimed. 
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For the retention of complete local control of our school system by the citizens of 
the Grosse Pointe School District, to whom it belongs. 
 
For the preservation and continued development of a school system uniquely 
equipped to prepare the children of the Grosse Pointe School District for the 




The theory that neither of the foregoing principles would, in any way be 
compromised by the assimilation of our School District into a regional concept 





The advertisement made no explicit mention of race, but Grosse Pointe residents were well 
aware that the Detroit Public Schools had recently gained a majority-black student population, 




Fuchs and Sandberg’s charges were met with bewilderment by the Grosse Pointe 
educational establishment. Acting School Superintendent J. Harold Husband assured residents 
that according to Michigan law, a school district could not be “assimilated” without a vote of the 
people. Board President Parcells urged voters to disregard “irresponsible criticisms.” Yet another 
candidate, Alan Neef, took the Fuchs and Sandberg line seriously enough to pledge his own 
commitment to “maintaining educational excellance [sic]…for our own children undiluted by 
outside students who are not our direct concern.”
5
 On Election Day, however, Fuchs and 
Sandberg triumphed as almost twice the usual number of voters went to the polls.
6
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 The challenge to the fledgling Council of Governments in the 1967 election for Grosse 
Pointe School Board foreshadowed a growing tide of opposition to the institution that gained 
strength in the months and years to come. When Kent Mathewson arrived in Detroit, almost no 
one framed the “metropolitan problem” as an issue of race or inequality. As the civil rights 
movement began to challenge segregation in North, however, and particularly after the uprising 
of 1967, the “metropolitan problem” came to be understood by many people—black and white, 
left and right—as essentially a racial problem, the latest permutation of the “American 
dilemma.” In that context, new metropolitan institutions came under immediate scrutiny by 
whites and blacks alike. SEMCOG would strive mightily to dispense with any notion that it 
sought to desegregate the suburbs, on the one hand, or dismantle black political power in the 
central city, on the other. Ultimately, as Mathewson found to his chagrin, the Council of 
Governments would only survive by taking a hard line against the stronger metropolitan 
government that he had begun to champion. 
 
From New COG to New Detroit 
 
By the time of the Grosse Pointe school board elections, stirrings of opposition to 
SEMCOG had also manifested in Lansing. As early as June, Mel Ravitz of SEMCOG’s steering 
committee had noted “strong conservative opposition” to the bills that would provide a formal 
legal basis for councils of government.
7
 One of the leading opponents was State Senator Robert 
Huber, Republican and chair of the Senate’s Municipalities Committee. The owner of a Detroit 
manufacturing firm, Huber had previously served as the mayor of Troy, one of the region’s 
fastest-growing suburbs. His public and private roles were sometimes difficult to distinguish: 
during Huber’s term as Mayor, the City of Troy had purchased the eighty-acre Huber farm to be 
developed as a new Civic Center.
8
  
 On Thursday, July 20, 1967, Huber’s Municipalities Committee and the Taxation 
Committee held a joint hearing at Detroit’s City-County Building on the proposals that would lay 
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a foundation for the Council of Governments. The event drew a set of speakers who described 
metropolitan government as a “Communist plot,” using the talking points that conservative 
commentators like Dan Smoot and Jo Hindman had popularized. “You want to do away with the 
last vestige of home rule and brainwash innocent people into the viselike grip of metropolitan 
government,” fulminated Anderson Arberry, an orthodontist from the city of Midland, a hundred 
miles from Detroit. “COG isn’t new,” charged Madeline Darrow of St. Clair Shores. “It’s been in 
Russia for several years,” she said, noting that Miami officials voted to create their metropolitan 
government shortly after a trip to Moscow.
9
 
 Actual municipal officials, however, seem to have been conspicuously absent from the 
opposition. Indeed, the News noted, several local officials from the northern suburbs spoke in 
favor of the COG legislation, including Glen Peters of the Macomb County Board of Education, 
representing the Michigan Association of Schools; William Mainland, Oakland Township 
Supervisor, who represented the Michigan Townships Association; and Delos Hamlin, chair of 
the Oakland County Board of Supervisors.
10
 This seemed to square with Hamlin’s description of 
the opposition, according to the News, as “a tiny but active group of ultraconservatives.”
11
 The 
most vocal opposition in the metropolitan area, the News stated, had originated in the Grosse 
Pointe communities, where, the News noted, school board candidates had charged that the 
Council of Governments would “meddle in the racial composition of school enrollments and 
force the opening of municipal parks to outsiders.”
12
 
 The News treatment of the Detroit SEMCOG hearing implied that opposition to the 
organization was a fringe opinion. This was probably true on July 20, 1967. Most suburbanites 
certainly would have opposed any consolidation of school districts with Detroit, but such action 
was hard for them to imagine. A few days later, however, a police raid on Twelfth Street touched 
off the Detroit uprising of 1967, and, eventually, a high-stakes debate over what the suburbs 
owed to the central city. 
The Detroit rebellion of 1967 has taken on a mythic significance somewhat out of 
proportion to the actual damage that rioters caused over five days of protest. Despite initial 
estimates of property damage valued at up to $500 million, the total was ultimately estimated at 
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less than $45 million.
13
 About two thousand buildings were looted or burned, a number greatly 
increased by the strong winds that spread flames from commercial streets to adjacent residential 
areas.
14
 Governor George Romney stated that Detroit looked as though it had suffered an aerial 
bombardment, but in fact much of the city was physically untouched by the rebellion. In terms of 
brick and mortar turned to rubble, urban renewal and expressway construction over the previous 
two decades had wreaked far more extensive damage. The construction of the Lodge Expressway 
alone had destroyed nearly three thousand structures.
15
 In fact, the physical destruction of the 
overcrowded inner city struck officials still committed to “urban renewal” by clearance as a 
silver lining. “The tragedy,” remarked one of Mayor Cavanagh’s aides, “was not that so much of 
the city was burned, but so little.”
16
 
Forty-three people lost their lives in the rebellion. Yet that toll marked the force with 
which the rebellion was subdued much more than it did the fury of the rioters. At least thirty of 
the dead were killed by law enforcement personnel. Only two of the dead were killed by rioters: 
a Detroit firefighter and the owner of a shoe store. One hundred and seventy-five people had 
been murdered in Detroit in the previous year alone.
17
 
What cannot be underestimated is the rebellion’s psychological impact. For white 
residents of the region, in particular, the events of July 1967 ignited fears and anxieties that had 
smoldered for decades. By that time, a generation had grown up under the conditions of 
residential segregation mandated by federal and local policy. In this context, large portions of the 
white community succumbed to hysteria fed by sensational media reports of black militancy. 
Rumors circulated that the next rebellion would involve a black invasion of the suburbs. 
Handgun registrations skyrocketed, and the police departments of Dearborn and Livonia hosted 
target practice classes for their residents. Hubert Locke, one of the highest-ranking black 
officials in the administration of Mayor Cavanagh, theorized that whites furthest removed from 
Detroit’s black community were most susceptible to the rumors. Yet the white Detroit 
neighborhoods on the frontlines of racial transition also proved fertile ground for fear. The 
Northeast Detroiter, a neighborhood newspaper particularly attuned to its readers’ anxieties,  
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printed such articles as one headlined “Civil War in Detroit’s Future,” which described black 
militants’ plans for targeting white children.
 18
 
For a time, the uprisings in Detroit and other cities also prompted politicians and 
corporate leaders to advocate far-reaching proposals for metropolitan desegregation. The most 
eloquent statement of the liberal establishment response, the 1968 report of President Johnson’s 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, spotlighted the role of metropolitan 
segregation in racial inequality. The Kerner Report, as it came to be known, warned that America 
was “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”
19
 The two 
societies had a clear spatial definition: “one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; 
                                                     
18
 Marilynn Rosenthal, “Where Rumor Raged,” Trans-action, February 1971, 35-43. 
19
 U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders (New York: Bantam, 1968), 1. 
 
Figure 3.1. A block of flats off Linwood Avenue goes up in flames on the first day of the 1967 
Detroit rebellion. High winds spread fires and caused widespread damage to residential 
areas. Rev. C.L. Franklin’s New Bethel Baptist Church is visible through the smoke at upper 




the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs and outlying areas.”
20
 The 
Commission called for a dual program of both equalization and integration: “ghetto enrichment” 
complemented with “[p]rograms which will allow substantial Negro movement out of the 
ghettos,” including an overhaul of federal housing policy to counter segregation.
21
 
The Kerner Report scarcely acknowledged the role of the federal government in 
constructing the all-white enclaves of American suburbia.
22
 However, in a chapter titled “The 
Formation of the Racial Ghettos,” the authors stressed the magnitude of white suburbanization 
and the sharp distinction between the dispersal of white immigrant groups into the suburbs and 
the continued confinement of blacks in the central cities, a pattern of growing polarization not 
reducible to economics.
23
 The report projected that if current trends continued, ten major cities, 
including Detroit, would have black majorities by 1980, and might be “nearly bankrupt,” while 
suburbs and outlying areas would remain “generally affluent” and more than 95 percent white.
24
 
“Within two decades,” the Commission warned, “this division could be so deep that it would be 
almost impossible to unite” the segregated societies. It closed the report with a call to action at 
the scale of the metropolitan region. “We cannot escape responsibility for choosing the future of 
our metropolitan areas and the human relations which develop within them. It is a responsibility 




The Kerner Report did not set out an agenda for metropolitan government. Indeed, in a 
paragraph on the topic, it stressed the limitations of governmental restructuring as a path to racial 
justice. 
Some areas might avoid political confrontation by shifting to some form of 
metropolitan government designed to offer regional solutions for pressing urban 
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problems such as property taxation, air and water pollution and refuse disposal, 
and commuter transport. Yet this would hardly eliminate the basic segregation 
and relative poverty of the urban Negro population. It might even increase the 
Negro’s sense of frustration and alienation if it operated to prevent Negro political 




Metropolitan desegregation, however, stood at the heart of the Kerner recommendations, 
although the report remained vague on how that goal should be pursued. In addition to a national 
fair housing law, the commission recommended the reorientation of federal housing programs to 
place new low and moderate-income housing in “nonghetto areas, particularly those outside the 
central city.”
27
  It did not indicate how this goal might be accomplished in the face of local 
opposition. 
Kent Mathewson could be counted on to have some ideas on the subject. As one of the 
key liaisons between the corporate directorate and the region’s political leadership, he played a 
vital role in the business response to the rebellion. According to Wayne State professor and 
policing consultant Hubert Locke, it was Mathewson who helped convince Metropolitan Fund 
board chair Joseph Hudson to chair the New Detroit Committee, a public-private “urban 
coalition.”
28
 A study of the first five years of the organization described Mathewson as 
“Hudson’s loyal and expert right hand in building New Detroit.”
29
 Mathewson advised Hudson 
on the selection of the committee’s members, drawn from across the tri-county area, and was 
“directly in charge of the committee staff’s operations.”
30
 Mathewson also convinced Hudson of 
the need to hire a black executive director of the new organization, and recruited former Detroit 
city councilman and Michigan Bell executive Bill Patrick, Jr. for the position.
31
 
Like peer organizations around the country, New Detroit focused on channeling corporate 
resources into the “inner city” that its benefactors had largely abandoned.
32
 Yet Mathewson 
believed that the rebellion also demanded a metropolitan response and a transformation of 
regional public policy. In a February 23, 1968 address at Cranbrook, the elite Bloomfield Hills 
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Figure 3.2.  Although Joseph Hudson (left) was the public face of the New Detroit Committee, 
Kent Mathewson (right) and the Metropolitan Fund played a crucial role in its establishment.  
Wayne State University, Virtual Motor City Collection. 
 
 
Figure 3. 3.  One of the nation’s first “urban coalitions,” the group’s initial iteration brought 
together black Detroiters and some of the region’s most powerful corporate leaders. Wayne 
State University, Virtual Motor City Collection. 
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prep school and art institute, Mathewson called for suburban residents to take responsibility for 
the so-called “urban crisis.”  
While there is much that must be done and decided by those who live in the city, 
it is up to the white suburban voter and the white out-state legislator to breathe 
funds and taxes back into our flaking core cities. It is up to those who live 
‘outside of town’ to narrow the income gap and revise the zoning laws that pen 
the inner city resident behind invisible walls of prejudice and despair…It is up to 
the suburbanite who works in the city to examine the possibility of regional 
taxation to give the unseen children below the expressway the same American 
opportunities that his own children enjoy. 
 
Mathewson insisted that such action was ultimately in the interest of white suburbanites. “[T]he 
problem is in the suburbs…the answer is in the suburbs…and, quite naturally, the consequence 
of inaction will ultimately come to roost in the suburbs,” he said, through “the white 
community’s ever-increasing load of financial, physical and intellectual commitment to treat the 
wounds of the inner city.”
33
 
 One of Mathewson’s more creative responses to the rebellion was a proposal for “skip 
annexation,” in which central cities would annex islands of suburban greenfield land and develop 
them as “new towns” with desegregated housing that could bring black residents closer to 
suburban jobs. Mathewson described the concept in an article in The Nation’s Cities, the organ 
of the National League of Cities. In Detroit, the idea drew the support of Mayor Cavanagh, and 
the City Plan Commission examined the possibility of creating a “satellite city” in the 
undeveloped northwestern corner of Wayne County, where the City already owned two large 




Mathewson’s concept of metropolitan responsibility towards black Detroiters, however, 
was not shared by a majority of white suburbanites. In the fall of 1967, local elections in Royal 
Oak spelled trouble for the Council of Governments. Royal Oak, one of Detroit’s more 
established suburbs, was located along Woodward Avenue in southeastern Oakland County, two 
miles north of Detroit. By 1960 it had more than 80,000 residents, nearly all of them white. 
Mayor L. Curtis Potter had chaired the Metropolitan Fund’s Committee of 100 as it laid the 
foundation for SEMCOG and had been elected temporary chairman of the General Assembly its 
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May 1967 meeting. The meeting had drawn little controversy at the time, but as Potter sought re-
election for a third term in November, he faced a growing backlash against his role in SEMCOG. 
Of 15 candidates that year for Mayor and City Commission, only 5 unapologetically supported 
SEMCOG, while 6 were strongly opposed. The Detroit “riots,” and the ensuing talk of action to 




“The July riots indicated we must all be concerned with each other’s problems,” Mayor 
Potter told the Tribune, decrying opposition to SEMCOG as “isolationism.” Yet he also assured 
constituents that “it will only be a coordinating agency, not a controlling one.” The fact that 
SEMCOG’s authority rested in the General Assembly, where each government had a vote 
regardless of population, “will defend against a big city ruling the roost.”
36
 Others disagreed. 
One of Potter’s opponents, former City Commissioner Robert Patnales, called for a public 
referendum on Royal Oak’s membership in SEMCOG. “I think the current COG supporters do 
not intend to allow it to stop with studying regional problems,” Patnales told the Tribune; they 
planned to use it to attack “social problems” as well. He warned that SEMCOG “could be used 
as a big club to beat local cities into submission,” citing a recent remark by Detroit Mayor 
Jerome Cavanagh, who had said that if the suburbs refused to build low-cost housing, Detroit 
might move to stop subsidizing water and sewer infrastructure.
37
 
Mayor Potter managed to win re-election. However, several of the newly elected 
Commissioners did not share his support for SEMCOG, and the Tribune reported that the Mayor 
would not touch the “COG issue” until meeting with the new city council members.
38
 In the 
wake of the 1967 rebellion, suburban fear of metropolitan institutions was no longer a fringe 
opinion, limited to a few ultraconservatives. SEMCOG had become a focus of white racial 
anxiety around policy responses to the rebellion. The Detroit News editorial page commented 
that “[t]he reason” for suburban resistance to SEMCOG “is on the tip of everyone’s tongue—just 
short of being said out loud.”
39
 Over the next few years, as proposals for metropolitan 
desegregation roiled the metropolitan region and spurred a powerful suburban backlash, the 
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seemingly innocuous sentiment Potter had expressed—that the people of the region “must all be 
concerned with each other’s problems”—would become more and more toxic, to the point that 
not only SEMCOG’s enemies but its friends would disclaim efforts to use the organization as a 
platform for addressing the region’s racial dilemma. 
 
“Black and White Implications” 
 
In April 1968, metropolitan Detroit’s annual planning conference took place, as it had for 
many years, in the marble-clad Veterans Memorial Building on the riverfront in downtown 
Detroit. For the first time, however, it was under the auspices of SEMCOG rather than the 
Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission. The conference also occurred in the 
shadow of the previous year’s rebellion, and just three weeks after the uprisings that followed the 
April 4 assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 Over the previous year, SEMCOG had established a more solid organizational footing. 
The Supervisors Inter-County Committee had formally dissolved the previous November at a 
meeting at the Botsford Inn in Farmington.
40
 Oakland County had been the first county in the 
region to pay its membership dues—$35,000 per year—the previous summer.
41
 And after 
extensive debate, which focused on whether school districts should be included in the Council of 




 At the conference, SEMCOG Chair William Mainland introduced the newly hired 
director of SEMCOG: E. Robert Turner, the former city manager of Boulder, Colorado and 
Burbank, California, who had arrived on the job just one month earlier. Turner expressed 
gratitude at inheriting “a solid foundation of regional effort which has no parallel in any other 
metropolitan area of this country.” Yet he also noted the long shadow of the racial upheavals of 
the previous year. “The tragedy of last summer and of this spring looms as a paramount 
preoccupation in the minds of all of us—as it should,” he said. Turner closed by invoking the 
central importance of the region’s racial dilemma: 
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As to program, I am compelled to observe that the major, over-riding social 
problem of our day cannot and must not be ignored. Every COG activity will be 
examined carefully for its black and white implications. In many respects this is 
tragic, but let’s be honest, ladies and gentlemen, no metropolitan issue transcends 
this one. The sooner we address ourselves to the concept of living up to our 
constitution and exercise our best human and moral instincts, the better will be 




Yet the new director of the Council of Governments also declared himself a “conservative” in his 
approach to metropolitan cooperation. “I believe that the best way to face up to the urban crisis is 
through the traditional, local units of government,” he said, omitting the fact that the 
fragmentation of metropolitan Detroit into a mosaic of separate suburban governments was 
largely a development of the previous several decades. Turner even went so far as to say that 
“the concept of voluntary regional councils represents the last hope for the preservation of grass-
roots democracy in this country,” the only alternative to metropolitan “super government” or 
“escalation of federal domination.”
44
 
 The closing speech at the conference was delivered by Detroit Common Council’s Mel 
Ravitz. Unbeknownst to many in the crowd, Chairman Mainland had proposed that Ravitz serve 
as SEMCOG’s first director, but the councilman demurred, writing that “my responsibility must 
be to the people of the city of Detroit…particularly under the duress of the immense problems 
that face our city.”
45
 In his speech to the planning conference, Ravitz noted that the city and the 
suburbs both faced common problems in planning. However, he underscored “the blunt fact of 
both racial and social class segregation, that separates the suburbs from the central city,” warning 
that “there are some who would maintain that segregation even if it means sacrificing the COG 
structure and turning their backs on unified regional planning and development.” 
 Ravitz observed that thus far, the main opposition to the COG had come from 
suburbanites, but he warned that black leaders in the central city also feared the potential for 
SEMCOG to become a new “containment structure” limiting black political power. To assuage 
those concerns, Ravitz urged equitable representation for the central city in COG governance, 
and called on suburbanites to “help break down the remaining elements of racial discrimination 
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and segregation,” particularly in housing. “Only a complete end to this segregation in fact as well 
as in word or in law,” he said, “can erase the growing suspicion of suburban domination.” Ravitz 
warned that if regional planning “is unconcerned with some of the tough social issues that 
underlie much of what we do, then COG will be viewed as a rather meaningless entity and 
people will go their own way in search of better answers than COG and its regional planning 
division are willing to provide.”
46
 
 Over the next several years, however, the more immediate question became whether 
SEMCOG would continue to exist. 114 local governments, out of the 350 eligible to join, had 
joined SEMCOG as dues-paying members in 1968. Yet several held up payment of their second-
year dues as suspicion of the organization persisted.
47
 A citizens’ committee appointed by Mayor 
Jule Famularo of Troy, one of the fastest-growing communities in Oakland County, unanimously 
recommended that the city withhold its $720 contribution. The committee’s report warned that “a 
strong metro-governmental body could erode the basic principle embodied in our constitution of 
one man-one vote,” allow Detroit to dominate the suburbs, and increase the suburban tax burden. 
Mayor Famularo, perhaps influenced by his predecessor Robert Huber, stated he hoped the 
report would “cause a bombshell in the six-county area.”
48
 
SEMCOG Chair Mainland dismissed the report as “doomsday conjecture,”
49
 and the 
Detroit Free Press editorial page scolded Troy for “its adamant opposition to becoming involved 
in downtown problems,” predicting that “[e]ventually, the suburbs and the central city will 
become reconciled.” Yet by January of 1972, more than a dozen other units of government had 
followed Troy’s lead in dropping out of SEMCOG, bringing the total number of SEMCOG 
members to just 98. The absences included some of the region’s largest suburbs: the cities of 
Warren, Southfield, and Dearborn.
50
 Some local officials, like Royal Oak mayor John Austin, 
said they favored SEMCOG but simply could not afford to pay their dues.
51
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 It did not help that one of the projects SEMCOG absorbed from its predecessors had run 
into trouble. The Detroit Transportation and Land Use Study, or TALUS, a computer-based 
planning effort previously administered by the Regional Planning Commission, had gotten its 
start in 1964 under Irving Rubin, formerly the State Highway Department’s chief freeway 
construction agent. Five years later, Rubin had spent four and a half million dollars without 
completing the regional plan TALUS was supposed to produce, as detailed in a February 1969 
exposé in the Detroit Free Press.
52
 SEMCOG director Turner expressed surprise at the delay, 
and Mainland acknowledged a “lack of confidence” in Rubin, although SEMCOG ultimately 
authorized another $60,000 grant to Rubin to finish the project.
53
 It was not an auspicious start 
for the fledgling Council of Governments, and federal action against segregation in suburban 
schools and housing would only further suburban distrust of metropolitan initiatives. 
Beginning in 1969, officials in the Chicago regional office of the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development began to raise concerns about federal grantmaking to the city of 
Warren. Just thirty years after bulldozers broke ground for its federal arms factories, Warren had 
become Detroit’s largest suburb and one of the biggest suburbs in the nation, with nearly 
180,000 residents. Warren’s black population, however, consisted of no more than thirty 
families. HUD field representative Mary Ann Taranowski felt it obvious that in nearly all-white, 
working-class Warren, “whatever discrimination was going on was not economic,” given 
Warren’s “largely union workforce” and documented history of violence against black 
residents.
54
 Black families who moved to Warren, or white residents suspected of attempting to 
sell their homes to blacks, could expect attacks of the kind that had typified white resistance to 
black settlement in Detroit over the previous several decades.
55
 
The conflict escalated as HUD representatives faced off against Warren officials, 
particularly a faction of newer City Council members, led by a Chrysler publicist Richard 
Sabaugh who declared his opposition to “open housing.”
56
 In a May 1970 meeting in 
Washington, George Romney told Mayor Ted Bates that he would cut off federal urban renewal 
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funds if Warren failed to take steps towards desegregation.
57
 In July, the Detroit News received a 
copy of a memorandum from the Chicago HUD office which it published under the title “U.S. 
Picks Warren as Prime Target in Move to Integrate All Suburbs.” When Romney flew to Warren 
and met with suburban officials in an attempt to assuage their fears, he was confronted by 
hundreds of demonstrators. “Just because Warren is an all-white community, does that mean we 
are all racists? No,” Sabaugh declared. In an August referendum, 57% of the electorate voted to 
reject the urban renewal program.
58
 
Meanwhile, an even more explosive set of battles were brewing over the issue of school 
desegregation. In February 1970, federal judge Damon Keith ordered the desegregation of the 
school district of Pontiac, among the first orders of its kind in a Northern city.
59
 In April 1970, 
the Detroit Board of Education voted to redraw high school attendance boundaries to promote 
desegregation. This action prompted organized opposition from white parents and students, 
drawn from the homeowner associations, who organized as the Citizens’ Committee for Better 
Education. The Committee launched a successful recall election of the liberals on the school 
board and convinced the Michigan Legislature to invalidate the desegregation plan. Shortly 
afterwards, the NAACP sued in federal district court. The lawsuit, however, took an unexpected 
turn when Alexander Ritchie, the attorney for the Committee, convinced his clients that their best 
hope was to argue for a desegregation plan that encompassed the entire metropolitan area, 
including the suburbs. Ritchie formally requested this plan in July 1971, and on October 4, after 
finding that the Detroit Public Schools were indeed racially segregated, federal judge Stephen 
Roth requested the preparation of metropolitan-wide integration plans that included all 87 school 
districts in the region, as well as a set of Detroit-only remedies.
60
 
The mere possibility of a metropolitan school desegregation order inflamed suburban 
resistance to SEMCOG, seemingly confirming the consolidation fears that Grosse Pointe 
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residents had expressed four years earlier. Save Our Children, a Warren-based anti-busing group, 
seized on a League of Women Voters questionnaire in which several candidates for local office 
had expressed support for joining SEMCOG. Save Our Children equated that position with 




 Figure 3.4. SEMCOG’s emissary to the suburbs: Mel Ravitz greets Downriver officials at a 
January 1971 meeting of the Lincoln Park Kiwanis Club, January 1971. Pictured are 
Ecorse Mayor Richard Manning; Allen Park Councilman Frank Lada; Ravitz; Southgate 
Mayor Robert Reaume; Trenton Mayor Clarence J. Hanlon; Lincoln Park Kiwanis Vice-
President Douglas Gourlay; and Lincoln Park Councilman Max Schiebold. At the time, 
Allen Park, Lincoln Park and Trenton were SEMCOG members; Ecorse and Southgate 
were not. “Ravitz Says Cities Should Be United Behind SEMCOG,” The Lincoln Parker, 
January 27, 1971, 2-A, in MRP, Box 60, Folder 14. 
 
 Mel Ravitz was elected chair of SEMCOG in January of 1970. In a way his charge at 
SEMCOG resembled his task in the Mack-Concord conservation area a decade earlier. As a 
Detroit city planner, Ravitz had labored to convince residents of the neighborhood to stay in 
place, even as black residents moved in. Now, Councilman Ravitz attempted to stem the wave of 
suburban jurisdictions exiting the metropolitan organization, despite their fear of association with 
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the increasingly black central city.
62
 Like Turner, Ravitz made the case for SEMCOG 
membership by forcefully rejecting the idea that SEMCOG should become an autonomous layer 
of government. Ravitz had been elected to City Council as an advocate of regional cooperation, 
and he once viewed metropolitan government as “inevitable.” Over his term as SEMCOG chair, 
however, Ravitz hit the lecture circuit to reassure audiences that the organization’s goal was to  
serve local governments, not the other way around. SEMCOG, he told the Detroit Economic 
Club, “seeks merely to assist local governments [to] do their thing better.”
63
 Ravitz assured the 
League of Women Voters of the Plymouth-Northville area that the Council of Governments 
“provides the greatest possible protection to local governments without threatening their 
autonomy.”
64
 In a January 1971 address to mayors of the Downriver suburbs, Ravitz stressed 
SEMCOG’s practical utility in coordinating region-wide planning for solid waste disposal, drug 
abuse prevention, and environmental protection. He also emphasized the cost savings SEMCOG 
membership provided for local governments.
65
  
Ravitz suggested the political rationale behind this strategy in a blistering 1970 lecture on 
“Major Routes to Regionalism” at the University of Michigan’s Dearborn campus. Ravitz spoke 
harshly of those who continued to press for stronger metropolitan government with no regard for 
political realities: 
The blunt fact is that metropolitan or regional government is a figment of the 
academic mind… [M]etropolitan government does not exist in the United States 
because no one but its academic advocates want it. And they want it because in 
their abstract world it seems to meet the arbitrary requirements of being rational, 
of being more efficient, of being more economical. But even if it possessed all 
these virtues, which it doesn’t, it is destined to remain untried because the people 
of our urban areas don’t want it. 
 
The professors of political science and the professional promoters of faddish 
concepts would have us believe that metropolitan government is a sound concept 
that hasn’t yet been tried because the people of the regions just haven’t 
understood what it was all about. They blame the failure of metropolitan 
government to find its way into practical existence on the ignorance of the people. 
They are mistaken. Metropolitan government, whether in its unadulterated state or 
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in the two level form, or in any other variation, hasn’t been adopted by the people 
of the United States’ urban regions, not because they don’t understand it, but 
because they do. It really doesn’t require great sophistication for people to 
recognize that the price they would pay for the presumed increase in rationality, 
efficiency and economy would be loss of their local power. They have understood 
that plain and simple, and they have turned away from metropolitan government 
almost universally. 
 
Merely examine the interest of the people of the urban region, and we can 
appreciate the vehemence of the opposition. Only those who are removed from 
the everyday realities of power and politics could make the mistake of proposing 
a new governmental layer as part of the answer to the problems of these regions. 
 
Neither the majority of the residents of the white, middle class suburbs, nor the 
majority of the black residents of central cities wants a new governmental echelon 





The growing racial divide between city and suburbs made metropolitan government a fool’s 
errand. 
 Indeed, Ravitz soon decided that political reality also made it impossible for SEMCOG to 
meaningfully address that divide, at least in the short term. Ravitz’s convictions on the subject 
had not changed. In his 1971 State of the Region address to the annual General Assembly at 
Cobo Hall, he issued a grim warning that “separatism…spells ultimate disaster for all parts of the 
region,” citing Martin Niemoller’s famous words regarding the absence of solidarity under 
Nazism.  “The point should be clear to all,” Ravitz said. “Either we concern ourselves now with 
the plight of every part of the region or we reconcile ourselves to piecemeal deterioration.” 
Although Ravitz noted that about a dozen older suburbs had lost population over the previous 
decade, there could be little doubt that Detroit’s plight was foremost in his mind.
67
 
 Yet while Ravitz affirmed the need for metropolitan cooperation, he also rejected the idea 
that SEMCOG could directly address the metropolitan racial dilemma. In a fall 1971 letter to 
Ravitz, Interfaith Action Council president Albert Dunmore had pointed out that every aspect of 
SEMCOG’s work program could be approached from a racial justice perspective. With respect to 
rapid transit, for example, would a new system “only provide the means for more suburban 
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whites to have greater access to inner city jobs?” With respect to water and sewer infrastructure, 
“[w]ho is paying for excess capacity, and who is benefiting?”
68
 
 Ravitz replied that SEMCOG’s youth and organizational fragility precluded attempts to 
tackle racial inequality: 
SEMCOG cannot yet be a forum for the taking of positions on deeply held 
controversial issues. We have had two attempts at doing so, with disasterous [sic] 
results both times… 
SEMCOG must grow into power through usefulness to the governments of 
the region. To fault SEMCOG for not solving the immense social and political 
and economic problems of southeastern Michigan is not constructive given its 




Only three years earlier, Ravitz had said that SEMCOG must directly confront “social issues”—
most of all racial inequality—or risk irrelevance. As chair, however, he had come to decide that 
to do so would be to risk the organization’s survival. 
 In fact, the fiscal condition of SEMCOG was dire. Detroit Edison chief Walker Cisler had 
personally loaned the organization $50,000 in anticipation of further corporate funding, but that 
support proved elusive. In January of 1972, E. Robert Turner wrote a desperate letter to General 
Motors Vice-President O.A. Lundin, pleading for General Motors President Edward Cole to 
make good on his previous commitment to lead a fundraising drive: “I recognize that you are an 
extremely busy person,” he wrote, “and that SEMCOG’s problems are not very high on your 
priority scale…I submit, however, that this was an obligation that Mr. Cole agreed to take on, 
and that it would be disasterous [sic] for us at this late date if you now ignore our situation or fail 
to make any effort on our behalf.”
70




 Through overtures to the suburbs, pleas to the corporate elite, and renunciation of 
redistributive goals, SEMCOG warded off a wholesale stampede out of the organization and 
gained a few new members, such as the city of Pontiac, which joined in 1970, and Livingston 
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 Ravitz’s efforts, in concert with those of longtime Macomb County Board of 
Supervisors member and former SICC chair Bernard Kalahar, even convinced Macomb to join 
on a trial basis in 1971. Kalahar reminded readers of the Macomb Daily that SICC had helped 
secure representation for the county on the Detroit Water Board and ensured the extension of the 
water lines that made Macomb’s growth possible. Participation in metropolitan institutions, he 
argued, was in the interests of suburban counties.
73
 
In the long run, however, Kalahar’s historical anecdote did not count for much in the 
vastly different political context of the 1970s, when the word “metropolitan” immediately called 
up the threat of desegregation. The continued furor over city-suburb busing in Macomb ensured 
the county’s tenure in SEMCOG would be short. In February 1972, the Macomb County Board 
of Commissioners voted 18-1 to quit. Commissioner Robert VerKuilen of Warren led the 
opposition; his colleague Dennis Dutko, also of Warren, described SEMCOG as “the wrong 
group, interested in the wrong kind of problems at the wrong time.” The vote was cheered on by 
dozens of members of anti-busing groups, including Irene McCabe’s National Action Group and 




SEMCOG survived the defection, but its survival had come at a cost. “If I’ve learned 
anything in four years,” Ravitz told journalists in January 1972, at the close of his two years as 
chair, “it’s the limits of SEMCOG. It cannot even take a stand on a highly controversial issue,” 
he said. “If it does, it blows itself out of the water.” SEMCOG’s main accomplishment, he stated, 




Self-Determination and the City 
 
In 1971, the Metropolitan Fund had begun work on a new project it called the Regionalist 
Papers.  Kent Mathewson had grown increasingly frustrated with SEMCOG’s struggles, less 
than four years after its birth. After more than a decade of preaching the blessings of voluntary 
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regional cooperation, he was convinced that only a more powerful framework of unified regional 
government could overcome the limitations of the council of governments model that he had 
pioneered in Salem and then helped to institute in Detroit. 
Mathewson was aware that proposals to strengthen metropolitan government would draw 
opposition not only from suburban jurisdictions, but from the growing class of black elected 
officials in central cities. In 1966, Detroit activists James and Grace Lee Boggs had discussed the 
potential for municipal government as the basis for black power in America in an article entitled 
“The City is the Black Man’s Land;
76
 the following year, Carl Stokes and Richard Hatcher had 
been elected the first black mayors of Cleveland, Ohio and Gary, Indiana. As more central cities 
gained black majorities, it seemed clear that others would follow in Stokes and Hatcher’s 
footsteps, and as Mel Ravitz had warned, many black activists suspected that metropolitan 
institutions could function as new “containment structures” limiting black control. 
The most widely shared articulation of that view came in a 1967 series of articles in the 
New Republic by the leftist sociologists Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward. They warned 
that federal mandates for metropolitan coordination were undermining local government 
autonomy and black political power, in what they called a deliberate strategy by the Democratic 
political leadership to preserve its metropolitan majority against defectors from city and suburbs 
alike.
77
 In some respects, Piven and Cloward echoed longstanding conservative critiques of 
metropolitan government, viewing further centralization as furthering a technocratic and 
ultimately undemocratic mode of governance. “As the business of government comes to be 
carried on by a coalition of federal, metropolitan and local bureaucracies in the language of 
expertise,” they wrote, “local groups and elected officials will become puzzled outsiders, lacking 
the specialized knowledge to perceive and articulate their interests.” Although Piven and 
Cloward viewed the advance of metropolitan government as inevitable, they counseled black 
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officials to resist surrendering municipal authority and to bargain for proportional representation 
and veto power in metropolitan decision-making.
78
 
Mathewson rejected that view. In a 1970 speech to the National Municipal League, titled 
“Our Leftover Cities,” he described himself as “somewhat mystified by this growing concern 
with black leadership about the regional thrust.” Since the era of slavery, he observed, blacks had 
had to make do with the cast-off and unwanted goods of the white majority: clothing, housing, 
even food, such as chitlins and other marginal meats. “Now is the time,” Mathewson argued, “for 
black leadership…to refuse to accept inferior, worn out left-over cities…What does it profit the 
black citizens of Detroit to inherit a bankrupt city?” He described Piven and Cloward’s argument 
as “a dangerous cop out. There is no possible way that the major central cities of this nation can 
reverse the process of physical and fiscal blight unilaterally. They cannot tax their own citizens 
enough, nor withdraw sufficient services, to balance the budget.”
79
 Mathewson even urged the 
“transfer of the traditional mantle of leadership from the central city mayor to the chairman of 
SEMCOG”—notwithstanding the fact that unlike the mayor of Detroit, the chair of SEMCOG 
was not elected to that position by constituents and had little formal authority.
80
 
Notwithstanding SEMCOG’s struggles to gain support for a limited form of metropolitan 
planning and governance, the Metropolitan Fund moved forward with a new project, dubbed the 
Regionalist Papers, that aimed to significantly strengthen the organization. The  Fund’s Regional 
Governance Policy Committee commissioned twelve papers on topics in regional governance 
and organized panel discussions of each one at colleges and universities across the metropolitan 
area. The discussions did not yield much resembling a consensus. That of Paper Number Eight, 
for example, an essay on “Regional Governance and Racial and Ethnic Minorities” by Los 
Angeles mayor Tom Bradley, prompted heated debate over the implications of regional 
government for black Detroiters. Some panelists sided with Bradley, who argued that while 
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black elected officials should work to promote their interests within regional government rather 
than rejecting it wholesale.
81
 Others, like Nelson “Jack” Edwards, one of the highest-ranking 
black officials in the UAW, argued that “[i]f you go to a regional government, you’ll be lost in 




Not long afterwards, in November 1973, the stakes of that debate increased as Detroit 
elected Coleman Young as its first black mayor. The candidates thought to be the front-runners 
at the outset of the campaign were white: Police Commissioner John Nichols, the hard-line “law-
and-order” candidate, and Mel Ravitz, representing the liberal black-white coalition that had 
elected Cavanagh. Young, the Detroit Free Press wrote, “got a late start and has not yet caught 
fire.”
83
 Yet it was Ravitz who failed to make it past the September primary. Despite 
endorsements from the United Auto Workers and other elements of the liberal establishment, and 
more biracial support than any other candidate, he polled only 18% of the vote. As the Free 
Press put it, “Ravitz appealed to voters everywhere, but not enough anywhere.”
84
 Ultimately, “he 
appeared to have been defeated by the same racial divisions that he had worked for years to 
break down.”
85
 Young then defied predictions to defeat Nichols and win election as Detroit’s 
first black mayor, less than two decades after the arch-segregationist Cobo had died in office, in 
a vote that divided almost entirely along racial lines. The Detroit News estimated that Nichols 
received 91 percent of the white vote and Young received 92 percent of the black vote. In 
previous years, the News observed, that split would have delivered the mayor’s office to Nichols, 
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Figure 3.5. Detroit mayoral candidates debate, 1973. Coleman A. Young is standing, Mel 
Ravitz is at right. Virtual Motor City Collection, Reuther Library of Labor and Urban 
Affairs. 
 
Many suburban leaders, even those sympathetic to SEMCOG, also deemed metropolitan 
government a political impossibility. Taylor Mayor Richard Trolley suggested that the cross-
district busing issue had set back the regionalist cause by five to ten years: “If local governments 





 Richard Miller, publisher of the Royal Oak Daily Tribune, surely remembered how the 
SEMCOG issue had affected Royal Oak elections five years earlier; he described the idea of 
regionalism in the suburbs as “dynamite.”
88
 
 Review of the Regionalist Papers went before the Fund’s Regional Governance Policy 
Committee—a group that included eight representatives of private businesses, including Joseph 
Hudson and Max Fisher, and just two local elected officials, Wayne County Board of 
Commissioners chair Robert E. Fitzpatrick and Pontiac councilman Charles M. Tucker. Tucker 
was one of the body’s three black members, who also included Judge Wade McCree and 
Reginald Wilson, president of Wayne County Community College.
89
 In a vote reviewed at the 
committee’s January 1974 meeting, the group overwhelmingly supported the formation of a non-
voluntary, financially independent regional agency that would address issues of both social and 
physical planning.
90
 The Committee recommended to the Michigan Legislature a two-stage 
process for implementing regional government in the SEMCOG region. The first stage would 
reconstitute the General Assembly of SEMCOG as a 41-member body, composed of directly 
elected representatives as well as local government officials: it would include 10 elected by the 
County Boards of Commissioners, 10 by the mayors and township supervisors of the municipal 
governments, 20 elected by the public on a district basis, and one Chairman elected at large. 
Over the course of three years, the reconstituted SEMCOG would conduct a regional charter 
study to recommend a permanent system of regional governance.
91
  
 Responses to the proposal by the larger board of the Metropolitan Fund indicated a 
widening divide between the region’s corporate leaders, who largely endorsed the 
recommendations, and its elected officials, who did not. Michigan Secretary of State Richard 
Austin, still the most prominent black member of the board, stated that he was “not prepared to 
accept metropolitan government.” He further warned that SEMCOG was the wrong body to 
study the question of regional organization and “would be damaged irreparably in the process.” 
Wayne County Board of Commissioners Chair Robert Fitzpatrick stressed the need for elected 
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county executives instead. “The creation of a new level of government is unnecessary and 
undesirable,” wrote SEMCOG chair James P. Grannan.
92
 
  If Kent Mathewson had doubts about pressing ahead with the project, he did not reveal 
them in his foreword to the Regionalist Papers, published in a handsome bound edition in April 
of 1974. Mathewson’s forward acknowledged his own share of the “responsibility for creation of 
the COG institution,” and found that institution wanting. Voluntary councils of government, he 
argued, had the same weaknesses as the early United States under the Articles of Confederation. 
Metropolitan areas required a stronger constitution to address the social and environmental ills 
that an “excess of democracy” entailed. 
Presently the urban condition of the metropolitan regions of our nation is critical. 
The urban condition of Southeast Michigan, for example, is characterized by 
nearly one thousand murders in the year 1973…with more than seven hundred in 
a single jurisdiction; by distressingly high unemployment, seemingly endemic, 
particularly in certain groups and locales; by inefficient use of energy due to 
ineffective or non-existent planning; by public transportation inadequate or 
unavailable at a time of great need; and by spread-city continuing unabated 




Mathewson acknowledged that regional government was no panacea, yet he observed that 
“authors of the Federalist Papers promised no miracle from a federated union but saw no 
alternative but to try.” Alexander Hamilton, he pointed out, had initially been outnumbered two 
to one by “localist” delegates at the New York convention to ratify the Constitution. “The odds, 
actors, and arguments seem much the same today,” Mathewson admitted.
94
 
 The man who took up the cause of the Regionalist Papers in the Michigan state capitol 
could hardly have been more different from the flamboyant Hamilton. William Ryan, a white 
state legislator from Detroit’s East Side, was described as journalists as “a rumpled, drab-looking 
man” with “zero charisma,” perhaps “the most unprepossessing politician in Michigan’s 
history.”
95
 Despite appearances, however, Ryan was a gifted politician, elected president of his 
union local at Zenith Carburetor at the age of 23. He also held strong ethical commitments 
influenced by Catholic social teaching,
96
 and his advocacy of open housing legislation had 
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angered many of his Democratic colleagues.
97
 Ryan’s metropolitan government proposal 
followed the recommendations of the Regionalist Papers, replacing SEMCOG with a 41-
member Southeast Michigan Planning and Development Agency that would prepare further 
recommendations to the Legislature after a three-year study.
98
 Like Mathewson, Ryan viewed 
SEMCOG’s semi-voluntary structure as hopelessly weak, given the scale of the problems the 
region confronted. “[W]hat kind of government can work with the understanding that you don’t 
have to belong and you don’t have to obey their decisions?” he asked.
99
 
The Regionalist Papers and Ryan’s bill brought an avalanche of criticism from suburban 
elected officials. Robert Huber of Troy, now serving in Congress, connected the Papers to Judge 
Roth’s metropolitan busing order. “There can be no opposition to cross-district busing if you 
eliminate all boundaries,” he warned, calling for an emergency “Committee to Protect Local 
Government and Schools.”
100
 The Macomb County Commission moved to place an “advisory 
referendum” on regional government on the November ballot. “This is the baby that brought this 
up,” said Commissioner Willard D. Back, brandishing a copy of the Regionalist Papers. “If this 
goes into legislation or executive order, then it will be too late to pose any questions.”
101
 Oakland 
County Commissioner Lawrence Pernick, chairman of SEMCOG’s county bloc, described the 
Metropolitan Fund as “basically a handful of people with big money behind them who would 
rather deal with a couple of regional officials than have to go from community to community to 
take care of their problem.”
102
 
 It was not just suburban elected officials who opposed the proposal, however. The new 
generation of black elected officials in Detroit joined in the chorus of opposition, although for 
different reasons. “The one effective tool that we have to fight for justice for poor people is the 
political power of our city,” argued Detroit Common Council’s Erma Henderson, charging that 
Ryan’s proposal would amount to “formally establishing a black ghetto without political power,” 
and pointing out that the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority “consistently ignores our need 
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for a viable recreation program in this area.”
103
 Congressman John Conyers said he wanted 
Ryan’s bill withdrawn, and called out the hypocrisy of suburbanites who favored regionalism as 
long as it did not encroach on segregation: “I know we hear calls to regionalize water service, or 
waste disposal, or transportation. But we never hear calls to regionalize school districts, do we? 
No, we spend millions of dollars in litigation over the matter…And we never hear calls to 
regionalize public housing, the matter that makes all the litigation necessary in the first place.” 
Indeed, in July 1974, three months after the release of the Regionalist Papers and seven years 
after the 1967 Detroit rebellion, the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down Judge Roth’s 
metropolitan busing plan, a momentous blow to school desegregation. “It may seem the easier 
course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided up into two cities—one white, the 
other black,” Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in his dissent, “but it is a course, I predict, our 
people will ultimately regret.”
104
 
 It was Mayor Young’s opinion that counted the most among black elected officials, of 
course. A 1975 staff memorandum to the Mayor warned that regional initiatives would 
“DISSIPATE THE POWER OF THE MAYOR AND THE CITY OF DETROIT WITHIN THE 
SEVEN (7) COUNTY REGION” and recommended he take steps to counter SEMCOG by 
forming an alternative organization focused on the region’s mayors, much as Mayor Cobo had 
considered building a municipal alternative to SICC 15 years earlier.
105
 “I want to go on record,” 
Young said later that year, “as saying I am now and always have been a firm advocate of 
regional cooperation. But I’m no more ready to give up the autonomy and independence of the 




 The racial and political polarization between Detroit and the suburbs had made proposals 
for metropolitan governance anathema in virtually all quarters, except among the generation of 
executives who served on the board of the Metropolitan Fund, whose support was not a selling 
point for everyone. The Regionalist Papers even received a write-up in the Ann Arbor Sun, the 
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newspaper of counterculture leader John Sinclair’s White Panther Party, under the headline “Big 
 
Figure 3.6. The Ann Arbor Sun was unconvinced by the Regionalist Papers’ arguments for 
regional governance, as suggested by this cartoon it published of auto executives  seated 
around a Metropolitan Fund monopoly board. Ann Arbor Sun, October 15, 1975, 5, AADL. 
 
3 & Friends Plot ‘Regional’ Empire.” The Regionalist Papers, the Sun announced, comprised “a  
sophisticated scheme to legally take over political control of the Detroit metropolitan area,” 
wrapped in a “Bicentennial red-white-and-blue package” and “couched in the facile language of 
‘progressive liberalism.’” An accompanying illustration portrayed the cigar-chomping executives 
126 
 
of GM, Ford, Chrysler and AMC sitting around a Metropolitan Fund Monopoly board.
107
 
Thirteen years earlier, the Port Huron Statement had endorsed metropolitan governance as a 
means to check private power, but that had been in a different era, when the student left in Ann 
Arbor and elsewhere was still more likely to use “liberal” as a term of praise than an epithet. 
 In a roundabout way, the Regionalist Papers and the Ryan bill did succeed in 
strengthening SEMCOG: by uniting its member governments against their proposals. 
Immediately following the release of the Regionalist Papers, SEMCOG adopted a resolution 
opposing regional government and requesting its members to “formalize their opposition by 
resolutions sent to the Michigan Legislature.”
108
 SEMCOG’s 1976 Annual Report stressed the 
organization’s nature “as a voluntary Council…where communities can take stands on current 
issues—crucial issues, such as the continuing support of voluntary regional cooperation rather 
than regional government.” SEMCOG’s stand against regional government, it argued, was an 
important reason why many cities had decided to rejoin the organization.
109
 After almost ten  
years of upheaval, metropolitan Detroit’s regional governance body had found its voice: as a 
champion of local control. 
 
At a 1976 board meeting of the Metropolitan Fund, Kent Mathewson excused himself 
after feeling a sharp pain in his chest. When Joseph Hudson found him in an anteroom, the sixty-
year-old Mathewson was pale and perspiring. Hudson helped Mathewson down to his personal 
limousine and ordered the chauffeur to rush them to Henry Ford Hospital. Thirteen years after 
arriving in Detroit, the man the region’s leaders had hoped might bring “massive cooperation” to 
bear on their metropolitan problem had suffered a massive heart attack. 
After his discharge from the hospital, Mathewson settled into an extended convalescence 
in the basement of his home on Chablis Street. To provide more opportunities for exercise, he 
began spending the winters in San Diego. When Metro, the new regional government in 
Portland, Oregon, celebrated its inauguration, its leaders invited Mathewson as a speaker; his 
wife Mariana kept her hand on his wrist throughout the speech, checking his pulse. Mathewson 
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began teaching courses in city management and urban planning, using the Regionalist Papers as 
a textbook. In 1979, he formally retired from the Metropolitan Fund.
110
 
SEMCOG, too, had survived. Yet the organization Mathewson had helped bring into 
being was also bound for a lengthy recuperation. In the bitter contests over metropolitan 
segregation and inequality, as suburban whites showed themselves unwilling to concede racial 
and spatial privilege, and black elected officials cast their lot with political power in the central 
city, the very possibility of regional cooperation for the common good had been largely 
discredited. As liberalism waned, there would be no resolution to the metropolitan dilemma, 
which a growing number of regional leaders had come to believe was no problem at all.
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Chapter 4: Sprawl, Schmall 
 
Five years into the administration of Mayor Coleman Young, a week before Christmas of 
1978, longtime City of Detroit Human Rights Department staffer Jim Bush typed out an urgently 
worded memorandum on a subject he had considered for some time: “Disinvestment & 
Controlling Sprawl.” “Enclosed is a paper I prepared for the Detroit Community College 
Consortium,” he wrote William Cilluffo, one of Mayor Young’s delegates to SEMCOG. “I hope 
it meets with your approval or even has some value.” 
Bush explained that he sat on the board of the East Michigan Environmental Action 
Council (EMEAC), a citizen group founded several years earlier during the burst of ecological 
activism that followed the first Earth Day in 1970. In that capacity Bush served as an alternate to 
SEMCOG’s Council on Regional Development and enjoyed a close-up perspective on the 
regional planning process. “Recently,” he wrote Cilluffo, “I found myself all alone in raising 
questions about the widening of M-59 west of Pontiac—a position based on EMEAC’s 
opposition to M-275 and increasing traffic in NW Oakland County.” 
The environmentalists’ challenge to suburban highway expansion was also of vital 
interest to the City of Detroit, Bush argued, and City leadership ought to leverage its role at 
SEMCOG to join the fight. New development at the suburban fringe, supported by public 
subsidies for highway and sewer extensions, was sapping the population and resources of Detroit 
and older suburbs as well. Bush cited Wayne State University economics professor Wilbur 
Thompson, who had described the metropolitan housing market as a “’zero sum growth’ 
situation where the pluses of suburban construction must be balanced by deletions from the 
housing stock in Detroit.” Each year, the City of Detroit was already demolishing roughly six 
thousand abandoned or dilapidated homes, even as developers threw up new subdivisions 
beyond the city limits. 
To demonstrate the role of public infrastructure subsidies in the process, Bush mapped 




Figure 4.1. In 1978, 10 years after SEMCOG’s founding, environmental activist and 
Detroit Department of Human Rights staffer Jim Bush sketched this map of Southeast 
Michigan, showing how highway and sewer investments were continuing to further 
suburbanization and urban decline. James Bush, “Disinvestment & Controlling Sprawl’ 
[memorandum to William Cilluffo], December 18, 1978, in CYP, Box 120, Folder 17. 
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 market their subdivisions. “Of the 45 ‘Idea Homes’ of the past two years, none was within 15 
miles of downtown Detroit,” Bush wrote. Almost all of them were located along the interstates  
and state highways at the metropolitan fringe, where a new series of massive road 
construction proposals  
threatened to extend the region’s sprawl even further. It was high time, Bush argued, that 
activists for racial justice and environmental protection made common cause in their campaigns 
against redlining and disinvestment in central cities and what Bush called the “greenlining” of 
farmlands and wetlands for development.
1
 “The City needs to strengthen its efforts to bring 
regional infrastructure extensions under rational controls,” Bush urged. He recommended that 
the Mayor’s Office join the fight for land use legislation at the state level and flex its muscle in 
SEMCOG—in coalition with the older suburbs beginning to experience similar disinvestment 
and the environmentalists battling new development at the metropolitan fringe.
2
 
Bush was not the only individual in the Seventies to call for a grand coalition for 
metropolitan development reform, uniting city leaders, older suburbs, and suburban 
environmentalists in an effort to stop sprawl and disinvestment in central cities. In his 
memorandum, he cited a planned joint conference of the national Sierra Club and the Urban 
League as an example of progress towards that end.
3
 Yet in metropolitan Detroit, and most other 
places around the nation, this coalition never got off the ground. At the start of the decade, as the 
environmental movement flowered across the nation, some heralded the advent of a “quiet 
revolution” in land management. With a handful of exceptions, however—most notably the case 
of Oregon, where environmentalists and farmers joined with city leaders to secure the nation’s 




In principle, metropolitan planning organizations like SEMCOG could have provided a 
locus for coalition-building against sprawl. Bush had sketched the possibility of a metropolitan 
majority coalition for that purpose, encompassing central city leaders, older suburbs, and 
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 For an insightful comparative study of metropolitan reform proposals in four states, see Margaret Weir, “Coalition 






 Indeed, after an extended recovery from the turbulent 1970s, 
SEMCOG staff made an effort to foster such a coalition through the Regional Development 
Initiative of 1990-1992, a scenario planning process documenting the costs of sprawl and 
disinvestment. The outcome of that process, however, vividly demonstrated the limits of 
SEMCOG’s power and the ascendance of a suburban growth machine. 
 
MPOwered? The Federal Framework for Regional Planning 
 
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 is best 
remembered for creating the “Model Cities” program, so named as the Johnson administration 
feared that the original name would link the program to the growing number of urban uprisings, 
an association that the bill’s opponents were only too happy to encourage.
6
 Less often 
remembered is the “metropolitan development” portion of the act. The task force that drafted the 
act had been chaired by leading regionalist Robert C. Wood, author of 1400 Governments, and 
had stressed that reversing urban decline could only occur “in the context of metropolitan area-
wide strategies.” To that end, the Act required the appointment of a federal “metropolitan 
coordinator” in selected demonstration cities.
7
 It also vastly expanded the potential authority of 
metropolitan planning agencies by requiring all applications for federal aid to be reviewed by 
such an agency, specifying that such agencies must be “composed of or responsible to” local 
elected officials.
8
 The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 also affirmed the 
consideration of state, local and regional goals “within a framework of national public 
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objectives,” including land conservation.
9
 These requirements were formalized in 1969 through 
the Bureau of the Budget’s Circular A-95, which specified the process for the “regional 
clearinghouse review,” in which metropolitan planning agencies commented on applications for 
federal aid. Though “A-95 review” did not give planning agencies the ability to approve or deny 
grant applications themselves, it did put them in a position of potentially significant influence—
depending how much weight federal agencies were willing to give the process.
10
 
 Most importantly, in 1975 the U.S. Federal Highway Administration and Urban Mass 
Transportation Administration finally released a comprehensive set of regulations for regional 
transportation planning. They required regional transportation planning to be conducted by 
“metropolitan planning organizations,” or MPOs, designated by state governors and local elected 
officials and subject to annual federal review. MPOs were charged with preparing both a long-
range regional transportation plan and a medium-term, five-year “transportation improvement 
program” including all local transportation projects. The new regimen provided “a stronger 




In theory, the powers of A-95 review and regional transportation planning gave 
metropolitan planning organizations considerable authority. In practice, the structure of MPOs, 
and especially councils of government like SEMCOG, made it unlikely that they would seek to 
exercise these powers in conflict with local governments. After the passage of the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1973, which designated a half-cent of every dollar of federal transportation 
funds for MPO planning efforts, MPOs were less dependent on local governments for funding.
12
 
Yet even if the loss of local government membership dues no longer presented the same 
existential threat that it had posed to SEMCOG over the previous several years, COGs remained 
relatively fragile, member-governed bodies that were unlikely to jeopardize their newly minted 
legitimacy by challenging established norms. Indeed, as Willard Hansen pointed out in a 1968 
article in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners, the new linkages between regional 
planning institutions and actual policy might in some respects prove a double-edged sword. 
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“[C]loseness to decision-making,” Hansen observed, “has a tendency to produce proposals that 




SEMCOG Sets a Course 
 
Indeed, as SEMCOG sought to put its troubled beginnings behind it, the organization’s 
new staff leadership reflected a desire for political stability. Executives brought in from 
elsewhere were replaced by longtime local officials. Both of SEMCOG’s top staff members in 
the 1970s, in fact, were white Detroit residents who had served alumni of the mayoral 
administration of Roman Gribbs. Michael M. Glusac had been Gribbs’ corporation counsel for 
Detroit—the city’s chief lawyer.
14
 The son of a Ford foundry worker,
15
 Glusac had previously 
served as a city council member and mayor of Highland Park—the old Ford factory enclave 
inside Detroit whose accelerating 1960s deindustrialization, racial transition and issues with 
crime and policing made it a microcosm of the challenges confronting the larger city beyond its 
limits.
16
 In those roles, he had also worked with the city’s emerging black political leaders, such 
as Mayor Robert Blackwell, a former union leader at the Highland Park Chrysler plant elected in 
1968.
17
 Glusac’s deputy, John Amberger, had served Gribbs as superintendent of the Detroit 
House of Correction (DeHoCo), the municipal prison in northwest Wayne County where Kent 
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Mathewson had proposed that Detroit build a new satellite city. Amberger got off to a rough start 
with Mayor Young when he ran a background check on the new deputy superintendent Young 
had nominated and informed the Mayor that the man had multiple convictions on his record. 
Amberger resigned to join SEMCOG not long afterwards.
18
 
Given the personnel involved, it was not difficult to get the impression, as some members 
of Mayor Young’s administration had, that SEMCOG might be a device for Detroit’s white 
political class to maintain control in the new era of black municipal leadership. In fact, Glusac 
had at one time been discussed as a possible successor to Mayor Gribbs, and none other than Mel 
Ravitz had also applied for the position of SEMCOG Executive Director following his 1973 
mayoral defeat at the hands of Nichols and Young.
19
 SEMCOG staff was anxious to counteract 
that perception. In 1974, the General Assembly approved a proposal that increased Detroit’s 
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Figure 4.2a and 4.2b.  Michael Glusac (left) and John Amberger (right) joined the 
SEMCOG staff as Executive Director and Deputy Director, respectively, after serving in 
the administration of Detroit Mayor Roman Gribbs. SEMCOG, “1975 Annual Report,” 
March 1976, CYP, Box 87, Folder 21. 




representation on the SEMCOG Executive Committee from two to three members.
20
 1975, 
Wayne County Commissioner Conrad L. Mallett, Sr., a former aide to Mayor Cavanagh, was 
elected SEMCOG’s first African American chairperson. Glusac insisted that contrary to some 
perceptions, SEMCOG was beholden to neither city nor suburbs.
21
 
 Perhaps the best test of that claim was SEMCOG’s actual planning efforts, which began 
to bear fruit in the mid-1970s after the formalization of federal planning mandates and the 
growth of federal funding to fulfill them. The goals for SEMCOG’s regional plan for the year 
1990, amended by the General Assembly of March 1974, were framed in terms of economical, 
social and ecological goals, reflecting the continuing influence of the civil rights legislation of 
the 1960s as well as the growing influence of the burgeoning environmental movement and the 
energy crisis. While carefully avoiding any blanket critique of suburbanization, the document 
reflected contemporary criticisms of decentralized, auto-oriented metropolitan development, as 
well as metropolitan segregation. 
SEMCOG’s regional goals for 1990 stated that the future pattern of land use ought to 
“increase accessibility to essential activities and amenities of life and to lessen the need for 
mobility.” While affirming that “the need for urban development is unquestionable,” they also 
stressed that “the timing and the staging need to be carefully planned so that the impact on 
people and the environment is positive and equitable.”
22
 The decline of downtown Detroit had to 
be stopped: “A viable major regional core is vital to southeast Michigan.” The program made a 
particularly strong case for altering the metropolitan pattern of racial and economic segregation 
in housing: 
Low cost and low rental housing opportunity on an open occupancy basis must be 
made available throughout the region, so that people at the lower rungs of the 
economic ladder have a wider choice of location and type of housing. Detroit and 
other older centers of the region cannot be expected to continue forever to bear 
the entire burden of providing housing and social services for the 
disadvantaged… 
 
We must open new areas to all kinds of people as rapidly as possible and 
simultaneously improve the quality of housing and the neighborhood amenities in 
the neighborhoods where lower-income, elderly and minorities now predominate. 
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Figure 4 3.  Proposed highway network in SEMCOG 1990 Regional Transportation Plan. 
“Summary Statement of the 1990 Transportation Plan for the Southeast Michigan 
Metropolitan Region,” Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, June 1975, in 




 Here, in effect, was a recapitulation of the Kerner Commission’s recommendations for a two-
pronged strategy of “ghetto enrichment” and opening the suburbs. 
 Somewhat surprisingly, given the history of massive white resistance to housing 
desegregation in the region, SEMCOG’s housing goals do not appear to have drawn much 
controversy, although a SEMCOG delegate from Grosse Pointe Farms did vote against the  
adoption of the housing strategy.
23
 Of course, one of the jurisdictions where opposition to 
housing desegregation had been most vocal—Macomb County—was no longer a member of 
SEMCOG when the document was adopted. Perhaps the most important reason for the lack of 
organized opposition to SEMCOG’s housing goals, however, was that they had little practical 
import. SEMCOG’s direct authority over housing development in the region was minimal. In the 
course of the transportation planning and A-95 review processes required for federal grant 
funding, SEMCOG could in principle cite inconsistencies with its regional housing goals. Yet 
this was an authority it used sparingly. Describing its 1974 reviews, SEMCOG noted occasional 
issues “relating to urban sprawl of residential development and the corresponding lack of 
adequate municipal services;” on three occasions, out of a total 93 reviews, it convened an “ad 
hoc regional review committee” for further discussion.
24
 Such restraint is not surprising, given 
SEMCOG leadership’s desire to show deference to local government, and the fact that A-95  
reviews were only advisory recommendations in the first place; ultimate approval of grant funds 
remained the prerogative of the federal agencies themselves.
25
  
SEMCOG had more authority in transportation planning, since federal law required 
SEMCOG approval in order for local transportation projects to receive funding. Nonetheless, the 
agency was still a newcomer on a scene dominated by the powerful road agencies, particularly 
the County Road Commissions and the Department of State Highways, which became the 
Michigan Department of State Highways and Transportation in 1973. Reviewing SEMCOG’s 
first proposed Regional Transportation Plan in 1975, Detroit city planner Paul Rempala was not 
impressed, despite the removal of several proposed urban expressways. The plan, he wrote in a 
memorandum to Planning Director William Deane Smith, “does very little for Detroit but 
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continues to provide for urban sprawl by indicating a massive road building and improvement 
program in the outer parts of the region.”
 26
 SEMCOG’s proposed “1990 Highway Network” 
would complete a set of circumferential suburban expressways that bypassed the city of Detroit: 
I-275 to the west of the city, and I-696 through the Oakland and Macomb County suburbs to the 
north. The plan also projected the possibility of a further Oakland-Macomb expressway along the 
M-59 corridor, far to the north of I-696.
27
 
The Southeast Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA), created almost 
simultaneously with SEMCOG, had begun to plan for an expanded public transit system, 
including a series of regional rail lines converging on downtown Detroit, that Mayor Young and 
downtown boosters hoped would help to reverse the centrifugal trend. Yet while these routes 
appeared in the transportation plan, there was still no money to make them a reality. A statewide 
transportation ballot measure that would have helped to fund the plan was defeated in November 
1974 after slight majorities opposed the proposal in Oakland and Macomb County.
28
 
In principle, the City of Detroit could have attempted to mobilize opposition,  at 
SEMCOG and through other venues, to put the brakes on further suburban highway construction. 
The city did, in fact, use its leverage with the federal government to raise issues with the 
construction of I-696, whose proposed route skirted the edge of two adjacent city properties 
located in southern Oakland County: the Rackham Golf Course and the Detroit Zoo.
29
 Yet there 
was good reason why Mayor Young did not expend too much political capital battling suburbs 
and the state over suburban expressway construction, since he also relied on them for funding for 
rapid transit, including a Woodward Avenue subway. Instead, the most effective resistance to 
suburban highway construction in the 1970s came from a different quarter: suburban residents 
themselves. 
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Land Preservation in Oakland County: The Revolution That Wasn’t 
 
 Amidst the nationwide growth of the environmental movement, and the continued 
advance of suburban growth, activists across the United States campaigned to conserve rural 
land, including both farmland and natural areas, from the “urban sprawl” that William H. Whyte 
had described a decade earlier.
30
 In an influential 1971 report, President Nixon’s Council on 
Environmental Quality declared that the country was “in the midst of a revolution in the way we 
regulate the use of our land…a quiet revolution…[whose] supporters include both conservatives 
and liberals.” In a number of states and regions, the authors stated, exclusively local control over 
land use was giving way to more comprehensive state systems of land use planning that aimed to 
conserve land “for the use of the region as a whole.”
31
 The metropolitan Detroit area witnessed a 
number of battles over land use in the 1970s. However, these revolts added up to something less 
than a revolution. 
The focus of struggles over development in Detroit were the lakes and wetlands of central 
Oakland County, where Ice Age glaciers had left behind a picturesque landscape of forested 
ridges and shimmering water. The natural beauty of the area had made it a favored location for 
the wealthy since the 1920s, when Sidney Waldon had built his estate at Pine Knob. As postwar 
expressway construction made it increasingly accessible, residential development spilled further 
west from Woodward Avenue. One example was Kent Mathewson’s subdivision on Chablis 
Drive, at the eastern edge of West Bloomfield Township. 
 It was in West Bloomfield that the expansion of highways that had paved the way for 
suburbanization in metropolitan Detroit for half a century would meet the strongest opposition 
they had yet encountered. Janet Lynn was in the first wave of migrants to the area. A native of 
New York’s Upper West Side, she had worked for the Women’s Trade Union League of New 
York and earned a master’s degrees in political science at Johns Hopkins University, where she 
met David Lynn, a medical student from the Detroit area. The Lynns lived for several years in 
Detroit’s Indian Village district in the early 1950s—just blocks from where Mel Ravitz was 
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working to organize the Mack-Concord neighborhood—before joining the growing migration of 
Jewish Detroiters to Oakland County.
32
 They originally looked for a home in Bloomfield 
Township. When they learned that Jews were not welcome there, the Lynns purchased a 30-acre 
alfalfa farm on Middle Belt Road, between 14 Mile and Franklin, at a time when the surrounding 
township of West Bloomfield was entirely rural.
33
 While raising four children, Janet Lynn also 
took an active role in suburban civic life. She volunteered with the League of Women Voters and 
helped to found Temple Kol Ami, a new Reform synagogue with progressive social ideals.
34
 
 In the early 1970s, Lynn joined the growing number of American suburbanites, 
influenced by the environmental movement, who were launching local battles for land 
preservation.
35
 One catalyst for her activism was the Lynns’ divorce, which prompted David 
Lynn to sell most of the thirty acres to developers. Janet Lynn continued to live in what a 
reporter called a “charming fieldstone and clapboard house”—now on just “six wooded acres 
jammed between two new subdivisions”
36
—and she feared that far more development was to 
come. In 1972, Lynn and her newly founded organization, the Citizens Council for Land Use 
Research and Education (CCLURE or CLURE), hosted William H. Whyte, who had helped 
popularize the term “urban sprawl” fifteen years earlier, as the keynote speaker at a conference 
addressing the question “Do the Laws Secure Our Land?”
37
 They quickly moved into action 
against a proposal by developer A. Alfred Taubman for a regional shopping center at the corner 
of Halsted and Maple Roads in the southwestern corner of West Bloomfield. Despite an 
aggressive advertising campaign by Taubman in favor of the center, CLURE mobilized hundreds 
of area residents to convince the West Bloomfield Township Planning Commission to block the 
project, citing what Lynn called its “domino effect” on surrounding land.
38
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 Despite the victory in West Bloomfield, however, another major shopping center was 
soon approved just a few miles away in the adjacent city of Novi. Lynn spoke out against the 
proposal, but CLURE’s membership did not include any Novi residents, limiting the group’s 
ability to stop the project. Lynn was mindful that her organization might be viewed as 
“meddlers,” but she warned that “a regional shopping center will have a regional impact.”
39
 By 
1976, the steel framework of the new Twelve Oaks mall—partially owned by Taubman, with 
parking for 6,000 cars and over a million square feet of retail space—was emerging off Interstate 
96, heralding the metropolitan area’s “westward surge.”
40
 
CLURE and allied groups enjoyed more success in another fight on their home turf of 
West Bloomfield: halting the state’s proposed extension of Northwestern Highway, which would 
have cut an eight-mile swath across the township, and the construction of M-275, a northern 
extension of the I-275 ring road which would have paralleled the township’s western border en 
route to a connection with I-75 north of Pontiac. CLURE took advantage of the recently passed 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and similar state reforms to require that the state 
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for the highways. After Lynn and her band of 
activists mobilized local opposition by distributing mimeographed flyers and making phone 
calls, both projects were cancelled by the state in 1977.
41
 
In some respects, local control of land use planning had facilitated local efforts at land 
preservation in places like West Bloomfield. Mobilizing a broader metropolitan campaign 
against sprawl, however, was considerably more difficult. Furthermore, for affluent suburbanites 
whose primary concern was defending their own backyards, local control of land use meant that 
such a broader effort was not necessary. 
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Figure 4.4a, 4.4b, and 4.4c. The Citizens Council for Land Use Research and Education 
(CLURE), founded by West Bloomfield Township resident Janet Lynn (a), managed to 
defeat  two major developments in the township: developer A. Alfred Taubman’s plan for a 
regional shopping center (b) and the Michigan Department of Transportation proposed 
extension of Northwestern Highway (c). Jewish Historical Society of Michigan; Detroit Free 
Press. 
 
 To be sure, some land use activists, including Lynn, did link their work to the fate of 
central cities like Detroit. “If we can persuade realtors not to build on open land, but on the 
destroyed, dilapidated shambles of our cities, we’ll all be helping each other,” said a homeowner 
in Franklin, an exclusive enclave near West Bloomfield whose voters approved the purchase of 
four acres of land to stop a proposed commercial development. Growth management legislation 
also won support from leaders in inner-ring suburbs, like state representative Philip Mastin of 
Hazel Park. Mastin warned that “overdevelopment” could turn both Detroit and older suburbs 
into “ghost towns,” forced to “continue providing public services with a dramatically diminished 
tax base.”
42
 In 1977, the Detroit Coordinating Council on Human Relations held its annual 
conference on the theme of “The Enemy: Metropolitan Sprawl,” with Detroit Representative Bill 
Ryan as its keynote speaker. “Unless sprawl is promptly checked by city residents, 
conservationists, farmers, and suburbanites acting together, the quality of life throughout the 
entire region may be irreparably damaged,” warned Council chairperson Richard H. Lobethal.
43
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 By the late 1970s, however, whatever tentative beginnings existed of the coalition against 
sprawl urged by people like Lobethal and Jim Bush were little match for the long-established 
partnership of suburban developers, road agencies, and local officials seeking to grow their 
communities’ tax base. Moreover, the region’s corporate leadership was accelerating the 
abandonment of the central city. In 1972, the Kresge (later Kmart) Corporation vacated its stately 
Albert Kahn-designed building on Cass Park near downtown Detroit for a 40-acre office park in 
suburban Troy. The following year, George Romney’s American Motors Corporation, long 
based on Detroit’s west side, announced it was constructing a new headquarters in Southfield. 
The massive Renaissance Center in downtown Detroit, funded by Henry Ford II, took shape as 
Ford also sold off land for a new suburban shopping mall, hotel and office complex on the old 
Ford Fairlane estate in Dearborn, and as the company continued to decentralize production from 
its River Rouge facility to new plants in southern Wayne County and northern Macomb. 
 The more enduring legacy of the 1970s was not the land use revolution but the “Reagan 
Revolution,” as a new generation of suburban elected officials worked out winning combinations 
of pro-development boosterism and the populist politics of cross-class white grievance, a kind of 
racial capitalism of the cul-de-sac supported by federal expenditures on highways and housing. It 
was fitting that the 1980 Republican National Convention was held at Cobo Hall in Detroit, 
named for the conservative mayor who had won the votes of white working-class voters to defeat 
his union-backed opponent thirty years earlier. Among Reagan’s most enthusiastic backers in 
Michigan, in fact, were two members of the Oakland County Road Commission who were 
engaged in battling Mayor Young’s subway proposal and heartened by Reagan’s opposition to 
further capital spending on mass transit. One of the casualties of the November election was a 
leading Oakland County environmentalist, state representative Alice Tomboulian of Oakland 
Township, whose opponent had denounced her support of the subway project.
44
 Her colleague 
Philip Mastin of Hazel Park, who had warned that sprawl’s effects would ultimately undermine 
the tax base of older suburbs, was recalled by his constituents in 1983 after voting for an income 
tax increase.
45
 The Reagan era also brought a halt to contemplated expansion of federal authority 
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for regional planning. The president’s 1981 budget slashed funding for regional planning 
agencies, he issued an executive order rescinding Circular A-95, ending the process of regional 
clearinghouse review and leaving transportation planning as metropolitan planning 




The Regional Development Initiative 
 
 In the late 1980s, the proposal for another major regional mall in Oakland County 
prompted SEMCOG leadership to attempt their most vigorous effort yet to challenge sprawl and 
disinvestment. An out-of-state developer’s plan to construct a massive “mega-mall” called 
Auburn Mills, off I-75 just north of Pontiac, had managed to unite a wide range of opponents, 
including environmentalists; residents of Lake Angelus, a tiny municipality of million-dollar 
lakefront homes just to the west of the proposed mall site; and officials in older suburbs who 
feared Auburn Mills would doom older shopping centers, like Southfield’s Northland Center and 
Waterford Township’s Summit Place, just as that first generation of malls had gutted downtown 
Detroit and Pontiac. In what the Detroit News editorial page called “an unprecedented move,” 
SEMCOG commissioned a regional impact study on the effects of the project.
47
 In the end, 
however, SEMCOG’s Executive Committee voted to approve designation of access roads to the 
mall site as eligible for federal aid, following an “emotional” debate in which Detroit City 
Council President Erma Henderson said the city could not afford further suburbanization.
48
 
“You don’t have to be a deep environmentalist or an anti-capitalist to be disgusted by the 
mega-mall in Auburn Hills,” wrote News columnist George Cantor. “It is wrong, destructive and 
a part of me would like gas prices to shoot through the roof so its developers can sit there and 
look at their empty parking lots for the next 20 years…Unfortunately, we can’t change the way 
we live just by pointing out how dumb it is.”
49
 SEMCOG director John Amberger, however, was 
convinced the time had come to try. 
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 Amberger’s personal experience probably helped to inform his decision to take a stand on 
sprawl and disinvestment. The son of immigrants from Germany, Amberger had spent part of his 
childhood on their 80-acre apple orchard in Farmington Township, at the corner of Twelve Mile 
and Haggerty Road, before the family sold the farm and moved to a neighborhood on Detroit’s 
east side, near the Michigan State Fairgrounds. For most of his tenure as SEMCOG director, 
Amberger lived in the northwest Detroit neighborhood of Rosedale Park, a leafy oasis off Grand 
River Avenue home to a tight-knit community of residents, including civic leaders like Mel 
Ravitz.
50
 Rosedale Parkers tended to pride themselves on their commitment to racially integrated 
living in Detroit, even as the city’s broader struggles increasingly encroached on their security.
51
 
The Amberger family had their car stolen multiple times over the course of their years in the 
neighborhood, and when Amberger became eligible for a SEMCOG vehicle, his wife urged him 
not to purchase one that might draw unwanted attention.
52
 
 By the fall of 1990, Amberger had been at SEMCOG for nearly two decades, and felt he 
had developed a strong rapport with local elected officials and the media. He convened a small 
task of regional leaders, much as the Metropolitan Fund had 40 years earlier, who included 
representatives of Mayor Young and Oakland County Executive Daniel Murphy, state 
government officials, business leaders, and the presidents of New Detroit, Inc. and the Detroit 
NAACP. They would be the steering committee for SEMCOG’s “Regional Development 
Initiative,” a year-long process of trend projection and issue area workshops on the future of the 
metropolitan area, which had as its goal “the development of policy alternatives that might result 
in a more desired future.”
 53
 
 The “trend future” scenario foreseen by SEMCOG analysts predicted that without 
changes in “business as usual,” the region’s developed area would increase 40% by 2010, despite 
only 6% population growth. (From 1950 to 1980, the region’s urbanized area had doubled, while 
population increased at less than half that rate.) Sprawl at the metropolitan periphery would bring 
further decline in older cities, particularly Detroit, which was projected to shrink by over 
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200,000 residents by 2010.
54
 As jobs decentralized, vehicle miles travelled—the total amount of 
driving—would continue to increase, having already jumped one-third from 1980 to 1987. 
Traffic congestion would worsen, as would air pollution, as increases in vehicle miles travelled 
overwhelmed gains in fuel efficiency.
55
 Segregation would continue, and racial and economic 
disparities would continue to increase, the study predicted, fulfilling the warnings of the Kerner 
Commission.
56
 Indeed, SEMCOG concluded, “[r]acial discrimination has been, is and likely will 




SEMCOG followed the analysis of future trends with an extensive process of public outreach, 
giving 150 presentations to a variety of local officials and organizations.
58
 “When we got to the 
very end,” Amberger recalled, “we were in the process of doing the final report, the public issue, 
and the question was: What sort of language should we couch this in? Should it be provocative? 
Should it be weasel words? Should it be careful?” Ultimately, the decision was made to use “the 
strongest possible terms,” in hopes that the report would serve as a “wake-up call.”
59
 
The RDI report recommended a variety of possible solutions to the metropolitan 
dilemma. They included a regional review process for major developments, similar to that used 
for the Auburn Mills mall; improving public transit; requiring impact fees for suburban 
development; and shifting away from the property tax as the primary means for funding local 
government and schools, given the inequities it fostered. The report noted that Birmingham in 
Oakland County, for example, raised over five times as much funding per pupil in local property 
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Figure 4.5.  SEMCOG’s Regional Development Initiative projected further sprawl (blue) 
through the year 2010 and beyond unless the region took action to change prevailing patterns of 
growth. SEMCOG, “The ‘Business as Usual’ Trend Future: The Data Base,” prepared for the 
Regional Development Initiative Oversight Committee, January 1991, 120. 
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 Amberger and his staff were unprepared for the scale of the reaction that followed. The 
Oakland County Board of Commissioners took the lead in denouncing the Regional 
Development Initiative, beginning by recalling all their delegates to SEMCOG except County 
Executive Daniel Murphy, who had suffered a stroke the previous year.  Commissioner Jack 
Olsen expressed fears that the RDI would lead to “more cash transfers to the city of Detroit,” as 
well as loss of local control. “This isn’t the first time they’ve tried this,” he added, citing the 
1970s proposals for regional government. It was time, he suggested, that Oakland County re-




The Board of Commissioners issued Freedom of Information Act requests for the sum 
total of SEMCOG’s proceedings on the RDI and put Amberger “on trial,” as he later put it, with 
six consecutive weeks of interrogatory hearings. “It was ugly,” Amberger reflected. “But as 
strategy, it was such a good idea.”
62
 According to Amberger, the commissioners may have voted 
to pull Oakland County out of SEMCOG and forced his resignation if not for the sympathetic 
response of Oakland County city managers. Many of them were already contending with tight 
municipal budgets as development bypassed their communities for outlying townships, and 




 In a summary of the Regional Development Initiative for the journal Planning Practice & 
Research, Amberger expressed hope that the project might represent a step towards transforming 
metropolitan development. “For us it is not whether we will adopt a more rational land 
development policy, it’s a question of when it will happen,” he wrote. Amberger acknowledged 
that “many are prospering in this rather helter-skelter development process,” and cited the 
challenges under the political landscape of Reaganism: 
We are a nation that has never had a national urban policy and considers a 
national industrial policy as subversive, and for the last three presidential 
elections we have supported candidates promulgating ‘less government’ as a 
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Nonetheless, to those who suggested that public planning was “subversive” or “un-American,” 
he quoted the apocryphal words of Chief Seattle, and the fact that indigenous Americans had 




The Regional Development Initiative, however, was largely dead in the water by the time 
the final report was released in 1993. The SEMCOG Executive Committee voted to strip the 
report’s original recommendation that tax base sharing be given “special consideration,” and 
Amberger was compelled to append a point-by-point rebuttal of various “misperceptions” of the 
RDI, such as its supposed claim that “[p]eople moving to the suburban fringe are racists.”
66
 
Detroit News columnist Chuck Moss, while sympathetic to growth management and transit 
investment, complained that “SEMCOG had exerted no real leadership,” and mocked its 
“scolding advice to return to inner city Detroit—as if the exodus wasn’t driven by the desire to 
get away from Old Detroit’s crime, crime, mismanagement, and more crime.”
 67
 One night not 
long after the release of the Regional Development Initiative report, one of Amberger’s 
neighbors confronted someone who was attempting to steal the tires off Amberger’s car. The 
would-be thief shot at the neighbor, who shot back. Several bullets struck the Ambergers’ home, 
one near the bedroom window, and the Ambergers decided the time had come to leave Detroit, 
moving to the suburb of Livonia.
68
 
Despite the rallying of the Oakland County city managers, moreover, there was relatively 
little pushback on RDI opponents from other elected officials. After all, as Moss noted, Detroit 
Mayor Coleman Young was nearing retirement after twenty years. Moss argued that Oakland 
County, not Detroit, was now “Southeastern Michigan’s 900-pound gorilla—especially,” he 
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Triumph of the Sprawlers 
 
 Political leadership in the metropolitan region had not shifted, as Kent Mathewson had 
urged twenty years prior, from the mayor of Detroit to the chairman of SEMCOG. Instead, 
fulfilling Edward Connor’s older hope of empowering county government in the era of 
suburbanization, it had increasingly migrated to the new position of County Executive. Oakland 
County had been the first in the region to take advantage of state enabling legislation to re-
organize its structure of government and elect its first County Executive, Daniel Murphy, in 
1974. Yet Murphy was a product of an older era in county government. Appointed county 
register of deeds in 1956, he was fundamentally an “administrator,” in the words of News 
columnist Moss. As his participation in the Regional Development Initiative suggested, he 




 L. Brooks Patterson, by contrast, had rarely been accused of forbearance. Patterson had 
been raised in North Rosedale Park, where he continued to reside through his graduation from 
the University of Detroit law school in 1967. After moving to Oakland County, he decided to 
fight the Pontiac school busing case for Irene McCabe’s National Action Group and quickly 
capitalized on the potential in the politics of white grievance newly salient in Oakland County, 
winning election to the office of Oakland County Prosecutor on a “law-and-order” platform.
71
  
Described by Free Press columnist Hugh McDiarmid as a “clever, witty, usually irreverent, life-
of-the-party type,” Patterson kept a miniature electric chair on his desk—he twice ran for 
governor on a platform of reinstating capital punishment in Michigan—and gained national 
attention for the facility with which he expressed the widely shared suburban antipathy towards 
his native city and its black political leadership. “I don’t give a damn about Detroit,” Patterson 
told one journalist. “It has no direct bearing on the quality of my life,” he explained, comparing 
the fate of Detroiters to that of “Indians on the reservation”: “Those who can will leave Detroit. 
Those who can’t will get blankets and food from the government men in the city.”
72
 As Patterson 
prepared a run for County Executive, even admirers like McDiarmid suggested he might 
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consider moderating his rhetoric: the use of the term “taxjacking,” for example, to equate the 
reform of local government dependence on the property tax, and the amelioration of resulting 
inequalities, with having one’s vehicle stolen at gunpoint.
73
 
Patterson was elected County Executive in 1992, and immediately declared a new era of 
suburban hegemony. “I intend to move past Coleman Young as a regional leader,” he said. 
“Oakland County is the epicenter of activity in the region.”
74
 During the economic boom of the 
1990s, and even into the 2000s, as the region’s economy faltered, the metropolitan area 
continued to sprawl along the lines that the Regional Development Initiative had predicted. 
Through the mechanism of state government, some reforms to the structure of localist structures 
did occur, particularly where they also benefited rural Michigan jurisdictions, and Patterson even 
lent grudging support to the passage of a dedicated, albeit limited, property tax to sustain a 
limited level of suburban bus service.
75
 
Given the new landscape of power in the region, however, and the experience of the 
Regional Development Initiative, SEMCOG staff made no further attempts to challenge the 
prevailing pattern of regional growth. The Auburn Mills megamall project, after stalling in the 
early 1990s economic downturn, was resuscitated by A. Alfred Taubman’s Taubman Companies 
and finally opened in November 1998. Two weeks earlier, the thirty-three-story structure of the 
flagship J.L. Hudson’s department store, shuttered for a quarter-century, had been imploded from 
within to be replaced by a parking lot.  
John Amberger retired the same year, succeeded by his longtime deputy Paul Tait, who 
had borne much of the backlash against the RDI.
76
 Not surprisingly, given his predecessor’s 
experience, Tait was less than sympathetic to activists who charged his organization with 
complicity in the decline of Detroit and inner-ring suburbs. “SEMCOG needs consensus to move 
things forward,” he argued, emphasizing that the organization’s role was not “telling people what  
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Figure 4.6. L. Brooks Patterson with members of the National Action Group (NAG) in the 
early 1970s. Jessica McLean, “Remembering L. Brooks Patterson, in photos,” Dearborn 
Press & Guide, August 3, 2019, https://www.pressandguide.com/multimedia/remembering-l-
brooks-patterson-in-photos/collection, accessed October 1, 2020. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Oakland County Executive Patterson (right) with Michigan Governor John 
Engler at a May 1, 2000 press conference for Engler’s “Build Michigan III” highway 
initiative, with map showing proposed road projects in Oakland County. “L. Brooks 
Patterson through the years,” Detroit Free Press, March 26, 2019, 
https://www.freep.com/picture-gallery/news/local/michigan/oakland/2019/03/26/l-brooks-
patterson-pictures/3276632002/, accessed October 2, 2020. 
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to do,” since SEMCOG lacked the power to implement regional plans. “Widely divergent 
positions on any SEMCOG plan or policy means it will not be implemented.” In practice, such a 
process of “consensus” typically meant that the most powerful actors prevailed.
77
 
 In an essay titled “Sprawl, Schmall: Give Me More Development,” published in 2003 in 
the Michigan Real Estate Journal, Patterson outlined a view of suburban development in sharp 
contrast to the Regional Development Initiative’s conclusions. His philosophy of suburban 
development framed it as an expression of market ideology, or what Patterson, paraphrasing 
Milton Friedman, called the “freedom to choose.” 
I love sprawl.  I need it.  I promote it.  Oakland County can't get enough of it.  Are 
you getting the picture? 
  
Sprawl is not evil. In fact, it is good. It is the inevitable result of a free people 
exercising their cherished, constitutionally protected rights as individuals to  
pursue their dreams when choosing where to live, where to work, where to 




This claim—contrasting a supposedly laissez-faire process of sprawl to the specter of land use 
regulations “turning local control over to state government planners”—erased nearly a century of 
government planning for suburbanization, from the inter-county highway commissions of the 
early 20
th
 century to the infrastructure investment that Oakland County continued to demand 
from Lansing. In his 2000 State of the County address, Patterson had summarized his highway 
expansion demands to state government, demands he argued were justified by Oakland County’s 
status as the “golden goose” providing nearly one-fifth of Michigan’s tax revenue. “Widen our 
expressways, widen our surface roads, fix our potholes,” he urged. “The only thing that threatens 
our economy is a road system that is so congested that it postpones business expansion or, worse 
yet, drives business away.”
79
 
 Patterson specifically rejected claims that unrestrained suburbanization might be to blame 
for the woes of central cities like Detroit. Saturated with the ostensibly “color-blind” rhetoric of 
homeowner protection, taxpayers’ rights, public safety and “neighborhood schools” that had 
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driven white politics in the region from the 1940s onward, his account suggested that 
suburbanites were the real victims. 
The anti-American Dreamers would have you believe that suburban growth is at 
the root of all problems that beset our cities, both in Michigan and across our 
country.  They seem to believe that citizens left thriving cities, and that it was 
their departure that caused high crime, high taxes, invisible public services, and 
failing public school systems. 
 
Anybody who believes that line of thinking is taking denial to a whole new level. 
Sprawl did not cause the decline of the cities. Cities declined because they 
squandered their assets. High crime rates, high taxes, failing schools, foul air and 
a lack of open green spaces forced people to move. 
 
Sprawlers, like me, simply wanted a home with green grass on a safe, well 
maintained street, a quality neighborhood school that actually educated their 
children, a good job, nearby parks and recreational spaces, and a local 
government that actually delivers the services their taxes paid for. In other words, 
they wanted a place like today's Oakland County. 
 
As Patterson had said before, suburbanites owed the city nothing. They were not oppressors but 
refugees, “forced” to flee in their pursuit of the American Dream. 
Patterson closed his case for suburban innocence with a final twist of the knife, aimed at 
wealthy suburban advocates of growth regulation. 
[T]he next time somebody rubs your face in the word sprawl, take a long, hard 
look at that person.  Too often you will see some limousine liberal who long ago 
fled our cities. Now, they want others to go back and take their place. They want 
to use the power of government to force you back into a city, or a neighborhood, 
or a housing type they chose not to live in themselves. They want to force you 
back to the city to help purge themselves of their perceived sin of abandonment. 
 
Whatever the merit of Patterson’s speculations on anti-sprawl psychology, his description of the 
class character of such activism was not entirely groundless. The revolt against mall and 
expressway development in West Bloomfield could, in some cases, form an elite variation of the 
same kind of protectionist ethos that led Warren residents to battle affordable housing and 
Pontiac mothers to rise up against busing.
80
 
Yet some of the land preservationists, including Janet Lynn, Alice Tomboulian, and 
Philip Mastin, had in fact linked their advocacy to a more comprehensive analysis of the 
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metropolitan dilemma. They argued that suburbanization was driving the hollowing-out of the 
urban core and the neighborhood effects that Patterson claimed “forced people to move.” By the 
time Patterson penned his essay, however, the electoral careers of Tomboulian and Mastin were a 
distant memory. Both had been swept out of office by the same politics of white suburban 
grievance that had brought Patterson to power. In tandem with the market ideology that 
increasingly dominated the rhetoric of both parties at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the 
triumph of that nominally color-blind but deeply racialized politics—a politics that obscured the 
divergent implications of continued suburbanization on places as different as Warren and West 





Conclusion: Towards Reparative Regionalism 
 
On June 23, 2017, a month before the 50
th
 anniversary of the 1967 conflagration, a major 
new exhibit on those events opened inside the Detroit Historical Museum, a concrete structure on 
Woodward Avenue that Mayor Albert Cobo had helped to open in 1951.
1
 The exhibit marked a 
bold step for an institution best known for its “Streets of Old Detroit” exhibit, a nostalgic 
underground simulacrum of the 19
th
-century city. Some people asked why the museum would 
even try to address the events of 1967, or “pull a scab off an old wound,” as one individual 
accused project director Marlowe Stoudamire of doing.
2
 Despite such misgivings, the exhibit 




The following January, another, much smaller exhibit opened across the hall, celebrating 
“50 years of success” in regional planning and governance. To mark its silver anniversary, the 
Southeast Michigan Council of Governments had filled the museum’s temporary exhibition 
space with a variety of data and maps, along with a few artifacts, like old TALUS reports, and a 
mailbox that invited visitors to “send us a postcard from the future.” A historical series of aerial 
photographs showed the gradual colonization of downtown Detroit by sports arenas and parking 
lots;  another, the transformation of distant Brighton, near the interchange of US-23 and I-96 in 
Livingston County some fifty miles from the museum, from a diminutive farm town into a 
sprawling constellation of retail “super-centers.”The exhibit was relatively light on narrative 
interpretation; it was left to visitors to gauge the nature of SEMCOG’s “success” from the 
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materials at hand. Neither the SEMCOG exhibit nor the Detroit ’67 exhibit made any reference 
to one another. 
This dissertation has argued, in contrast, that the two stories cannot be separated. The 
history of regional planning and governance in Detroit must be understood in reference to the 
political transformations that occurred in the fifty years after World War Two: transformations in 
the geography of power in the metropolitan Detroit region, and transformations in national 
politics as well. Both originated in the pattern of segregated suburbanization that federal policy 
fostered from the New Deal onwards, and although they were already developing before the 
urban rebellions of the 1960s, their ramifications grew increasingly evident in the wake of those 
events. Furthermore, a full evaluation of the aftermath of the rebellion and the rise of black 
political power in Detroit must take into account the trajectory of metropolitan politics in the 
decades that followed, including the rise of a suburban political regime that largely rejected 
public investment in the central city and its people, while promoting the continued development 
of the metropolitan fringe at the expense of Detroit and, increasingly, older suburbs as well.
4
 
By viewing the development of SEMCOG in this broader context, we can better 
understand why metropolitan planning organizations have not resolved the American 
metropolitan dilemma of sprawling, inequitable suburbanization. This study began with the 
question of whether MPOs have simply been too weak to substantively alter this trajectory; 
whether they have lacked the political will to do so; or whether both factors have contributed. 
The preceding history supports the third interpretation. SEMCOG’s limited authority and lack of 
political will to address the metropolitan dilemma have been mutually reinforcing. As a result, if 
MPOs are to play a more meaningful role in resolving the metropolitan dilemma, this must occur 
through a combination of structural change to expand MPO authority and political change to set 
MPOs on a course towards “reparative regionalism,” instead of sprawl and inequality. 
It is instructive to compare the case of Detroit with that of Portland, Oregon. Margaret 
Weir has described the gradual development of regional planning and governance in Portland—
culminating in the nation’s only elected regional government—as the culmination of a “virtuous 
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cycle” in which “policy and politics reinforced one another.” Early metropolitan planning and 
governance efforts led to the formation of a Metropolitan Planning Commission in 1957 and a 
council of governments in 1966. A broad coalition for land preservation passed state laws in 
1973 that empowered that COG with the authority to set an urban growth boundary. In 1978, 
voters approved the replacement of the COG with a new, directly elected Metropolitan Services 
District. This organization, whose inauguration Kent Mathewson attended during his recovery 
from his heart attack in Detroit, was ultimately granted home rule status as “Metro” in 1992.
5
 
When Kent Mathewson arrived in Detroit in the mid-1960s, it was possible to imagine 
that Detroit might follow a similar course. In effect, the Metropolitan Fund was an effort to 
further the kind of “virtuous cycle” Weir describes, building on the work of the region’s 
pioneering metropolitan institutions: the Regional Planning Commission and Supervisors Inter-
County Committee. Despite their limited formal authority, these organizations were nonetheless 
influential in an era when suburban political leadership was in its infancy; when the desirability 
of suburban growth was widely accepted as a positive by the region’s political and economic 
leadership; and so long as they made no effort to alter the exclusionary terms of the process of 
suburbanization. 
Over the course of the 1960s, however, the definition of the problems to be solved by 
regional planning and governance shifted. Wendell Pritchett has made this argument with regard 
to national policy, and this dissertation has shown that it holds for metropolitan Detroit as well.
6
 
The Regional Planning Commission and SICC viewed their primary tasks as managing suburban 
growth and facilitating collective action by the panoply of new local governments. As late as 
1963, when General Motors President Jack Gordon told Kent Mathewson that his task was to 
solve Detroit’s “metropolitan problem,” he probably understood the task in similar terms. Yet in 
the ensuing years, as the black freedom struggle moved North and black political power grew in 
cities like Detroit, the most pressing “metropolitan problem” became the so-called “urban crisis,” 
and specifically the problem of racial segregation and inequality. Particularly after the 1965 
uprising in Watts, the “metropolitan problem” increasingly came to be understood as intertwined 
with the American dilemma of racism, as a crisis in black and white. 
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The extent to which this was the case, however, varied from city to city. In Portland, 
where the black population was comparatively miniscule, racial segregation and inequality were 
largely nonissues in debates over metropolitan planning and governance.
7
 In Detroit, where the 
central city was fast approaching a black majority and the suburbs remained almost exclusively 
white, they became the dominant issues. As various elements of the federal government and 
some local leaders broached the possibility of metropolitan desegregation, the concept of 
planning and governance across jurisdictional lines became particularly threatening to the 
region’s white suburban residents. As white political opposition to black equality mounted, in the 
Detroit suburbs and across the nation, Detroit’s emerging black political leadership increasingly 
saw control of the central city as its best hope for securing some level of power. “Hollow prize” 
it may have been, in some respects, but the possibility of other prizes seemed dim when George 
Wallace had won Michigan’s Democratic primary election. In this reactionary atmosphere, 
practically no black elected official, not even longtime Metropolitan Fund trustee Richard 
Austin, could in good conscience endorse any proposal that required Detroit to cede control to 
the wider region. 
Perhaps SEMCOG would have weathered the storm more successfully if it had been 
established a few years earlier, and developed a constituency that extended beyond local elected 
officials. As it was, the initial weakness of the organization—including its heavy reliance on 
locally generated, voluntarily approved funds prior to the 1973 federal transportation bill—
sapped any political will its leaders had to take bold action on metropolitan problems. Like its 
predecessors, SEMCOG could only function effectively by broad consensus, and in the turbulent 
political context, such a consensus proved elusive. Mel Ravitz’s shifting position captured the 
organization’s conundrum: as he warned in 1968, SEMCOG risked irrelevance if it failed to 
tackle “tough social issues,” yet as he soon realized, it also jeopardized its survival if it did. 
The “virtuous cycle” of expanding influence for SEMCOG thus came to a halt almost 
before it began. To the extent that such a cycle eroded local authority, many of its members had 
come to see that prospect as less virtuous than vicious.  SEMCOG finally came into its own, 
ironically enough, by opposing measures to strengthen its own authority , even as federal 
regulations finally granted metropolitan planning organizations defined (albeit limited) authority 
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and a stable source of funding. Meanwhile, with the adoption of its new optional unified form of 
government, headed by a County Executive, in 1973, Oakland County led the way towards the 
establishment of county government, not SEMCOG, as a formidable new political force 
dominated by the white suburban majority. 
As a result, it was not until nearly a quarter-century after the agency’s creation that 
SEMCOG staff, with the tacit support of County Executives McNamara and Murphy, attempted 
to convene a regional reckoning with the costs of continued suburbanization and disinvestment: 
the Regional Development Initiative. If not for the loss of SEMCOG’s leading allies in Oakland 
County—Governor Blanchard and County Executive Murphy—the Initiative might have met a 
different response. As it was, the blowback from Oakland County, and the replacement of 
Blanchard and Murphy by distinctly less sympathetic successors, ensured SEMCOG would not 
dare to repeat the effort for at least another quarter-century. Once again, in the context of the 
agency’s limited authority and influence, SEMCOG’s leaders believed they faced a choice 
between their attempts to address the metropolitan dilemma and their own organizational 
survival. Once again, they chose the latter. 
Psychologists have described a condition of “learned helplessness” that can befall 
individuals faced with adverse events seemingly outside their ability to control. Recent research 
suggests that this condition is not necessarily “learned” but instead forms a default response, an 
“unlearned reaction,” which can also be reinforced over time through repeated shocks.
8
 The story 
of SEMCOG suggests that this condition can befall organizations as well as individuals. 
As SEMCOG treaded water, however, other units of government did not stand still. In 
2008, when Macomb County became the last of the region’s three most populous counties to 
adopt a county executive form of government, the transformation of metropolitan political 
leadership was complete—not from the mayor of Detroit to the chair of SEMCOG, as Kent 
Mathewson had once urged, but to the so-called “Big Four” of the mayor of Detroit and the three 
County Executives, of whom L. Brooks Patterson, at the helm of Oakland County’s suburban 
growth machine, was probably the most influential. The 2013 appointment of a state “emergency 
manager” for the city, superseding local elected officials, and the election that November of 
Mike Duggan—protégé of longtime Wayne County Executive Edward McNamara—took this 
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transition a step further.
9
 As Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, acting through emergency 
manager Kevyn Orr, took the city of Detroit through Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings—and 
reorganized the governance of water and public transit in the region—it was with the “Big Four” 
that negotiations were conducted, but in a context where the Mayor of Detroit’s formal authority 
had been largely eliminated.
10
 SEMCOG played at best a marginal role in these events, which 
may shape the future of the region for decades to come. 
 
More comparative research into the history of various metropolitan planning 
organizations is necessary before the story of SEMCOG can be generalized. Yet while Detroit’s 
metropolitan dilemma and the weakness of its MPO are in some respects particularly acute, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that SEMCOG’s history is not unusual.
11
 It is instead the “Portland 
exception” that tends to prove the American rule: weak metropolitan planning organizations that 
have rarely dared to take initiative to confront sprawl and inequality, even as associated crises 
intensify. If MPOs are to be a force for positive regional change in the next fifty years, as Gian-
Claudia Sciara has urged, planners, policymakers, and the public must reckon with the record of 
MPOs over the previous five decades, and take corrective action, both to strengthen MPO 
authority and to push MPOs towards a “reparative regionalism” agenda.
12
 
MPOs today have more authority under federal law than they did when they were 
created, but not by much. More than 25 years have passed since the last major expansion of 
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MPO powers under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA), which granted 
MPOs some additional authority over specified funding sources and required that their regional 
plans be fiscally constrained. Yet despite these measures, most MPOs still “have not developed 
substantial institutional autonomy” with respect to states and local governments.
13
 The history of 
SEMCOG’s Regional Development Initiative demonstrates the costs: a reform agenda held 
hostage by wealthy suburban jurisdictions. Providing MPOs with more authority to allocate 
federal funding would be a first step towards expanding their powers. State action to provide 
MPOs with taxation authority, and perhaps even to establish independently elected governing 
boards, would further increase their independence. 
Simply giving MPOs more authority, however, does not guarantee that MPOs will use it 
to plan for more equitable, less sprawling regions. There are several possible approaches to 
substantively shift MPO policy. A federal mandate to ensure proportionate representation in 
MPO governance is long overdue, as many scholars have argued.
14
 Coupled with stronger MPO 
authority, this might contribute to more equitable policy outcomes, but it is unlikely to be 
transformative, given most MPOs’ longstanding attachment to consensus-based decision-
making.
15
 Federal or state mandates for MPOs to plan for particular outcomes—such as reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions and diminished segregation—are a logical next step, although they 
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Ultimately, the surest path to generating political will for MPOs—and other units of 
government
17
—to confront the metropolitan dilemma may lie in bottom-up organizing to change 
the substance, and not merely the structure, of metropolitan politics. As this history suggests, 
MPOs are in many respects remnants of a bygone political era, vestigial structures forged amidst 
the last gasps of postwar American liberalism. In many respects, the unraveling of regional 
reform in Detroit embodies the shortcomings of that political tradition: its protagonists’ 
overreliance on a corporate leadership largely indifferent, at best, to liberal goals; their failure to 
grapple earlier with the racial and economic inequality wrought by New Deal policy; and their 
inability to articulate a convincing alternative to the local mobilizations, in defense of white 
suburban privilege and black central city sovereignty, that emerged in that fragmented political 
landscape.
18
 Ira Katznelson wrote that the politics of “community control” of neighborhoods in 
the late 1960s ultimately detracted from a broader movement for redistributive politics across 
these “city trenches.” 
Resolving the metropolitan dilemma, then, may require the revival of liberalism itself, 
and specifically the kind of populist liberalism that concerned itself with inequality and 
envisioned a meaningful role for government in redressing it. In retrospect, it seems clear that the 
“new regionalism” of the late 1990s and early 2000s—expounded by former Albuquerque mayor 
David Rusk and Minnesota state legislator Myron Orfield, with support from the Ford 
Foundation, Brookings Institution, and other philanthropies—faced an uphill battle in the context 
of a conservative national political landscape that was, in considerable part, the outcome of a 
growing bipartisan rejection of responsibility for the metropolitan dilemma. The era of big 
government was over, or at any rate, the welfare state was yielding to the carceral state. Orfield 
might argue that “all communities are winners when it comes to regionalism.” Yet in fact, 
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Orfield’s agenda was inherently redistributive, and the primary kind of redistribution in vogue in 
this era was the enrichment of the already rich.
19
 
 As we enter the third decade of the twenty-first century, however, there are some 
encouraging signs. Since 2008, skyrocketing economic inequality has become ever more difficult 
to ignore, and liberals, at least, have largely abandoned the notion that the United States is a 
“post-racial” society.
20
 The Great Recession, climate crisis, and global pandemic have convinced 
many Americans that there are decided disadvantages in ceding public life to corporate power, 
and that certain forms of democratic planning may be preferable to a planet “managed by the 
markets.” Even in metropolitan Detroit, there are glimmers of possibility on the horizon. In the 
Oakland County suburb of Troy, whose city fathers spearheaded the opposition to SEMCOG 50 
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Figure C.1. Demonstrators march in the Oakland County suburb of Troy on June 6, 2020. 
“Peaceful protest held in Troy one of many in Oakland County this weekend,” The 
Oakland Press, June 6, 2020, https://www.theoaklandpress.com/news/peaceful-protest-held-




years earlier, a recent high school graduate led a Black Lives Matter march of more than one 
thousand people down the Big Beaver Road.
21
 A new “reparative regionalism” will not emerge 
overnight or without struggle, but we may hope that the generation to come will refuse to remain 
prisoners of the metropolitan dilemma. 
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